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Abstract 
 
In Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate (Zohar, 2000; 2003; Zohar & Luria, 
2005), workers’ perceptions of their supervisor and manager’s commitment to 
safety are separately assessed and aggregated to the group and organisational level 
respectively. Treating safety climate as a multilevel construct has a number of 
conceptual and methodological advantages over the traditional single-level 
approach; however few researchers have adopted this practice and examined the 
cross-level or the lagged effects of safety climate.  
In the current thesis, the cross-level and lagged relationships safety climate has with 
safety outcomes was investigated through the use of a recently developed 
multilevel safety climate survey in the Australian oil and gas context. Data was 
collected over a two year period in a single organisation. The survey consisted of 
three scales, separately examining manager, supervisor, and co-worker 
commitment to safety. Safety outcomes were operationalized as self-reported near 
misses and injuries.  
The assessment of cross-level and lagged relationships involved a number of 
analyses, distributed across five objectives. In Objective One the factorial validity of 
the scales was assessed using confirmatory factor analysis. In Objective Two the 
cross-sectional criterion validity of the scales was examined using multilevel logistic 
regression in order to determine whether commitment to safety at each level of the 
organisation was associated with safety outcomes. In Objective Three, the 
predictive validity of each scale was assessed using multilevel Poisson regression in 
order to determine whether safety climate scores in Year One were predictive of 
safety outcomes in Year Two. In Objective Four, a series of path models were 
compared using path analysis in order to examine cross-level relationships between 
manager, supervisor, and co-worker commitment to safety. This analysis allowed 
the replication of Zohar and Luria’s (2005) findings, and could determine whether 
Zohar’s model could be extended to include perceptions of co-workers. In Objective 
Five, comparisons were made between safety climate operationalized at the 
v 
 
individual and aggregate level, given the inconsistent labelling of safety climate at 
both levels of analysis despite the possibility that they may be distinct constructs.  
While all three scales demonstrated acceptable factorial validity, only the 
supervisor and manager scales provided evidence of criterion and predictive validity 
through significant associations with self-reported near misses. Path model 
comparisons provided support for Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate and 
further suggested that co-workers were of lesser importance in promoting safety 
compared to supervisors and managers.    
Comparisons between safety climate operationalized at the individual and 
aggregate level demonstrated that level of analysis did affect that pattern of 
relationships between safety climate and self-reported near misses. While 
aggregated co-worker safety climate was the weakest predictor of self-reported 
near misses, individual level co-worker safety climate was the strongest predictor 
even after controlling for higher level variance.  Analyses further indicated that 
individual level co-worker safety climate mediated the relationship between 
aggregated supervisor safety climate and individual level self-reported near misses. 
While replication of these findings is necessary, the results overall supported 
Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate and suggested that the model could be 
extended to include individual level perceptions of co-workers. Results also 
indicated that level-of-analysis has a potentially important effect on the pattern of 
relationships between safety climate and safety outcomes.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
In the period between June 2005 and June 2006, 690,000 Australians, or 6.4% of the 
working population, experienced a work-related injury or illness (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, 2007).  The total cost of these injuries was conservatively estimated to 
be $58b (National Occupational Health and Safety Commission, 2004). The oil and 
gas industry is one context where injuries are an ever present concern, with 
employees working with flammable liquids and high pressure in sometimes hostile 
operating conditions (Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association, 
2011). While recording a lower frequency of lost-time injuries (LTI) compared to the 
mining industry (Department of Mines and Petroleum, 2011), LTI frequency is still 
appreciably higher compared to industries in less precarious environments, such as 
retail, media, education, and finance (Worksafe, 2010). Additionally, while the 
Australian oil and gas industry’s safety record has improved substantially in recent 
times, with LTI frequency nearly halving in the last few years, the overall frequency 
is still higher than many countries (International Association of Oil and Gas 
Producers [OGP], 2011). OGP statistics indicate that Australia’s LTI frequency of 0.71 
per million work hours is higher than the average in the Asia-Australasia region 
(0.29), North America (0.48), South America (0.61), and the Middle East (0.25). 
Therefore, the oil and gas industry in Australia represents an area where there is 
room for substantial improvement in the frequency of work-related injury and 
illness.  
  
In an attempt to minimise the injuries, mortality and economic losses that result 
from poor workplace safety, a significant body of research has evolved to promote 
understanding of the factors that contribute to workplace accidents (Seo, Torabi, 
Blair, & Ellis, 2004). Early research in the safety field focused on engineering or 
technical solutions to safety problems, however it became apparent to 
organisations and researchers that the majority of workplace injuries were not the 
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result of technical malfunctions or inadequate engineering safeguards (Hale & 
Hovden, 1998), but had significant human contributions. One pertinent and often 
cited example is the Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster, in which operating 
procedures were ignored and a multitude of safety systems were disabled by 
employees due to a variety of individual and organisational factors (Pidgeon & 
O’Leary, 2000). Another focus of early safety research was on human factors such as 
attitudes and compliance; however this too failed to completely explain the causes 
of safety outcomes (Hale & Hovden, 1998). This led to what Hale and Hovden 
described as the third age of safety research, where organisational variables such as 
safety climate and safety culture were of interest.  
 
Safety climate refers to shared perceptions of an organisation’s safety priority (e.g. 
Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000; Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Zohar & Luria, 2005; Huang, 
Chen, DeArmond, Cigularov, & Chen, 2007; Neitzel, Seixas, Harris, & Camp, 2008). 
The construct has steadily developed both theoretically and methodologically over 
the past 30 years, particularly in the last decade with the advent of detailed 
conceptual models by authors such as Zohar (2000; 2003; Zohar & Luria, 2005) and 
Flin (2007). These models propose a multilevel conceptualisation of safety climate, 
where perceptions of safety’s priority among supervisors and managers are 
measured separately and aggregated to different levels of the organisation (Flin, 
2007; Zohar & Luria, 2005), reflecting the separate influences that these hierarchical 
levels of the organisation have on an employee (Simard & Marchand, 1997; Tomas, 
Melia, & Oliver, 1999). However, this multilevel phase of safety research is still in its 
early stages. Further studies are required to identify the lagged/longitudinal 
relationships that safety climate has with safety outcomes, in order to improve the 
predictive qualities of safety climate surveys. No study to date has examined safety 
climate’s lagged relationships with safety outcomes in the oil and gas industry while 
utilising the multilevel approach to measurement, with few multilevel studies 
conducted outside of the manufacturing sector.  
 
In addition, there is the possibility of further conceptual development of the 
construct. While the influence of supervisor and management commitment to 
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safety on safety outcomes is well established in the safety climate literature, little 
research has examined the role of co-workers. Research in related fields has 
suggested that co-workers are an important and distinct source of behavioural 
norms (e.g. Roy, 2003; Zhou, Fang, & Wang, 2008) and so further research is 
required to determine whether existing conceptual models can be extended to 
include perceptions of co-workers.   
 
1.2 The Current Study  
The overarching aim of this thesis is to identify lagged relationships between safety 
climate and the subsequent impact it has on safety outcomes, with safety outcomes 
operationalized as self-reported near misses and injuries. In the literature review to 
follow I will argue that these lagged relationships will best be identified through an 
analysis of interactions at the manager, supervisor, and co-worker level. 
Identification of these lagged relationships will allow organisations to diagnose 
potential safety deficiencies and plan improvements to organisational processes, 
with the aim of reducing the possibility of employee injury. The research for this 
thesis takes place in the oil and gas industry in Australia. Given the absence of 
studies investigating lagged relationships using a multilevel design in this context, 
coupled with the high injury rate in the Australian oil and gas industry as compared 
to other regions (OGP, 2011), the findings will be of practical and theoretical 
importance.   
 
1.3 Format of Thesis 
The format of the thesis is as follows. 
In Chapter Two, a review of the literature will be undertaken in order to find 
common threads among the safety climate studies despite the different measures, 
conceptualisations of climate, outcome criteria, and analytic techniques used in 
research. The chapter will present a conceptual model of safety climate based on 
the work of Zohar (2000; 2003; Zohar & Luria, 2005) and discuss areas where 
further research is required.  
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Chapter Three will describe the rationale, aims and hypotheses of the thesis, while 
Chapter Four will outline the research methodology, including an overview of the 
research design, participants, measures, and procedure. A number of analyses will 
then be presented in order to further our understanding of safety climate and its 
relationship with safety outcomes.  Chapter Five will outline Objective One, in which 
the factorial validity of the safety climate survey will be assessed. Since the thesis 
uses a survey not yet featured in the literature, an assessment of factorial validity is 
necessary to ensure that employees can differentiate between the behaviours listed 
in the scales, yet also perceive them belonging to the same underlying construct. 
This analysis marks the first step in providing support for Zohar’s Multilevel Model 
of Safety Climate, given the survey utilises behavioural domains that Zohar similarly 
uses.  
 
Chapter Six will outline Objective Two, in which cross-sectional analyses will be 
conducted between safety climate and safety outcomes at each level of the 
organisation. This will provide an indication of each scale’s criterion validity. The 
analysis also serves as an exploratory examination of whether a multilevel model of 
safety climate is applicable to an oil and gas environment.    
 
Chapter Seven will build upon what was discussed in Chapter Six by examining the 
predictive validity of the each scale in the multilevel safety climate survey 
(Objective Three). As stated previously, longitudinal studies are rare in the safety 
climate literature, with the majority of studies cross-sectional in design. By utilising 
a longitudinal design, causal statements can be made regarding the relationship 
between safety climate and safety outcomes. Given that predictive validity is the 
most critical feature of a scale and that safety climate scales are used for the 
diagnosis of potential safety deficiencies in an organisation, this analysis also 
importantly provides the first indication of the scale’s utility as a diagnostic tool. 
The analysis also has theoretical ramifications, given that no study to date has 
tested the predictive validity of a multilevel safety climate survey in the oil and gas 
industry.  
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Chapter Eight will outline Objective Four, in which longitudinal relationships 
between separate levels of the organisation and safety outcomes will be assessed. 
A series of five multilevel path models will be compared, as this will allow the 
replication and extension of the work of Zohar and Luria (2005), and provide insight 
into the lagged relationships among the nested levels of safety climate and safety 
outcomes given the absence of research on this topic.  
 
Chapter Nine will outline Objective Five, in which the effect that level-of-analysis 
has on the pattern of relationships between safety climate and safety outcomes will 
be investigated. Comparisons will be made between safety climate operationalized 
at the aggregate and individual levels in order to understand whether research 
conducted at the individual level is potentially confounded, and whether safety 
climate operationalized at the individual level should be considered a distinct 
construct to safety climate operationalized at the aggregate level.  
 
Finally in Chapter Ten, the overall findings of the research will be discussed. 
Particular attention will be paid towards the theoretical implications of the findings, 
especially in regards to Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate, and the practical 
implications for organisations utilising safety climate surveys. In addition, the 
strengths and limitations of the thesis will be addressed, before a discussion of 
future directions that safety climate research can take.    
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
 
2.1 History of Climate Research 
The origins of safety climate can be traced to the 1930’s, with Lewin, Lippit and 
White’s (1939) study on experimentally created “social climates”.  In this classic 
study, Lewin and colleagues had leaders at an American summer camp create an 
authoritarian, democratic, or laissez-faire atmosphere through their leadership 
techniques. The climate created had a significant impact on the children, for 
example when an authoritarian climate was created the children tended to be more 
apathetic when the leader was present, and more aggressive when the leader was 
absent. Though the authors did not give any details on how climate as a construct 
should be measured or conceptualized, the study marked a turning point in that 
aggressive behaviour was seen to be a product of group processes rather than 
simply a product of individual attributes. Lewin (1951) continued in this vein of 
research through his classic heuristic of B = f(P, E),  in other words, an individual’s 
behaviour (B) is a function of both his or her person (P) (e.g. individual attributes) 
and environment (E). The term ‘organisational climate’ originated from these 
efforts to describe the organisational (i.e. environmental) variables that influence 
behaviour. 
 
Argyris (1958) first defined the term “organisational climate” in his study of group 
dynamics in a bank, where he described the organisational environment in terms of 
formal organisational policies and individual variables such as employee values and 
personality. It was a very ambiguous term describing the organisational situation, 
and little changed definition-wise in the following decades. Though the construct 
took shape in the 1960’s with the operationalization of climate through employee 
perceptions and with more comprehensive frameworks of climate proposed by 
authors such as Litwin and Stringer (1968), the conceptual ambiguity persisted with 
researchers commonly contradicting one another in terms of climate definition, 
dimensionality, and measurement. This led Glick (1985, p. 601) to describe 
organisational climate as a “conceptual morass” and Guion (1973, p. 121) to state 
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that organisational climate is “…one of the fuzziest concepts to come along in a long 
time”.  
 
James and Jones (1974) attempted to provide some coherency and structure to 
organisational climate research through their review of the literature. The authors 
categorised organisational climate research as belonging to one of three 
approaches. The first approach was the multiple measurement-organisational 
attribute approach, which regarded organisational climate as an organisational 
attribute (in comparison to an individual attribute) that could be assessed by a 
number of disparate methods such as perceptual surveys and objective indices such 
as the size of the organisation and the complexity of systems.  James and Jones 
believed that this approach was far too encompassing to be useful, with authors 
utilising this approach erroneously believing they were contributing something new 
to the literature when instead they were assessing what was more adequately 
described by other authors as components of situational variance or structure. 
James and Jones referred to the second approach as the perceptual measurements-
organisational attribute approach, which regarded organisational climate as an 
attribute of an organisation, measured through the shared perceptions of 
employees. In contrast, the perceptual measurement-individual attribute approach 
regards climate as an attribute of the individual, not of a workgroup or organisation. 
Hence, data is not aggregated and analyses predict individual behaviour rather than 
that of a workgroup or organisation. These conceptual and methodological 
differences between the two approaches led James and Jones to suggest the 
rebranding of organisational climate assessed using the perceptual measurement-
individual attribute approach as ‘psychological climate’.  
 
Though James and Jones’ (1974) review made a significant contribution to the 
literature, with many authors adhering to their suggestions and using the term 
‘psychological climate’, a great deal of confusion still remained. Glick (1985), in his 
review of the climate literature a decade later, bemoaned the fact that many 
authors had aggregated measures of psychological climate to make inferences 
about psychological climate, despite the unit of theory for psychological climate 
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being the individual, not the aggregate. This problem was widespread and not 
limited to the time period of Glick’s review, with a recent review by Kuenzi and 
Schminke (2009) finding over 100 articles that purported to measure organisational 
climate despite the unit of analysis being the individual, and therefore psychological 
climate being measured.  
 
Further adding to the complexity of climate research was the lack of consensus over 
dimensionality. Since climate, both organisational and psychological, was 
considered a multidimensional ‘umbrella’ construct describing employees’ 
perceptions of their environment, a large number of dimensions have been used to 
measure it. For example, Koys and DeCotiis (1991) identified over 80 distinct 
dimensions in their review of the psychological climate literature. The ever 
increasing number of dimensions posited by researchers was roundly criticised by 
Schneider (2000, p. 5), who lamented the tendency for researchers to add 
dimensions without theoretical rationale, stating that “climate research has 
languished as an increasingly large number of dimensions were added to its 
conceptualization, with new facets added each time a researcher thought climate 
might be useful for understanding some interesting phenomenon”. Glick (1985) 
described climate’s multidimensional nature as both an asset and a liability, as a 
multidimensional approach was required to capture multifaceted relationship 
between an individual and the organisation; however it also resulted in climate 
lacking parsimony. Glick (p. 606) stated “Saying everything is related to everything 
does not provide much of an explanation”, a concern echoed by many authors 
including Guldenmund (2000), over a decade later, when he stated that the broad 
nature of climate had the potential to make it meaningless.  
 
Another major hurdle facing climate research was the confusion over the 
conceptual boundaries between organisational climate and the related term of 
organisational culture (Kuenzi & Schminke, 2009). In his review of the literature, 
Schneider (2000) pointed out how some authors fostered confusion by using the 
terms interchangeably, despite there being a number of distinct differences 
between them.  Though both terms refer to the process in which individuals make 
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sense of their environment, safety culture, with its anthropological academic roots, 
seeks to understand the deeper, underlying assumptions and normative beliefs of 
the organisation (Schein, 2004). In comparison, climate refers to surface-level 
perceptions (Kuenzi & Schminke), and due to this lower level of abstraction it is 
argued that it can be readily assessed via quantitative measures such as perceptual 
surveys. To access these implicit and unconscious beliefs that constitute culture, 
qualitative methods are required, such as observation and interviews (Guldenmund, 
2000). 
 
The inconsistency in the use of the terms ‘climate’ and ‘culture’ in the literature is 
not surprising. Both concepts have changed markedly in the past few decades and 
refer to different things compared to early stages of research. Guldenmund (2000), 
for example, states that what was once considered organisational climate, as in, a 
broad multidimensional construct attributable to the organisation, now refers to 
the concept of organisational culture. Some authors have even revised their own 
conceptualisations of climate over the years. According to James and Jones’s (1974) 
conceptualisation of climate, organisational climate is an attribute of the 
organisation while psychological climate is an attribute of the individual. However, 
in later years James (James, 1982; James et. al., 2008) argued that organisational 
climate was simply the label for psychological climate when it was aggregated, the 
perceptions still being attributed to the individual regardless of whether 
psychological or organisational climate was measured. Despite organisational 
climate referring to shared perceptions and assessing the overall meaning 
employees derive from their environment (James, 1982; Schneider, 1983), James 
believes that the definition of the construct remains the same whether aggregated 
or not. However, most authors do not take this stance, with many considering 
organisational climate an attribute of the workgroup (e.g. Schneider & Reichers, 
1983; Young & Parker, 1999), while others consider it an attribute of the 
organisation. Those authors whose focus is on the workgroup have what is known 
as a subjective perspective (Glick, 1988), whereby employee interactions in 
response to organisational phenomena leads to shared understanding and 
perceptions of these events.  Those authors who consider climate an organisational 
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attribute have what is known as an objective perspective (Glick, 1985; Rousseau, 
1988), and assess employee descriptions of a specific area of organisational 
functioning such as customer service (Schneider & Bowen, 1985; Salvaggio et. al., 
2007), ethics (Dickson, Smith, Grojean, & Ehrhart, 2001; Parboteeah & Kapp, 2008), 
diversity (McKay, Avery, & Morris, 2009), or safety (e.g. Zohar, 1980; Neal, Griffin, & 
Hart, 2000; Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Johnson, 2007). The latter - safety climate - is 
the focus of the current thesis, and as will be discussed shortly, has involved some 
researchers unifying both the subjective and objective approaches.  
 
2.2 Safety Climate 
The concept of safety climate was introduced by Zohar (1980, p. 96) to describe a 
specific type of organisational climate that “reflects employees’ perceptions about 
the relative importance of safe conduct in their organizational behaviour”. Research 
into facet specific forms of organisational climate were burgeoning at this time, in 
line with Schneider’s (1975) suggestion to focus on specific strategic areas of the 
organisation so as to improve the validity of climate instruments and avoid the 
definitional, theoretical and methodological confusion afflicting the organisational 
climate literature. In the following sections, the safety climate literature will be 
discussed, with attention directed at its definition, dimensionality, and relationship 
with other constructs. 
 
2.3 Definition 
One area where there appears to be general consensus in the literature is in the 
definition of safety climate. A comprehensive review by Guldenmund (2000) 
showed that most authors stressed the perceptual nature of safety climate (e.g. 
Zohar, 1980; Brown & Holmes, 1986; Glennon, 1982; Niskanen, 1994), with these 
perceptions being shared (e.g. Zohar, 1980; Brown & Holmes, 1986; Dedobbeleer 
and Beland, 1991; Diaz & Cabrera, 1997), and directed towards safety (e.g. Cooper 
& Phillips, 2004; Williamson, Feyer, Cairns, & Biancotti, 1997 ), organisational 
characteristics (e.g. Glennon, 1982), or the work environment (e.g. Zohar, 1980; 
Dedobeleer & Beland, 1991). A review of the definitions used in the past decade 
since Guldenmund’s review can be seen in Table 1. 
  
Table 1 
Definitions of Safety Climate 
Reference Definition of Safety Climate 
Neal, Griffin, & Hart (2000) “Safety climate is a specific form of organizational climate, which describes individual perceptions 
of the value of safety in the work environment” (p. 100) 
Zohar (2000) Perceptions of the overall priority of safety in regards to policies and procedures at the 
organisational level, and supervisory practices at the group level.  
Gillen, Batlz, Gassel, Kirsch, 
& Vaccaro (2002) 
“The Safety Climate Measure for Construction Sites analyzed worker perceptions of job safety 
regarding management concerns, safety activities, and employee risk” (p. 38) 
Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & 
Fleming (2001) 
“The study investigated the underlying structure and content of offshore employees’ attitudes to 
safety, feelings of safety and satisfaction with safety measures” (p. 144) 
Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin 
(2003) 
“…scales addressing satisfaction with safety activities, workforce involvement in health and safety 
planning, and communication about health and safety, as well as a set of 19 attitudinal statements 
about safety and 11 items relating to the frequency of unsafe behaviour” (p.646) 
Silva, Lima, & Baptista 
(2004) 
“Safety climate is understood as the shared perceptions about safety values, norms, beliefs, 
practices and procedures” (p. 211) 
Cooper & Phillips (2004)  Safety climate describes shared employee perceptions of safety management, providing an 
indication of the overall priority of safety.  
Seo, Torabi, Blair, & Ellis Uses Zohar’s (1980, p. 96) definition of safety climate being a “summary of molar perceptions that 
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 (2004) employees share about their work environments” 
Katz-Navon, Naveh, & Stern 
(2005) 
Uses Schneider’s (1990, p. 384) definition of safety climate being “the shared perceptions of the 
employees concerning the practices, procedures, and the kind of behaviors that get rewarded, 
supported, and expected in a setting” 
Zohar & Luria (2005) “The core meaning of climate relates, therefore, to socially construed indications of desired role 
behavior, originating simultaneously from policy and procedural actions of top management and 
from supervisory actions exhibited by shop-floor or frontline supervisors” (p. 616) 
“…most climate scholars have postulated that safety climate perceptions refer to those attributes 
of policy and practice that indicate the priority of safety (which might diverge from formal 
declarations)” (p. 617) 
Oliver, Tomas, & Cheyne 
(2006) 
“Safety climate, the main focus of this study, refers to the shared perceptions of safety policies, 
procedures and practices” (p. 29) 
“Given that safety factors are inherent to any industrial process, and that they compete with other 
factors of the process, such as task speed or profitability, it is clear that safety policies and 
procedures have to be considered as relative priorities” (p.29) 
Neal & Griffin (2006) “The term perceived safety climate, therefore, refers to individual perceptions of policies, 
procedures, and practices relating to safety in the workplace. Group safety climate refers to the 
shared perceptions of the group as a whole” (pp. 946-947) 
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 Hofmann & Mark (2006) “Given the complexity of the health care delivery process, we believe that a comprehensive 
assessment of safety climate should assess not only the degree to which high-quality safety practices 
exist and the extent to which the social context encourages adherence to these policies. But, it should 
also include a focus on effectively and constructively responding to errors when they occur” (p. 849) 
Wills, Watson, & Biggs 
(2006) 
“This literature suggests SC (safety climate) represents employees' perceptions about organizational 
support, and particularly, management's commitment to safety in the organization” (p. 375) 
Johnson (2007) “Safety climate reflected employee perception of an organization's safety efforts” (p. 512). Johnson 
also uses Zohar and Luria’s definition of safety climate perceptions reflecting the priority safety is 
given in the organisation.  
Hahn & Murphy (2008) “Safety climate refers to shared perceptions of employees about the safety of their work 
environment” (p. 1047) 
Baek, Bae, Ham, & Singh 
(2008) 
Scale includes factors assessing management commitment to safety, merits of the H&S procedures, 
instructions, and rules, accidents and near misses, training and competence, job security and 
satisfaction, pressure for production, communications, perceptions of personal involvement in H&S, 
perceptions of organisational and management to H&S, rule breaking, workforce view on state of 
safety and culture.  
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 Huang, Chen, DeArmond, 
Cigularov & Chen (2007) 
“…safety climate is defined as employees’ shared perceptions of the safety policies, procedures, 
and practices, as well as the overall importance and the true priority of safety at work” (p. 1089) 
Matsubara, Hagihara, & 
Nobutomo (2008) 
“The safety climate is conceptualized as workers’ shared perceptions of how safety management is 
implemented in their workplace” (p. 211) 
Neitzel, Seixas, Harris, &  
Camp (2008) 
“This term refers to employees' shared perception of the priority safety receives in their 
workplace” (p. 392) 
Newman, Griffin, & Mason 
(2008) 
“Safety climate has been described as an individual’s perceptions of the value and importance 
associated with safety within an organization” (p. 634) 
Nielsen, Rasmussen, 
Glasscock, & Spangenberg 
(2008) 
Refers to Zohar (2000), stating that Zohar “defines safety climate as employees’ shared perceptions 
of management’s commitment and performance with regards to safety policies, procedures and 
practices” (p. 440) 
Pousette, Larsson, & Torner 
(2008) 
Perceptions of safety conditions.  
Probst, Brubaker, Barsotti 
(2008) 
Uses definition by Zohar (1980, p. 101) of safety climate as a “unified set of cognitions [held by 
workers] regarding the safety aspects of their organization”  
Strahan, Watson, Lennon 
(2008) 
“Safety climate typically refers to workers’ perceptions of the way in which the organisation views 
and manages safety” (p. 420) 
1
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 Tharaldsen, Olsen, & 
Rundmo (2008) 
“Safety climate, on the other hand, is often used to describe employees’ perceptions, attitudes and 
beliefs about risk and safety” (p. 428) 
Turnberg & Daniell (2008) Uses Zohar’s  (1980, p. 96) definition of safety climate being a “summary of molar perceptions that 
employees share about their work environments” 
Vinodkumar & Bhasi (2009) “Safety climate can be defined as employees’ shared perceptions of safety policies, procedures, 
practices, as well as the overall importance and the true priority of safety at work (p. 659) 
Christian, Bradley, Wallace, 
& Burke (2009) 
“…shared perceptions of work environment characteristics as they pertain to safety matters that 
affect a group of individuals” (p. 1106) 
Beus, Payne, Bergmann, & 
Arthur (2010) 
“…employees’ perceptions of organizational safety policies,  procedures, and practices” (p. 713) 
Lu & Tsai (2010) “…employees’ perceptions pertaining to safety practices, policies, and procedures, which are 
implemented and prioritized in the organization” (p. 2000) 
Luria & Yagil (2010) “…perceptions of policies, procedures, and practices concerning safety in organisations” (p. 1423)  
Hansen Williams, & Singer 
(2010) 
“Underlying safety culture visibly manifests itself in organizations as elements of safety climate, 
including policies, procedures, and practices, which can be more easily measured through 
workforce perceptions” (p. 598) 
Lu & Yang (2011) Refers to Zohar (1980), and states that “safety climate is a term used to describe shared employee 
perceptions of how safety management is being operationalized in the workplace” (p. 329).  
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From Table 1 it can clearly be seen that safety climate research has flourished over 
the past decade. Guldenmund (2000) listed 18 studies in his review of studies from 
1980 to 1997, while it can be seen that there are 33 studies published from 2000 to 
2011.  The definitions demonstrate a high degree of consensus in the literature, 
with the majority of authors stating that safety climate consisted of “shared” or 
“molar” perceptions. Some authors associate safety climate with attitudes, beliefs, 
and satisfaction (e.g. Mearns, Flin, Gordon & Fleming, 2001; Mearns, Whitaker, & 
Flin, 2003; Tharaldsen, Olsen, & Rundmo, 2008; Baek, Bae, Ham, & Singh, 2008). 
However, as will be discussed later, attitudes and beliefs are more commonly 
considered to represent the related term of safety culture. 
 
The objects of these perceptions vary considerably in their degree of explicitness, 
with authors using very general or implicit objects such as the safety management 
(Matsubara, Hagihara, & Nobutomo, 2008), work environment (e.g. Hahn & 
Murphy, 2008) safety conditions (e.g. Pousette, Larsson, & Torner, 2008) and the 
overall value/priority of safety in the workplace (e.g. Neitzel, Seixas, Harris, & Camp, 
2008). A number of definitions are more explicit, referring to perceptions of 
policies, procedures and/or practices (Neal & Griffin, 2006; Zohar, 2000; Zohar & 
Luria, 2005; Katz-Navon, Naveh, Stern, 2005; Oliver, Tomas, & Cheyne, 2006; Huang, 
Chen, DeArmond, Cigularov & Chen, 2007; Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2009), with the 
majority of the aforementioned authors mentioning that these perceptions of 
policies, procedures, and/or practices provide an indication of the overall priority 
safety is afforded in the workplace.  This is in line with Zohar’s updated (2000, Zohar 
& Luria, 2005) conceptualisation of safety climate. Zohar clearly remains an 
influential figure in the safety climate literature, with most authors citing or quoting 
him in their definitions, however a number of authors (e.g. Lu & Yang, 2011; Seo, 
Torabi, Blair, & Ellis; Probst, Brubaker, & Barsotti, 2008; Turnberg & Daniell, 2008) 
refer to Zohar’s 1980 conceptualisation of safety climate, despite the construct 
being significantly redefined since his original article.  Given that a definition “…sets 
the stage for ensuing research, i.e. it is the basis for hypotheses, research paradigms 
and interpretations of the findings” (Guldenmund, 2000, p. 227), this thesis will 
adopt Zohar’s recent definition of the construct. Safety climate therefore will refer 
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to shared perceptions of the overall priority of safety, as evidenced through enacted 
policies, procedures, and practices (Zohar, 2000; 2003; Zohar & Luria, 2005).   
 
2.4 Safety Climate and Safety Culture 
Another area where historically there has been considerable confusion is in the 
boundaries separating safety climate and safety culture. The term “safety culture” 
originated from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA, 1986) enquiry into 
the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, where it was ascertained that safety culture rather 
than technical malfunctions were largely responsible for the meltdown. The term 
has been used in disaster inquiry reports for over 20 years to describe the 
combination of social, managerial, and organisational factors that led to various 
disasters (Glendon, Clarke, & McKenna, 2006). Despite this rich history, a 
unanimously agreed upon definition, either conceptually or operationally, has 
proven elusive (Guldenmund, 2000).  A multitude of definitions have been proposed 
(for a review, refer to Choudhry, Fang, & Mohamed, 2007; Guldenmund, 2000), 
however, a prominent definition is that safety culture refers to “the product of 
individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of 
behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an 
organization’s health and safety management” (Health and Safety Commission, 
1993, p. 23). Another commonly cited definition of safety culture is that it 
constitutes “the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values that employees share in 
relation to safety” (Cox & Cox, 1991, p. 93). Though definitions differ across studies, 
the general consensus is that safety culture is a multidimensional construct, shared 
by employees, which provides a frame of reference when it comes to safety within 
an organization – hence the potential for confusion with safety climate is quite 
evident,  with many authors confusing the terms or using them interchangeably 
(Cox & Flin, 1998; Glendon & Stanton, 2000).  
 
It is evident that the confusion over safety climate and culture paralleled that of the 
wider organisational climate/culture literature. The generally agreed differences 
between safety climate and culture also echoed that of the wider literature. While 
safety climate is predominately assessed via perceptual surveys, multiple methods 
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are required to adequately assess safety culture due its complex multidimensional 
and multilayered nature (Glendon & Stanton, 2000). Triangulation is an approach 
advocated by a number of researchers (Cooper, 2000; Cox & Cheyne, 2000; Flin, 
Mearns, O'Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Glendon et al., 2006), and involves utilising a 
combination of methodologies (e.g. multiple sources of data, multiple method 
techniques, multiple data collection times) on the same object of study. For 
example, Cox and Cheyne (2000) utilised perceptual/attitudinal surveys, 
behavioural indicators, document analysis, and interviews/focus groups. The 
triangulation approach is useful as it counterbalances the limitations of any single 
approach (Glendon et al., 2006). 
 
Safety climate and safety culture are generally perceived as being related yet 
distinct entities, with safety climate a measurable manifestation of safety culture 
(Choudhry et al., 2007; Cox & Flin, 1998) or a component of safety culture (Cooper 
& Phillips, 2004; Glendon & Stanton, 2000). Safety culture is often regarded as a 
more trait-like, complex and stable construct, whilst safety climate is seen as more 
state-like, a surface-level ‘snapshot’ indicative of selected aspects of the safety 
culture at a particular point in time (Cox & Cheyne, 2000; Glendon & Stanton, 2000). 
This relationship between safety culture and safety climate is perhaps best 
demonstrated by the many models used to describe safety culture. A similarity that 
exists in many of these models is that safety culture is comprised of a number of 
levels/layers. This perspective can be traced to Schein’s (1992) multi-layered 
organisational culture model. For example, Guldenmund (2000), drawing on the 
work of Schein (1992) and Cox and Cox (1991), described three layers of safety 
culture. The first is the outer layer, which consists of behaviour and visible artefacts 
such as meetings, inspection reports, and dress codes. This is the most overt 
manifestation of culture, but alone provides little insight into the comprehension of 
the underlying culture. The middle layer consists of relatively explicit and conscious 
values and attitudes, directed at hardware, software, people, and risks.  Hardware 
refers to safety equipment and hazards while software refers to policies and 
procedures, and legislation. ’People’ refers to attitudes directed at fellow workers, 
supervisors, managers, and non-organisational entities such as unions and 
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authorities. Finally, risks refer to risky behaviour and regulation. The core layer 
represents the implicit ontological assumptions that permeate the organisation. 
This deepest layer of culture is also the hardest to assess, and can be deduced 
through examination of the preceding layers and observation. Figure 1 summarises 
Guldenmund’s model.  
 
Figure 1.  Representation of Guldenmund’s (2000) safety culture model. 
 
This model merged both safety climate and safety culture as the middle layer 
represented safety climate. Guldenmund stated that each layer may be studied 
separately, and so it can be seen that in this perspective safety climate is one 
manifestation of safety culture. In this model safety climate is assessed through 
attitudes. While operationalizing safety climate through attitudinal surveys makes 
safety climate fit neatly within the pre-existing culture literature, it also puts it at 
odds with the majority of safety climate literature which define it as consisting of 
perceptions (Zohar, 1980; Zohar & Luria, 2005; Brown & Holmes, 1986; Glennon, 
1982; Niskanen, 1994; Neal & Griffin, 2006; Oliver, Tomas, & Cheyne, 2006; Hahn & 
Murphy, 2008; Christian et al., 2009; Johnson, 2007; Beus et al., 2010). Attitudes 
have long been considered distinct from perceptions, with James and Jones (1979) 
noting that attitudes were of an emotional and evaluative nature, with perceptions 
being of a cognitive and descriptive nature. While the distinction between attitudes 
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and perceptions are not universally agreed upon, with Eagley and Chaiken (1982) 
describing attitudes as having cognitive, behavioural and affective components, the 
vast majority of authors (and the current thesis) takes the view that attitudes do not 
represent safety climate due to their affective and evaluative nature. Therefore, the 
attitudes-based conceptualisation of safety climate is a limitation of Guldenmund’s 
model, particularly in light of recent research which has supported the empirical 
distinctiveness of safety climate and attitudes (Pousette et al., 2008).  
 
Glendon and Stanton (2000) similarly take this three layered approach, yet include 
two additional dimensions. Their significantly more complex model (as seen in 
Figure 2) notes the importance of breadth (how localised or shared the cultural 
elements are across the organisation) and time (as cultural elements do not exist at 
one point at time – they also have a past and future).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Glendon and Stanton’s (2000, p. 199) model describing the 
relationship between culture and climate.   
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Like Guldenmund, Glendon and Stanton place climate in the middle layer of the 
three-layer model, and since climate measures only some aspects of culture at a 
particular time, it provides only a superficial indication of culture (Glendon & 
Stanton, 2000). Additionally, Glendon and Stanton’s model describes the layers of 
safety culture affecting one another in both directions, contrasting with 
Guldenmund’s linear representation of culture. This linearity, in which implicit 
assumptions dictate attitudes, which in turn dictate behaviour, was the subject of 
criticism by Cooper (2000). Cooper (2000) stated that the model was overly linear, 
as behaviours have been demonstrated to affect attitudes and not just be dictated 
by them. It could also be argued that assessing the deeper layers in Guldenmund 
and Glendon and Stanton’s model is extremely difficult, given they consist of 
implicit underlying assumptions. Though Glendon and Stanton’s model more 
comprehensively describes the elements of culture within an organisation, it also 
makes the measurement of culture much more complex and time consuming. 
Glendon and Stanton note that additional dimensions are likely, but are difficult to 
represent on a two-dimensional figure. Hence, while Glendon and Stanton’s 
addition of a time and breadth dimension theoretically extends the culture 
construct, their conceptualisation is potentially even more difficult for organisations 
to assess than Guldenmund’s model.  
 
Cooper’s (2000) model shares some similarities with those previously described. In 
his reciprocal model based on Bandura’s (1977) social learning theory, safety 
culture is the result of an interaction between person, behaviour, and the situation, 
as seen in Figure 3. Situational features of the organisation include policies, 
practices, and procedures, in other words, the safety management system. The 
behavioural component consists of observable safety-related behaviours.  The 
person component is safety climate; hence it is subjective psychological factors such 
as perceptions. Unlike the previous models, safety climate is represented as a 
component of safety culture. Another major difference is that unlike Guldenmund’s 
linear model, Cooper’s reciprocal safety culture specifies a dynamic relationship 
present between components, with each component interrelated with the other 
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two. A strength of this model compared to previous models is that each component 
is clearly operationalized and relatively simple to assess. However, the three-way 
interactions between the components have not been empirically tested (Glendon et 
al., 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Cooper’s (2000, p. 120) reciprocal safety culture model.  
 
In summary, there are a number of models of safety culture, each catering towards 
a different definition, approach and metatheoretical underpinning. All models are 
somewhat similar in their representation of safety culture, as all emphasise safety 
culture’s complex, multifaceted nature. Though there are some differences 
between the models in their operationalisation of safety culture and their emphasis 
on specific aspects, in all models safety culture is seen to be reflected in 
situational/environmental features, internal psychological factors (i.e. safety 
climate), and behaviour.  
 
2.5 Models of Safety Climate 
A major contributor to safety climate’s lack of conceptual development for a 
number of years had been the lack of a causal model or theoretical framework to 
guide research. In Guldenmund’s (2000) review he regretted that few authors 
attempted to relate their study to previous research or tried to establish an 
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integrative framework, with most authors simply developing new scales from 
scratch. However, much has changed in a decade, with a number of detailed models 
emerging shortly after the publication of Guldenmund’s review.  
 
2.5.1 Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate 
One of the models was developed by Zohar (2000; 2003; Zohar & Luria, 2005), the 
researcher responsible for introducing the term ‘safety climate’. Compared to his 
original conceptualisation of the construct, his recent model is far more detailed in 
describing the processes by which safety climate affects safety outcomes. According 
to Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate, safety climate derives from shared 
perceptions of an organisation’s priority for safety, relative to other production 
goals (i.e. pressure to work speedily). These perceptions are not of formal policy 
(e.g. written procedures) but of enacted policies, the actions which management 
take in reality, which may contrast with formal policies (e.g. management expecting 
employees to disregard certain procedures if production is falling behind schedule).  
From these perceptions of safety’s true priority, employees develop behaviour-
outcome expectancies, in other words, they can hypothesise the consequences of 
their safety-related actions. For example, if from previous events employees 
perceive production speed is rewarded; it is more likely that employees will 
prioritise speed over safety due to the expectancy of reward. This aspect of Zohar’s 
theory integrates the findings of a number of influential researchers in the 
behaviour literature, with these expectancies shown to be the strongest predictor 
of behaviour in a number of studies (e.g. Bandura, 1986; Lawler, 1971; Vroom, 
1964, Ramsey et. al., 2000). Overall, employees should more frequently exhibit safe 
behaviour if safety has a high priority, and since human action is a primary 
determinant of injury (Reason, 1990; 1997; McAfee & Winn, 1989; Fellner & Sulzer-
Azaroff, 1984), injury rates should be lower in environments with a positive safety 
climate. Safety climate’s ability to predict safety behaviour (e.g. Cooper & Phillips, 
2004, Johnson, 2007) and injury rate (e.g. Zohar, 2000; Hoffman & Mark, 2006) 
therefore reflects this aspect of Zohar’s theory.    
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As the name of Zohar’s model suggests, the multilevel aspect of safety climate is 
also highly important. While conventional safety climate measures include items 
relating to both supervisors and manager commitment to safety in the one scale 
(e.g. Seo et al., 2004, Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; Tharaldsen, Olsen, & Rundmo, 
2008), doing this fails to reflect theory and empirical evidence demonstrating that 
managers and supervisors contribute to safety outcomes in different ways (e.g. 
Simard & Marchand, 1997; Tomas, Melia, & Oliver, 1999). According to Zohar’s 
model, supervisors have discretion in their implementation of management policy, 
therefore potentially creating a discrepancy between formal and enacted policy. 
This discretion stems from the fact that formal policies would unlikely cover every 
possible eventuality, and that production pressures may result in a different 
interpretation and implementation of formal policies depending on the supervisor. 
For example, if employees in a particular workgroup perceive that their supervisor 
promotes the cutting of corners when production is falling behind schedule, then a 
safety climate may be formed which is distinct from other workgroups and from the 
overall organisational safety climate. Hence, employees will have coexisting safety 
climate perceptions, directed towards multiple levels of the organisation’s 
hierarchy. This aspect of Zohar’s theory has also been supported by empirical 
evidence, with Zohar and Luria (2005) finding variation between workgroups in 
terms of perceptions of supervisors (group-level safety climate), with group-level 
safety climate meditating the relationship between perceptions of managers 
(organisational level safety climate) and safety audit scores. More recent research 
by Zohar and Luria (2010) found that supervisors can act as ‘gatekeepers’, 
protecting against harmful management level safety climates.  Zohar also 
postulated that his model could be extended to include additional levels of the 
organisation, since each level has discretion in conveying the priority of safety to 
the level below them. Hence, mid-level management may potentially be a source of 
behaviour-outcome expectancies, though this aspect of his theory has not yet been 
tested. 
 
A primary advantage of separating the perceptions of supervisors and managers is 
that it provides more specific and practicable feedback to the organisation - 
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interventions can be directed towards supervisors or managers since they would be 
measured by separate scales with separate scores. This practicality is further 
improved by the behaviour-based itemisation used by Zohar. Rather than having 
items which generically refer to commitment to safety in his scales, Zohar refers to 
specific behaviours relating to active, proactive, and declarative practices for each 
level of the organisation. Active practices refer to monitoring and control 
behaviours, proactive practices refer to the promotion of learning and 
improvement, and declarative practices refer to public declarations. Active and 
proactive practices are synonymous with the variables of safety compliance and 
safety participation (Griffin & Neal, 2000), and control versus commitment 
(Zacharatos, Barling, & Iverson, 2005).  
 
Since perceptions are shared within a workgroup for perceptions of supervisors and 
across the organisation for perceptions of managers, data would need to be 
aggregated to reflect these shared perceptions (within group homogeneity and 
between group heterogeneity needs to be demonstrated before this occurs). The 
shared nature of safety climate has been statistically tested and demonstrated in a 
number of studies (e.g. Zohar, 2000; Oliver, Tomas, & Cheyne, 2006; Pousette et al., 
2008). Aggregating the data and conducting multi-level analyses in this manner also 
makes analytical sense. Since safety climate consists of shared perceptions, using 
standard statistical techniques would not be appropriate given that they assume 
independence of observations (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998). The basic premise of 
multi-level analysis is that it takes into account this dependency of observations in 
groups (Twisk, 2006).  
 
In recent articles Zohar (2008; 2010) has further elaborated upon his model, 
detailing the potential social-cognitive processes which precede the formation of 
safety climate perceptions. One process is symbolic social interaction, which refers 
to how individuals construct reality by comparing their own perceptions of events 
with those around them (Blumer, 1969; Stryker, 2008). Zohar (2010, p. 1519) states 
that the process involves “…comparing bits of information and cues, discussing 
possible interpretations, and attempting to reach consensual interpretation of the 
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meaning of events, procedures and practices at the workplace”, which over time 
results in the convergence of perceptions. It is suggested that these shared 
meanings promote the emergence of shared climate perceptions, particularly at the 
group level since employees would likely interact more with those in the same 
workgroup (Zohar, 2010). The role of these symbolic interactions in forming safety 
climate perceptions was examined by Zohar and Tenne-Gazit (2008), who used a 
social-network analysis to find that the density of group communication (a proxy for 
the symbolic interaction sense-making process) was positively related to the level of 
consensus in climate perceptions (climate strength). Their results echoed that of 
other researchers who examined the role of symbolic interaction in predicting 
climate strength in the wider organisational climate literature (Gonzalez-Roma, 
Peiro, & Tordera, 2002; Klein, Conn, Smith, & Sorra, 2001). Given that safety climate 
was considered to reflect the ‘objective’ approach to organisational climate (Parker 
et al., 2003), by including social-cognitive processes, Zohar has incorporated the 
‘subjective’ approach to organisational climate in his theoretical framework.  
 
A related potential antecedent of safety climate is leadership, a premise dating back 
to Lewin and colleague’s (1939) study examining leader-created climates in a 
summer camp context. As previously explained, employees observe and interact 
with supervisors and managers, informing them of the relative priority of safety 
within the organisation. A proximal antecedent of climate is the quality of the 
interactions between leaders and employees (Hoffman & Morgeson, 2003; Ostroff, 
Kinicki, & Tamkins, 2003), assessed through such constructs as transformational 
leadership (Bass, 1990; Zohar& Luria, 2010) and leader-member exchange (Graen & 
Uhl-Bien, 1995; Zohar & Luria, 2005). Zohar and Luria (2010) differentiates between 
leadership and safety climate by stating that leadership is the medium in which 
safety’s priority is demonstrated, and that higher quality leadership interactions 
promote stronger climates; however they are distinct constructs which are assessed 
in a different manner. Safety climate is assessed via surveys enquiring about 
commitment to safety, while leadership is assessed via surveys enquiring about the 
nature of exchanges and the quality of the relationship. The quality of leadership 
interactions is suggested to be a product of the leader’s care and concern for 
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employee welfare, growth, and development (Hoffman & Morgeson, 2003; Zohar, 
2003; Zohar & Luria, 2010). Zohar and Luria (2010) states that leaders who care 
about their employees will have higher quality interactions, with these higher 
quality interactions providing the opportunity for safety related information to be 
communicated. Hence, safety climate perceptions develop through a combination 
of leader-member exchanges (leadership) and member-member exchanges 
(symbolic social interaction) (Zohar, 2010).  
 
Zohar (2010) recently proposed a model which includes the previously mentioned 
antecedents of safety climate (see Figure 4). The model modifies and extends upon 
Reason’s (1997) safety pyramid model, depicting the relationship between a 
number of organisational variables and safety outcomes. The bottom layer of the 
pyramid represents the organisational policies, practices, and procedures, and the 
extent to which they reflect a priority for safety (i.e. management commitment to 
safety). A distinction is made between espoused and enacted priorities, given that 
management might contradict their espoused policies when competing demands 
(e.g. time, cost) come to the fore. The middle layer is supervisor commitment to 
safety, hence the group or departmental safety priority over other factors such as 
production pressure. These levels of safety climate promote unsafe behaviour and 
are also ‘latent pathogens’, in other words, factors which contribute to an overall 
unsafe working environment and increase the probability of employees becoming 
injured.   
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Figure 4.  Zohar’s (2010, p. 1520) safety pyramid model.  
 
2.5.2 Griffin and Neal’s Model 
At approximately the same time as Zohar, Griffin and Neal (2000; Neal, Griffin, & 
Hart, 2000) proposed their own safety climate model. Griffin and Neal 
acknowledged the lack of a cohesive framework linking safety climate to behaviour 
and so tested the model seen in Figure 5, with a similar model tested by Neal, 
Griffin, and Hart. 
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Figure 5. Griffin and Neal’s (2000, p. 349) safety climate model.  
 
In order to more comprehensively describe the mechanisms in which safety climate 
affected safety performance, Griffin and Neal included the components, 
determinants, and antecedents of performance. Based on the work of Motowidlo 
and Van Scotter (1994), the components of safety performance included task 
performance, which assessed compliance to safety rules and regulations, and 
contextual performance, which assessed participation and organisational citizenship 
behaviours related to safety. Griffin and Neal referred to these components as 
safety compliance and safety participation respectively.  The determinants of safety 
performance included knowledge and motivation. Hence, unlike Zohar’s model 
which had safety climate directly predicting safety outcomes, Griffin and Neal’s 
model proposes that this relationship is mediated. This belief was based on the 
work of Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, and Sager (1993), and posits that an individual 
must understand how to work safely and be motivated to perform for safe 
behaviour to occur. Support for this model was found in Griffin and Neal (2000) and 
Neal, Griffin, and Hart (2000), with the latter study additionally finding support for a 
model with organisational climate as an antecedent of safety climate. Since 
organisational climate generally refers to the quality of the work environment and 
the support provided to employees, this model suggests that organisations that 
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support their employees tend to be supportive of safety too. Neal, Griffin and Hart 
suggested that interventions directed at improving an organisation’s safety climate 
will likely be more effective if it is part of an overall organisational climate 
improvement program. Zohar (2008) alternatively does not place as much 
importance in organisational climate, preferring facet specific climates given they 
are less generic and ambiguous than organisational climate. Instead, Zohar (2008) 
proposed that employees develop perceptions of multiple facet specific climates 
(e.g. safety, creativity, ethics) instead of a global organisational climate. The number 
of facets that employees attend to is limited, given the complexity of the 
organisational environment and the social-cognitive processes that lead to shared 
perceptions, (Hardins & Higgin, 1995; Schneider & Reichers, 1983). Hence, Zohar 
(2008) suggested that employees focus on those climates that best predict the 
outcomes of behaviour. While this move away from organisational climate to 
multiple facet specific climates hold promise, there has been little subsequent 
research investigating Zohar’s multiple climate framework.  
 
Griffin and Neal’s theory, which outlined the antecedents, determinants and 
components of safety performance, was a positive step forward in clearly 
operationalizing and defining the variables which predict and are predicted by 
safety climate. While these early studies were conducted at the individual level, 
subsequent testing of this mediated relationship between aggregated safety climate 
scores and safety outcomes found support for the model. Neal and Griffin (2006) 
conducted a five year longitudinal examination of the relationship safety climate 
had with safety outcomes in the healthcare context. While safety climate did not 
directly predict safety behaviour, it did predict safety motivation which in turn 
predicted behaviour. Safety climate in this study was aggregated to the group level, 
and so there was stronger evidence for the findings being generalizable to the wider 
literature.  
 
Theoretically, Zohar and Griffin and Neal’s model have some key differences, with 
these differences even more evident when discussing their methodology.  As 
previously stated, Zohar adhered to a multi-level model of safety climate, where 
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perceptions of supervisors and managers were separated and aggregated to their 
respective levels. In contrast, Neal and Griffin appear to follow a single-level model 
of safety climate, with management commitment to safety being the 
unidimensional target of perceptions. Supervisors appear to have little role in the 
promotion of safety, or are considered indistinct from management. Additionally, 
the wording of items is extremely different. In Zohar’s recent studies, a behaviour-
based operationalization is used, with items such as “Provides all the equipment to 
do the job safely” and “Listens carefully to workers’ ideas about improving safety” 
(Zohar & Luria, 2005, p. 628). Neal and Griffin (2006, p. 953) alternatively do not 
address specific behaviours, with their 3-item scale consisting of different 
rewordings of “Management considers safety to be important”. Safety compliance 
and safety participation, which are the two outcome variables in Neal and Griffin’s 
study, are actually two subscales in Zohar’s safety climate scales. Zohar labels safety 
compliance and safety participation as “active” and “proactive” practices 
respectively. Finally, Neal and Griffin’s scale was aggregated to the group level 
despite group practices not being assessed, a limitation that Neal and Griffin 
acknowledge as potentially reducing the sensitivity of the scale. Hence, there are 
substantial methodological differences between these two approaches to safety 
climate, which may explain the differences in findings. While Zohar (2000) 
acknowledges that behaviour-outcome expectancies have a motivating effect, it is 
strangely never tested in his studies. No study has yet determined whether the 
relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes is mediated by individual 
variables such as motivation and knowledge while using a behaviour-based 
multilevel operationalization of the construct. Therefore, while there are substantial 
differences between these models, there is the possibility that they can be 
integrated into a singular model, as seen in Flin’s (2007) safety climate model.  
 
2.5.3 Flin’s Safety Climate Model 
Flin (2007) has recently attempted to combine the different approaches of Griffin 
and Neal and Zohar by proposing a safety climate model for the healthcare context, 
as seen in Figure 6. In Flin’s model, safety climate consists of manager and 
supervisor commitment to safety, aggregated to the workgroup and organisation as 
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per Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate. Hence, this model acknowledges a 
multilevel operationalization of safety climate and expands upon Griffin and Neal’s 
model which focused solely on management. In the model, safety climate 
determines an individual’s motivation/behaviour-outcome expectations, which in 
inturn affects safety behaviour, such as an individual’s compliance with safety rules 
and their participation in safety related endeavours. While Zohar and Neal and 
Griffin describe a somewhat different intervening variable between safety climate 
and safety behaviour (behaviour-outcome expectancies versus motivation), Flin 
suggests that the two models are congruent with one another, as both intervening 
variables describe a motivational driver which directs behaviour. Though the 
intervening variable in Zohar’s model is not explicitly measured, in Neal and Griffin’s 
and Flin’s model motivation is assessed, reflecting the mediation findings of Griffin 
and Neal (2000) and Neal and Griffin (2006).   
 
One aspect of Flin’s model which separates it from Zohar’s model is the addition of 
human error as a separate stage. Flin states that a drawback of Zohar’s model is 
that he fails to specify how behaviour-outcome expectancies lead to errors. In other 
words, while behaviour-outcome expectancies might explain why an employee 
might rush a task or not wear proper safety equipment, it does not explain why an 
employee might misread procedures for example.  Hence, errors in Flin’s model are 
included as a separate stage to illustrate how unsafe behaviours have a tendency to 
result in errors.  The presence of errors is particularly relevant for the healthcare 
context where Flin directed her model, given that an error (e.g. administering the 
wrong dosage of medication) would have immediate and potentially fatal 
outcomes. 
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Figure 6.  Flin’s (2007, p. 660) model of safety climate for the healthcare 
context. 
 
While not explicitly modelled, error may also be a consequence in Zohar’s 
conceptualisation of the construct. According to Zohar and Luria (2005), if 
employees perceive that speed is unequivocally prioritised over safety, their 
behaviour will reflect these priorities. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that errors 
will result from such a speed-orientated safety climate, despite not being 
mentioned in his studies. Conversely, in Zohar’s (2010) Safety Pyramid model, there 
are some organisational factors not included in Griffin and Neal’s and Flin’s models, 
such as unsafe conditions and chance variations.  It is unlikely that Griffin and Neal 
and Flin are unaware of such factors, and so these minor differences between the 
models may represent differences in the priorities of the researchers.  
 
Zohar’s scales, with their behaviour-based itemisation, are tailor made for 
diagnosing specific vulnerabilities in an organisation. He additionally focuses on 
group/organisational predictor variables, and neglects individual predictors such as 
motivation and knowledge. It appears Zohar wants his research and scales to be of 
maximum practical use to organisations. Changing an organisation’s safety climate 
or conditions would likely reduce the injury rate, while an individual’s motivation 
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would be less important to measure given it is largely a product of the 
organisation’s safety climate. Alternatively, Neal and Griffin and Flin appear to be 
more interested in the individual mechanisms in which safety climate affects 
behaviour, with their models primarily consisting of individual variables rather than 
organisational/group level variables. Overall, the differences between these two 
perspectives are minor, and the absence of any variable in these models does not 
necessarily represent a limitation, but possibly differences in the goals of 
researchers.  
 
2.5.4 Christian and Colleagues’ Safety Climate Model 
Another recent model of the factors contributing to safety outcomes was featured 
in a meta-analysis by Christian, Bradley, Wallace and Burke (2009). As seen in Figure 
7, it is a fairly comprehensive model based once again upon Neal and Griffin’s 
workplace safety model. Similarly to Neal and Griffin, Christian and colleagues do 
not represent safety climate as directly affecting safety outcomes, but rather model 
it as a distal link to safety  outcomes in comparison to the more proximally linked 
safety motivation/safety knowledge.  Christian and colleagues also included person-
related factors such as personality characteristics and job attitudes, which were also 
modelled as distally related to safety climate.  Meta-analysis of the literature 
supported their proposed model, with safety climate positively associated with 
safety knowledge and motivation. Personality (conscientiousness) was significantly 
associated with safety motivation. Safety motivation and knowledge in turn was 
significantly associated with safety performance (i.e. Neal and Griffin’s safety 
compliance and safety participation), which was negatively associated with injuries 
and accidents. 
   
 
 
Figure 7.  Christian and colleagues (2009, p. 1105) model of safety climate.  
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Though Christian and colleagues (2009) meta-analysis provided clarity and some 
much needed insight into the murky safety climate literature, cross-level effects 
were not included due to their potential to impair interpretation of results (see 
Ostroff & Harrison, 1999). Therefore, while the meta-analysis compared individual 
and aggregated data, it did not take into account research such as Zohar and Luria 
(2005) which demonstrated that organisational safety climate predicted group-level 
safety climate, which in turn was related to safety outcomes. Hence, in Christian 
and colleague’s meta-analysis, management and supervisor commitment to safety 
was considered as being on the same level, despite research which has shown 
significant variation in group- level (supervisor) priorities within the one 
organisation (Zohar & Luria, 2005).  
 
By mixing items related to group and organisational priorities in the one scale, 
scores will reflect an indeterminate mixture of levels, reducing measurement 
sensitivity and conceptual rigour (Zohar, 2008; 2010). For example, it would be far 
more informative for an organisation to determine whether perceptions of HRM 
practices or the safety system, two safety climate dimensions mentioned in 
Christian and colleague’s model, were the product of group level or organisational 
priorities. Additionally, the model includes job risk as a dimension, which as 
discussed later, does not represent the construct of safety climate (Beus et. al, 
2010). 
 
Hence, while Christian and colleague’s meta-analysis made a number of important 
contributions to the literature, some of aspects of it do not reflect recent advances 
in research. As seen in Zohar’s model and Flin’s model, it is important to separate 
perceptions of supervisors and managers for both practical and methodological 
reasons. It may not have been possible for Christian and colleagues to integrate 
cross-level effects in their meta-analysis, particularly given the small number of 
studies which perform such analyses; however cross-level effects do represent an 
important avenue of research given their previously mentioned advantages over 
traditional single-level safety climate methodology. 
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2.6 Methodological Implications 
Given the substantial conceptual and methodological advances that have been 
made since Guldenmund (2000) published his review, it was investigated whether 
this has been reflected in the type and quality of research that has recently been 
conducted. Table 2 lists the scale used, the research goal, and the presence of 
aggregation in safety climate studies conducted in the past decade.  
 
It is firstly evident the large number of distinct scales used to assess safety climate. 
Out of the 34 studies included in the review, there were 29 distinct safety climate 
scales. This suggests that there is not yet a generally accepted safety climate scale in 
any industry. Looking at the research goals of each study, it appears the literature is 
primarily concerned with methodological rather than theoretical issues, a finding 
echoed by Zohar (2010). Many of the studies are focused on scale development 
(Hahn & Murphy, 2008; Matsubara, Hagihara, & Nobutomo, 2008; Mearns, Flin, 
Gordon, & Fleming, 2001; Seo, Torabi, Blair, & Ellis, 2004; Silva, Lima, & Baptista, 
2004; Tharaldsen, Olsen, & Rundmo, 2008; Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2009) and 
predictive validity (Hansen, Williams, & Singer, 2010; Hoffman & Mark, 2006; 
Huang, Chen, DeArmond, Cigularov & Chen, 2007; Johnson, 2007; Katz-Navon, 
Naveh, & Stern, 2005; Lu & Tsai, 2010; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; Neitzel, 
Seixas, Harris, & Camp, 2008; Pousette, Larsson, & Torner, 2008; Probst, Brubaker, 
Barsotti, 2008; Strahan, Watson, Lennon, 2008; Wills, Watson, & Biggs, 2006). This 
represents substantial progress since Guldenmund published his review, where he 
lamented the lack of research investigating factorial or predictive validity, 
suggesting that the construct was still in an early developmental stage. Zohar (2010) 
states that the development and validation of new scales for specific contexts is 
something to be encouraged, as the target of climate perceptions may be context 
dependent. A context specific scale will likely be more sensitive than a scale 
generically enquiring about management/supervisor commitment to safety. 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Table 2 
Research Goals of Recent Safety Climate Articles 
Reference Source of Scale Aggregated 
(Yes/No) 
Goal/s 
Neal, Griffin, & Hart 
(2000) 
Self-developed.  No 1. Determine relationship between organisational 
climate and safety climate and their effect on safety 
performance.  
Zohar (2000) Self-developed.  Yes 1. Outline a new theoretical model of safety climate. 
2. Develop and validate scale for assessing group-level 
safety climate. 
3. Test model by examining relationship between group-
level safety climate and micro-accidents. 
Gillen, Batlz, Gassel, 
Kirsch, & Vaccaro 
(2002) 
Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991) No 1. Determine contribution of safety climate, job 
demands, decision latitude, and co-worker support on 
injury severity.  
Mearns, Flin, Gordon, 
& Fleming (2001) 
Scales taken from Offshore Risk 
Perception Questionnaire (Flin, 
Mearns, Fleming, & Gordon, 
1996a; 1996b) and additions 
made.  
No 1. Develop and validate safety climate survey. 
2. Examine relationship between survey, safety 
behaviour and accidents.  
3
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 Mearns, Whitaker, & 
Flin (2003) 
Used the Offshore Safety 
Questionnaire (Rundmo, 1994; 
1997; Mearns, Flin, Fleming & 
Gordon, 2001) 
Yes 1. Determine associations between safety climate and 
accident involvement, and safety management practices 
and safety performance.  
Silva, Lima, & Baptista 
(2004) 
Self-developed, with some items 
from Ostrom, Wilhelmsen, and 
Kaplan (1993) 
Yes 1. Develop and validate a scale assessing organisational 
climate and safety climate.  
2. Examine relationship between survey and accidents. 
Cooper & Phillips 
(2004) 
Self-developed, with some items 
from Zohar (1980) 
Yes 1. Validate the safety climate scale developed by Zohar 
(1980). 
2. Determine relationship between safety climate and 
safety behaviour.   
Seo, Torabi, Blair, & 
Ellis (2004) 
Self-developed.  No 1. Develop and validate a safety climate scale. 
Katz-Navon, Naveh, & 
Stern (2005) 
Safety procedures scale adapted 
from Brunsson and Jacobsson 
(2000), safety information flow 
scale adapted from Hofmann 
and Stetzer (1998) and O’Reilly 
(1980), managerial safety 
practices scale adapted from 
Zohar (2000) and Hofmann and 
Stetzer, and priority of safety 
scale adapted from Zohar 
(2000).  
Yes 1. Determine type and amount of relationship between 
separate dimensions of safety climate and treatment 
errors.  
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Zohar & Luria (2005) Self-developed, with items 
derived from Zohar (2000). 
Yes 1.  Outline theoretical model of safety climate. 
2. Test model by examining relationships between 
multiple levels of safety climate and safety behaviour. 
Oliver, Tomas, & 
Cheyne (2006) 
Scale jointly developed by 
universities at Loughborough 
(UK) and Valencia (Spain), refer 
to Cheyne and colleagues (1998) 
Yes 1. Test the assumption that safety climate consists of 
shared perceptions. 
2. Test whether safety climate is related to accidents in 
the workplace. 
3. Test which individual dimensions are most predictive 
of accidents in a Spanish setting.   
Neal & Griffin (2006) Neal, Griffin, & Hart (2000) Yes 1. Outlines theoretical model of safety climate. 
2. Tests a multi-level model of safety climate over a 5 
year period linking safety climate to motivation, safety 
behaviour, and accidents.  
Hofmann & Mark 
(2006) 
Uses items from a revised 
version of Zohar’s (1980) scale 
by Mueller, DaSilva, Townsend, 
and Tetrick (1999) coupled with 
items from Rybowiak, Garst, 
Frese, and Batinic (1999) 
Yes 1. Determine relationship between safety climate and 
back injuries, medication errors, urinary tract infections, 
patient satisfaction, patient perceptions of nurse 
responsiveness, and nurse satisfaction.  
Wills, Watson, & Biggs 
(2006) 
Used a modified version of 
Glendon and Litherland’s (2001) 
Safety Climate Questionnaire.  
No 1. To determine the relationship between separate 
dimensions of safety climate and work-related driving 
behaviours. 
4
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 Johnson (2007) Uses the group-level safety 
climate scale from Zohar and 
Luria (2005) 
Yes 1. To test the psychometric properties of Zohar’s (2000) 
safety climate measure. 
2. To assess the predictive validity of safety climate. 
Hahn & Murphy (2008) Self-developed, uses a modified 
and shortened version of a scale 
developed by Dejoy, Searcy, 
Murphy, and Gershon (2000) 
No 1. To develop and validate a short scale for assessing 
safety climate. 
Baek, Bae, Ham, & 
Singh (2008) 
Uses HSE (Health Safety 
Executive) survey 
No 1. Examine level of safety climate and demographic 
factors (e.g. organisational size and tenure) that may 
affect safety climate scores in a Korean context.  
Huang, Chen, 
DeArmond, Cigularov 
& Chen (2007)  
Survey developed by a loss 
prevention unit in a worker’s 
compensation insurance 
company, refer to Huang, Chen, 
Krauss, and Rogers (2004) 
Yes 1. To determine the effect of safety climate and injury 
frequency on perceived injury risk, and how this 
relationship is affected by work-shift. 
Matsubara, Hagihara, 
& Nobutomo (2008)  
Self-developed. Yes 1. To develop and validate a scale assessing safety 
climate in a Japanese context.  
Neitzel, Seixas, Harris, 
& Camp (2008)  
Self-developed, with some items 
from Griffin and Neal (2000). 
Yes 1. To asses rates of noncompliance with fall hazard 
prevention requirements.  
2. To assess safety climate, worker’s knowledge and 
beliefs, and determine the relationship between safety 
climate and fall hazard injury risk.  
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Newman, Griffin, & 
Mason (2008)  
Uses a modified version of 
Griffin and Neal’s (2000) safety 
climate scale.  
Yes 1. Outline model of safety climate in relation to safe 
work-related driving behaviour. 
2. Test model by examining relationships between 
multiple levels of safety climate, safety motivation, 
driving self-efficacy, driving safety attitudes, and self-
reported crashes. 
Nielsen, Rasmussen, 
Glasscock, & 
Spangenberg (2008)  
Uses the Danish Safety Culture 
Questionnaire, refer to 
Mikkelsen and Nielsen (in 
preparation).  
Yes 1. Determine differences in safety climate and accident 
rates at two manufacturing plants.  
Pousette, Larsson, & 
Torner (2008)  
Uses a modified version of a 
scale developed by Cheyne, Cox, 
Oliver, and Tomas (1998) 
Yes 1. Cross validate a previously attained factor structure 
and test whether a second-order safety climate factor 
exists.  
2. Determine whether degree of agreement in 
workgroups differed between safety climate and safety 
attitudes.  
3. Test predictive validity of safety climate.  
Probst, Brubaker, 
Barsotti (2008)  
Uses scale by Hecker, Gibbons, 
and Barsotti (2000) 
Yes 1. Test the extent to which workplace injuries and 
illnesses are under-reported.  
2. Test whether safety climate predicts the extent of 
under-reporting. 
4
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 Strahan, Watson, 
Lennon (2008)  
Uses the modified version of 
Glendon and Litherlands (2001) 
Safety Climate Questionnaire 
seen in Wills, Watson, and Biggs 
(2006) 
No 1. Determine relationship between occupational stress 
and safety climate on fatigue-related driving behaviour 
and near misses.  
Tharaldsen, Olsen, & 
Rundmo (2008)  
Self-developed.  Yes 1. Develop and validate safety climate survey. 
2. Determine changes in safety climate over time. 
Turnberg & Daniell 
(2008)  
Uses a modified version of Dejoy 
and colleagues (2000) safety 
climate scale.  
No 1. Assess the psychometric properties of a modified 
safety climate scale. 
Vinodkumar & Bhasi 
(2009)  
 
Self-developed, with items 
derived from various other 
safety climate scales.  
No 1. Develop and validate a safety climate scale for use in 
India. 
Christian, Bradley, 
Wallace, & Burke 
(2009) 
N/A N/A 1.  Meta-analytically examine the association between 
various situation/person-based variables and safety 
outcomes.  
Beus, Payne, 
Bergmann, & Arthur 
(2010) 
N/A N/A 1. Meta-analytically examine the relationship between 
safety climate and injuries.  
Lu & Tsai (2010) Self-developed. Yes 1. Examine the relationship between safety climate and 
safety behaviour.  
Luria & Yagil (2010) Self-developed semi-structured 
interview 
Yes 1. Examine referents of safety perceptions among 
permanent and temporary employees.  
Hansen, Williams, & Patient Safety Climate in Yes 1. Examine the association between safety climate 
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Singer (2010) Healthcare Organizations 
(PSCHO) Survey (Singer, 
Meterko, Baker, Gaba, & Falwell, 
2007) 
perceptions and hospital readmission rates.  
Lu & Yang (2011) Self-developed. No 1. Examine the effect of safety climate on self-reported 
safety behaviour in the passenger ferry context.  
4
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Hence, the studies by Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2009), who attempted to validate a 
scale in the Indian chemical industry context, or Turnberg and colleagues (2008), 
who attempted to validate a scale in the healthcare context, have valid and 
important goals. Zohar (2010) also stated that new scales should reflect recent 
advances in the safety climate literature, such as the separation of supervisor and 
management perceptions and the level-dependent aggregation of these scales. 
Though the safety climate literature has made remarkable progress in the past 
decade, these methodological aspects have been not as well acknowledged.  
 
Out of the surveys included in Table 2, nearly one third did not aggregate their data, 
therefore not acknowledging the shared or emergent qualities of safety climate. 
Though the fact that most researchers aggregated their data is an improvement 
compared to the studies included in Guldenmund’s review, the lack of aggregation 
in a substantial portion of studies has a number of concerning conceptual and 
methodological implications. Firstly, the conceptual development of the construct 
may be hindered if there are fundamental differences in the way safety climate data 
is operationalized by researchers. In the organisational climate literature, it is 
generally agreed that climate perceptions analysed at the individual level refer to 
the construct of psychological climate, while aggregated perceptions refer to 
organisational climate. Though some authors in the organisational climate literature 
appear similarly ambivalent to conceptual developments and fail to label their 
choice of climate correctly (Kuenzi & Schminke, 2009), overall, differentiating 
psychological and organisational climate in this manner reduces conceptual 
ambiguity since researchers can distinguish between individual  and group level 
theory. The aggregation of data also has important implications in terms of research 
findings. Kozlowski and Klein (2000) stated that relationships between constructs at 
the individual level may not hold at the group level. This was evident in a study by 
Ostroff and Rothausen (1997), where it was found that person-environment fit was 
affected by whether or not climate data was aggregated. Hence, studies which 
operationalise safety climate at the individual level may be contributing to further 
confusion in the literature given that their results may not be applicable to 
researchers who operationalise at the aggregate level. Additionally, given the 
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shared nature of safety climate perceptions (Zohar, 2000; Oliver, Tomas, & Cheyne, 
2006; Pousette et al., 2008), traditional single-level analyses are not appropriate 
given they assume independence of observations (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998). By not 
acknowledging the dependency in perceptions, regression coefficients may be 
overestimated and standard errors underestimated (Twisk, 2006). Hence, studies at 
the individual level have potentially confounded results. Given these studies refer to 
“safety climate” rather than a distinct construct, it is evident the serious 
implications that arise from operationalizing safety climate at the theoretically and 
methodologically inappropriate level.  
 
Aggregation due to the shared nature of climate perceptions is not a new concept, 
with Hoffman and Stetzer aggregating safety climate data in 1998, and Salancik and 
Pfeffer (1978) detailing its importance in the organisational climate field decades 
ago. Therefore, the ambivalence towards level-of-analysis is perplexing, particularly 
given the well-published ambiguity it promoted in the organisational climate 
literature. Kuenzi and Schminke (2009) suggested that the operationalization of 
organisational climate as an individual variable by some researchers may be due to 
pragmatic reasons, such as the inability to identify workgroups. Hence, similar 
reasons may be behind this occurrence in the safety climate literature. Kuenzi and 
Schminke suggested that if organisational climate is the construct of interest, then 
only aggregated data is appropriate, while if psychological climate is of interest, 
than only individual level data is appropriate. There needs to be a similar push to 
rename safety climate operationalized at the individual level, akin to what occurred 
in the organisational climate literature. Though safety climate operationalized at 
the individual level has been referred to as “perceived safety climate” (Neal & 
Griffin, 2006, p. 946) and “psychological safety climate” (Christian, Bradley, Wallace, 
& Burke, 2009, p. 1104), this is an uncommon occurrence. Given the previously 
mentioned ramifications of not operationalizing safety climate correctly, there 
appears to be a lack of awareness among researchers and journal editors on this 
issue.   
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Among those studies which did aggregate safety climate data, some methodological 
limitations are apparent. For example, some studies included items relating to 
perceptions of the supervisor/workgroup and management/organisation in the one 
scale (e.g. Hansen et al., 2010; Matsubara et al., 2008; Mearns et al., 2003; Neilsen 
et al., 2008; Pousette et al., 2008; Probst et al., 2008; Tharaldsen, et al., 2008) 
thereby reducing the specificity and usefulness of any feedback from the results. 
These studies do not appear to acknowledge the conceptual models of Zohar or 
Flin, which endorse the separation of organisational and group level targets of 
perceptions. Some of these studies also had individual level items (e.g. individual 
motivation) aggregated to the organisational level, which is fallacious given that the 
unit of theory (individual) is inconsistent with the unit of measurement (aggregate) 
(see Glick, 1985). A number of studies also aggregated their data without 
conducting the necessary tests to ensure sufficient homogeneity of perceptions 
(e.g. Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; Neitzel, Seixas, Harris, & Camp, 2008, Johnson, 
2007). Therefore, though there have been important conceptual developments in 
the past decade, these advances have yet to completely permeate research. Many 
authors incorrectly operationalize safety climate at the individual level, while others 
combine items relating to multiple levels of the organisation into a single scale.  
 
2.7 Related Organisational Theories 
The mechanisms in which safety climate affects an individual’s behaviour and 
ultimately their likelihood of becoming injured can be explained or related to other 
organisational theories. Social exchange theory (Homans, 1958; Blau, 1964) is one 
such framework to explain these relationships. According to social exchange theory, 
when an individual acts in a way to benefit another party, an implicit unspecified 
obligation is created for this action to be reciprocated (Gouldner, 1960; Hoffman & 
Morgeson, 1999). A simple example of this is that if someone was to give a gift to 
another, there is an expectation that the person will reciprocate this act, though not 
necessarily by giving a gift in return (Blau, 1964). Social exchange theory has been 
related to more macro organisational behaviours, with the underlying premise 
being that if organisations act in a way which is supportive of their employees, 
employees will reciprocate this support through increased organisational citizenship 
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behaviour (Konovosky & Pugh, 1994), increased performance and lower 
absenteeism (Tsui, Pearce, Porter, & Tripoli, 1997). Hoffman and Morgeson (1999) 
were the first to relate social exchange theory specifically to safety, stating that 
management commitment to safety in the form of training programs, participation 
in safety committees and other proactive behaviours may result in employees 
acting safer due to an implied obligation to reciprocate this commitment. Hoffman 
and Morgeson additionally found that safety commitment, safety communication, 
and accidents were related to this social exchange between management and 
frontline employees. It can be seen that social exchange theory and safety climate 
are similar concepts, with both theories involving some sort of implicit motivational 
driver being predicted by management behaviour. In social exchange theory, 
management safety actions instil an implied obligation that acts as a motivational 
driver, while in safety climate, management safety actions lead to the formation of 
behaviour-outcome expectancies that motivate/direct behaviour.  
 
Elements of social exchange theory have also been integrated into leadership 
constructs such as leader-member exchange. Leader-member exchange refers to 
the “…quality and effectiveness of interpersonal relationships between leader and 
members” (Zohar & Luria, 2005, p. 626), and involve such factors as psychological 
distance, openness, and, as per social exchange theory, reciprocity (Graen & Uhl-
Bien, 1995). It has been theorised that leader-member exchange is a proximal 
antecedent of climate (Kozlowski & Doherty, 1989), given that leader-member 
interactions are the primary medium to which the priority of safety is expressed. 
Research has found that higher quality leader-member interactions are associated 
with higher levels of safety climate (Hoffman, Morgeson & Gerras, 2003), with 
Zohar (2002) finding that this relationship was moderated by the safety priority of 
group-leader’s supervisors. Zohar and Luria (2005) state that this demonstrates that 
employees discriminate between perceptions of leadership and perceptions of 
safety climate, indicating that social exchange theory and the related term of 
leader-member exchange are intertwined yet distinct from the construct of safety 
climate.  
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A number of other models can also be used to explain the relationship safety 
climate has with safety behaviour. One such model is expectancy-valence theory 
(Vroom, 1964), which describes how individuals engage in particular behaviours 
(and not other possible behaviours) due to an expectation of attaining some sort of 
desired outcome from that behaviour. The theory is very similar to operant 
conditioning; however operant conditioning’s emphasis is on the environment 
shaping behaviour and not cognitive processes. In an organisational setting, if 
employees believe that acting safely will result in a desired outcome, they will 
therefore be more motivated to engage in safe behaviour (Neal & Griffin, 2006). 
Hence, the expectancy-valence theory is synonymous with the behaviour-outcome 
expectancies mentioned in Zohar’s conceptualisation of safety climate.  
 
Social learning theory (Bandura, 1969; 1977) similarly describes the motivational 
processes which may link safety climate with behaviour. Bandura’s most important 
contribution to the literature was his work on observational learning, whereby 
individuals either change or learn new behaviours by observing an outside stimulus 
(Sims & Manz, 1982).  In an organisational setting, supervisors and managers have 
been found to be important behavioural models (Sims & Manz, 1982). Employees 
not only imitate the behaviour of supervisors, if they observe a supervisor 
rewarding/punishing the behaviour of another employee, it will affect the 
frequency in which they perform that behaviour in the future (Sims & Manz, 1982). 
This parallels with the behaviour-outcome expectancies mentioned in Zohar’s 
Multilevel Model of Safety Climate, as organisations in which safety has a high 
priority will be rewarding safe behaviour more often and supervisors will be acting 
in a safer manner, therefore modelling safe behaviour to employees. As Zohar 
states, employees perceive patterns in the practices and procedures of 
supervisors/managers, which infer the priority of safety and the likely consequences 
of behaviour, in other words through observational learning. Social learning theory 
is therefore another theoretically and empirically supported perspective to explain 
the process through which safety climate perceptions are linked to behaviour.  In 
addition, similar findings to Zohar’s research have been found in the social learning 
theory literature. For example, Weiss (1977; 1978) found that while employees tend 
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to imitate the behaviour of supervisors, supervisors tend to imitate the behaviour of 
higher level managers. This was particularly the case if the supervisor was 
inexperienced and the manager was perceived as successful and competent. These 
results echo that of Zohar and Luria (2005), who found that the link between 
organisational safety climate and behaviour was mediated by group level safety 
climate, in other words, managers influence supervisors who in turn affect the 
behaviour of frontline employees.  
 
Overall, there are a number of social/motivational theories that help explain and 
substantiate the process with which safety climate affects behaviour and ultimately 
injury. Social exchange theory, for example, proposes that management safety 
activities elicit feelings of obligation from employees to reciprocate this behaviour 
by acting safely (Hoffman & Morgeson, 1999). This motivational link between safety 
climate and behaviour is in line with the safety climate models of Neal and Griffin 
(2006) and Christian and colleagues (2009), where motivation is emphasised and 
separately measured when assessing the relationship between safety climate and 
behaviour. Elements of social exchange theory have more recently been integrated 
into the construct of leader-member exchange, which is regarded as an antecedent 
of safety climate (Kozlowski & Doherty, 1989). Expectancy-valence theory (Vroom, 
1964) has also been related to safety climate (e.g. Neal & Griffin, 2006; Zohar, 
2000), and is synonymous to the concept of behaviour-outcome expectancies 
motivating behaviour as expressed by Zohar (2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005).  Finally, 
Bandura’s (1969; 1977) social learning theory can also be used to explain how 
expectancies can direct employee behaviour. According to this theory, behaviours 
are learnt through observational learning. As per Zohar’s theory, in organisations 
where safety has a high priority, safe behaviour will be rewarded more, increasing 
the frequency of safe behaviour occurring in the future among all those who 
observe these behaviour-outcome events. Therefore, though safety climate is a 
perceptual construct, when considered in relation to other psychological theories it 
is evident that perceptions inform behaviours through a combination of social, 
cognitive, and motivational processes.  
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2.8 Safety Climate Dimensionality 
As stated previously, safety climate scales are rarely reused (Seo, Torabi, Blair, & 
Ellis, 2004), or their construct/predictive validity evaluated (Guldenmund, 2000), so 
unsurprisingly there is little consensus on the factor structure and dimensionality of 
safety climate.  When studies have attempted to confirm a previously attained 
factor structure, the results have been inconsistent. It is commonly cited that when 
Brown and Holmes (1986) and Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991) reused Zohar’s 
(1980) safety climate scale, they failed to produce the same factor structure. 
Additionally, in the few studies where authors have retested their measure in order 
to validate the factor structure (e.g. Cheyne et al., 1998; 2002; Cooper & Phillips, 
2004; Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 1995; Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Thompson, Hilton, 
& Witt, 1998), it has been demonstrated that retesting on the same sample results 
in similar factor structures, whilst retesting on a different sample fails to replicate 
the factor structure. These earlier results suggested that safety climate factor 
structures were industry/sample specific. A review of recent studies does not 
challenge these previous results. Johnson (2007) appears to be the only researcher 
who has performed a confirmatory factor analysis on a previously developed scale 
in an unmodified form, where he validated the factor structure achieved by Zohar 
and Luria (2005) – however both studies were performed in the same industry 
(manufacturing).  
 
Though the lack of scale reuse has meant there is not a generally accepted scale for 
any industry, this does not mean there is a complete lack of consensus on safety 
climate’s dimensionality. Virtually all scales include the dimension of management 
commitment to safety (e.g.  Brown & Holmes, 1986; Cooper & Phillips, 2004; 
Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; Zohar, 1980; Neal & 
Griffin, 2006; Zohar & Luria, 2005; Hahn & Murphy, 2008; Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 
2009), with a meta-analysis by Beus, Payne, Bergmann, and Arthur (2010) finding 
that this dimension was the strongest predictor of future injuries. Supervisor 
commitment to safety is another common dimension (e.g. Mearns et al., 1998; 
Zohar, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005; Johnson, 2007).  The frequency of these two 
dimensions reflect Zohar’s (2000; 2003; Zohar and Luria, 2005) Multilevel Model of 
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Safety Climate. However, most authors do not adhere to Zohar’s multilevel model 
and so the dimensions consist of a variety of other aspects of the working 
environment. Frequently reported dimensions include employee involvement (e.g.  
Cheyne, Cox, Oliver, & Tomas, 1998; Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Mearns et al., 
2003; Seo et al., 2004), the safety system (e.g. Cox & Cox, 1991; Mearns et al., 1998; 
Zohar, 1980) work pressure (e.g. Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Mearns et al., 2003; 
Zohar, 1980), communication (e.g. Cheyne et al., 1998; Glendon & Litherland, 2001; 
Mearns et al., 2003), competence (e.g. Carroll, 1998; Donald & Canter, 1994; Zohar, 
1980) and perception of risk (e.g. Brown & Holmes, 1986; Mearns et al., 1998; 
Zohar, 1980).  
 
Some of these dimensions, however popular they may be, may not represent safety 
climate at all (Beus et. al, 2010). As Beus and colleagues point out, the perception of 
risk is not a theoretically appropriate dimension given that risk may be independent 
of climate. For example, certain work environments such as offshore drilling or law 
enforcement may have a high perception of risk because of the nature of the work 
itself, not because of the organisation’s commitment to safety. Beus and colleagues 
also identified personal safety attitudes and supervisor competence as commonly 
occurring dimensions which ‘contaminated’ the construct. This is because personal 
safety attitudes were not descriptive of organisations’ policies, practices or 
procedures, a stance supported by Pousette and colleagues (2008), who found 
empirical evidence for a distinction between safety climate and attitudes. 
Supervisor competence is similarly not associated with their safety 
behaviours/commitment to safety. Beus and colleagues found that content 
contamination has a tendency to inflate the relationships between safety climate 
and injury, and suggested that researchers should develop their scales based on 
pre-existing theoretical frameworks. Such a recommendation is validated by a 
review of recently published studies which shows that some researchers who 
develop scales without ascribing to a particular pre-existing safety climate model 
include dimensions which do not represent the construct. For example, Baek and 
colleagues (2008) included items relating to job security and job satisfaction in their 
safety climate scale, factors which may be related to an organisation’s commitment 
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to safety, but are independent of it. Bjerken (2010) included risk as a dimension, 
which as previously stated, is more related to the nature of the work rather than an 
organisation’s commitment to safety. Tharaldsen and colleagues (2008) included 
individual motivation as a safety climate dimension, which recent 
conceptualisations of climate (e.g. Flin, 2007; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Neal & Griffin, 
2006; Christian et al., 2009) consider an outcome of safety climate rather than a 
component. Lastly, Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2009) included safety attitudes and the 
work environment in their scale, which are variables not consistent with 
contemporary conceptualisations of the construct.  
 
Though the factor structure of safety climate has also been highly variable across 
studies, with the number of dimensions ranging from two (Dedobbeleer & Beland, 
1991) to ten (Mohamed, 2002), Guldenmund (2000) believes this is unsurprising, 
given differences in question generation, labelling of constructs, and perhaps most 
importantly, sample characteristics influencing the dimensionality of the measure. 
Guldenmund points out that authors have sampled such disparate settings as 
industry (e.g. Brown & Holmes, 1986; Cox & Cox, 1991; Zohar, 1980), construction 
(e.g. Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Mohamed, 2002), and health care (e.g. Coyle et 
al., 1995), and obviously differences will be apparent in what is pertinent for 
employees in each setting. Even Zohar (2010) regards having items specific to the 
industry as important, as it increases the sensitivity of the survey instrument for 
detecting within-unit and within-industry comparisons – however, Zohar believes 
these items should still relate to the policies/procedures of 
management/supervisors. Such a view is supported by the research of Seo and 
colleagues (2004). When Seo and colleagues validated a safety climate scale which 
included a number of the dimensions previously listed, they found that 
management and supervisor commitment to safety influenced other variables in 
their scale. The authors suggested that the lack of factor structure replication seen 
in the literature may be due to other researchers not taking into account these 
cross-loadings between manager/supervisor commitment to safety and other 
dimensions. What these results also suggest is that studies which assess other 
dimensions (e.g. safety systems, communication) are actually measuring second 
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order constructs representing manager/supervisor commitment to safety. While 
the hierarchical structure of safety climate has rarely been tested, studies by 
Hoffman and Mark (2006) and Silva and colleagues (2004) have found support for a 
second order safety climate factor.   
 
Though a number of safety climate dimensions have been proposed, both theory 
and research reflect management’s central role in promoting a safe working 
environment. Supervisor commitment to safety is also a validated dimension, 
particularly in the manufacturing context (e.g. Zohar, 2000; Johnson, 2007). 
However, far fewer studies have separated perceptions of supervisors and 
examined their association with safety outcomes. Research by Seo and colleagues 
(2004) demonstrated the influence these two dimensions have on other dimensions 
commonly reported in the literature, supporting the notion that dimensions such as 
communication and safety systems are aspects of the underlying 
manager/supervisor commitment to safety. Though it is highly unlikely that a safety 
climate scale will be created which can be used in all work environments due to 
differences in sample characteristics, a number of researchers include dimensions in 
their scales which do not represent the construct (e.g. Baek et al., 2008; Bjerken, 
2010; Tharaldsen et al., 2008; Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2009). Content contamination 
can inflate associations with safety outcomes (Beus et. al 2010), make comparisons 
between study findings problematic, and potentially contribute to safety climate 
becoming as ‘fuzzy’ and all-encompassing as the organisational climate construct 
from which it was derived from.  
 
2.8.1 Co-worker Safety Climate 
A further level of the organisation which may impact upon employee behaviour and 
is a logical extension of Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety climate is that of co-
workers. A co-worker in this thesis will be defined as a fellow employee who works 
in the same area and who is situated at the same level of the organisational 
hierarchy. Co-workers may be particularly influential in organisations where 
supervisor and managers do not work very closely with frontline employees – 
leaving them self-directed for day to day tasks. This is increasingly common in 
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contemporary organisations which have shifted from the traditional pyramid style 
hierarchical structure towards a flatter structure with empowered frontline 
employees (Clifford & Sohal, 1998). In self-directed work teams, team members are 
responsible for managing and planning their own work, setting team goals, and 
reviewing team performance (Irani, Sharp, & Kagioglou, 1997; Wellins, 1992).  
Hence, it is possible that co-workers may be an additional source of behaviour-
outcome expectancies, with the effects of group norms or peer pressure on 
behaviour distinct from supervisory or managerial influences. Though authors such 
as Seo and colleagues (2005; 2004) and Lu and Tsai (2008) included aspects of co-
worker commitment to safety  in their safety climate scales (e.g. co-worker support 
and safety practices), the dimension of ‘co-worker safety climate’ has been largely 
ignored and its effects rarely studied separately in the safety climate literature.  
While Melia and colleagues (2008) examined co-worker safety climate at the 
individual level, only two articles to date have separately examined the role of co-
workers in a multilevel safety climate scale. Heritage and colleagues (2012) 
demonstrated both the factorial validity and the cross-sectional criterion validity of 
a multilevel safety climate survey that included a co-worker safety climate scale. 
Brondino and colleagues (2012) found that co-worker safety climate mediated the 
relationship between supervisor safety climate and safety behaviour in their cross-
sectional study. Hence, recent research supports the extension of Zohar’s model to 
include co-worker safety climate, with further research required to validate the 
findings of these authors, particularly using a longitudinal design.   
 
While there has been little research exploring the role of co-workers in the safety 
climate literature, there have been a number of studies in the general safety 
literature which has suggested that they hold an important role  in promoting safe 
behaviour. For example, Burt and colleagues (1998; 2008) developed a scale 
measuring how caring co-workers were regarding safety, and though criterion 
validity of the scale was not tested, it was predicted that more caring co-workers 
would result in a better identification of hazards and communication of safety 
concerns among workers. Goldberg and colleagues (1991) found that co-worker 
support was associated with participation in safety programs, while Simard and 
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Marchand (1997) demonstrated that relations with co-workers was associated with 
safety compliance. Roy (2003) found that peer pressure among co-workers was a 
positive safety influence, for example in the wearing of safety equipment or other 
preventative behaviour, yet could also promote harmful norms such as a tolerance 
for risk. Finally, Zhou, Fang, and Wang (2008), using a technique known as Bayesian 
network modelling, found that manager commitment and workmate influences 
were the two most important predictors of safe behaviour. Hence, while co-worker 
commitment to safety is rarely included as a dimension on safety climate scales, it 
may have a significant influence on safety behaviour and therefore represents an 
important direction for safety climate research.  
 
A secondary benefit of studying perceptions of co-workers is that it may provide a 
less biased insight into the safety behaviours of frontline employees in comparison 
to scales that ask the respondent to rate their own behaviour. Previous research 
has found that participants have a tendency to over-report behaviours deemed 
desirable by researchers or observers, and under-report behaviours that are 
deemed undesirable (Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002; Moorman & Podsakoff, 
1992). This is especially the case in organisational research, as employees may fear 
the prospect of employers gaining access to their responses, even if the possibility is 
extremely remote (Donaldson & Grant-Vallone). Therefore, the measurement of co-
worker safety climate may be particularly valuable for the diagnosis of potential 
safety concerns in an organisation, as it may provide a more accurate and 
unguarded insight into the safety norms present among frontline employees than 
surveys that ask questions relating to an employee’s own behaviour.    
 
2.9 Links to Safety Outcomes 
To assess safety climate’s criterion or predictive validity, its association with a 
variety of relevant variables have been investigated. These variables include official 
injury/accident statistics, self-reported injuries/accidents, observed safety 
behaviour, and near misses, which refer to events where an injury/accident was 
close to occurring. Commonly, these variables are generically referred to as ‘safety 
outcomes’. 
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Cooper and Phillips (2004) argued that early research provided little compelling 
evidence of safety climate’s ability to predict safety outcomes. In the construct’s 
infancy, research was preoccupied with assessing psychometric properties such as 
factorial validity or discriminant validity; however there was little emphasis on the 
relationship safety climate had with safety outcomes (Cooper & Phillips, 2004). 
While some studies examined concurrent (cross-sectional) validity, Cooper and 
Phillips lamented the absence of studies examining the direct predictive validity of 
safety climate in their 2004 study. This lack of empirical evidence for safety 
climate’s predictive validity led Cooper and Phillips to suggest safety climate only 
indirectly affected safety outcomes, however, contrary to their expectations, a 
direct relationship was demonstrated between safety climate and safety behaviour 
in their study. Though Cooper and Phillips were the first to demonstrate a direct link 
between these two variables, evidence began to accumulate for a direct 
relationship, with Naveh, Katz-Navon, and Stern (2005) and Johnson (2007) also 
finding that safety climate directly predicted safety behaviour.  
 
Recent research has also provided evidence for safety climate predicting 
injury/accident outcomes. For example, Hoffman and Mark (2006) found that safety 
climate predicted the back injuries of nurses, while Johnson (2007) demonstrated 
direct associations between safety climate and injury severity. Johnson (2007) 
additionally found an indirect relationship between safety climate and injury 
frequency, mediated by safety behaviour. Furthermore, Silva, Lima and Baptista 
(2004) demonstrated that safety climate scores could discriminate between 
companies in terms of their injury rate and injury severity in a study involving 15 
Portuguese companies. Therefore, while early research failed to support safety 
climate’s direct predictive validity, recent research has provided mounting evidence 
for safety climate’s ability to predict relevant safety outcomes such as safety 
behaviour and accident involvement.  
 
There are a number of researchers who conceptualise safety climate as indirectly 
affecting safety outcomes, adhering to the models of Griffin and Neal (2000) and 
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Flin (2007). In this indirect approach, individual variables such as safety motivation 
or knowledge mediate the relationship between safety climate and safety 
outcomes.  This approach has garnered considerable empirical support. In Neal and 
Griffin’s (2006) 5 year study examining the lagged effects of safety climate, the 
authors found that safety climate predicted safety motivation, which in turn 
predicted self-reported safety behaviour. Self-reported safety behaviour was then 
found to predict organisational accident data. Newman, Griffin and Mason (2008) 
used Neal and Griffin’s scale in addition to an adaptation of the scale assessing 
perceptions of supervisors to examine multilevel safety climate effects on driving 
behaviour. Their results echoed Neal and Griffin’s study, with perceptions of 
management influencing safety motivation, which in turn was associated with self-
reported crashes. In addition, there was an interaction effect, in which motivation 
to drive safely was higher among employees who perceived both their manager and 
supervisor valuing safety.  
 
A meta-analysis by Christian and colleagues (2009) provided further evidence 
supporting the view that safety climate indirectly affects safety outcomes. Christian 
and colleagues found that while the association between safety climate and safety 
behaviour had a moderate effect size, the association between safety 
motivation/knowledge and safety behaviour had a large effect size. However, these 
results need to be considered in light of the studies which constituted the meta-
analysis. As previously stated, the meta-analysis did not include cross-level effects, 
and very few studies utilised scales conforming to Zohar’s Multilevel Model of 
Safety Climate.  
 
Only a few studies have separated perceptions of supervisors and managers and 
examined cross-level effects, and very few studies have utilised Zohar’s behaviour-
based operationalization of the construct. As mentioned earlier, authors such as 
Zohar (2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005; 2010) and Johnson (2007) included items relating 
to specific behaviours and found direct effects. In contrast, authors such as Neal 
and Griffin generically assessed safety climate, with items referring to an overall 
commitment to safety. Hence, there may be methodological reasons behind the 
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comparatively weaker association between safety climate and safety behaviour in 
Christian and colleague’s meta-analysis.  The finding in Beus and colleagues’ (2010) 
meta-analysis that the safety climate injuries relationship constitutes a small 
effect further highlights the need for more studies to be conducted that use Zohar’s 
behaviour-based operationalization of safety climate and which investigate cross-
level effects.  This will allow future meta-analyses to conduct comparisons between 
these different approaches to measurement. While Zohar acknowledges intervening 
variables such as behaviour-outcome expectancies/motivation, a question remains 
whether safety climate is a powerful enough predictor to reliably and directly 
predict safety outcomes, as suggested by Zohar’s research. Determining this will 
have important implications for organisations, given they would have the 
confidence to perform interventions based solely on safety climate scale results.    
 
Overall, there has been a shortage of longitudinal studies in the literature, 
particularly of the multi-level variety, with the majority of studies being cross-
sectional in design. A cross-sectional design is a substantial limitation for any study 
examining the relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes, given it is 
difficult to establish whether safety climate scores are the product of previous 
injuries or whether injuries are the product of safety climate scores. Table 3 lists 
studies which have assessed the predictive validity of safety climate using a 
longitudinal design. Only studies which aggregated safety climate data have been 
included, given that individual level safety climate is not in line with theory and 
empirical research, and may demonstrate a different pattern of relationships with 
variables. From Table 3 it can be seen that most of the studies were conducted in 
the manufacturing or healthcare sector, with only one study conducted in the 
petroleum industry, however as previously stated that study incorrectly 
operationalized safety climate.  
 
Many of the studies in Table 3 have a relatively small sample size, especially when 
the researchers were required to aggregate to the department/installation level. 
Though the difficulty in obtaining a sample is something all researchers can 
sympathise with, due to the infrequency of accidents/injuries, these studies may 
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have had insufficient power to adequately gauge the relationships between safety 
climate and safety outcomes.  
 
The majority of studies which are longitudinal tend to collect data for a short period 
of time, usually under a year and with two data points, with the exception of Neal 
and Griffin (2006), who collected data over a five year period. The meta-analysis by 
Beus and colleagues (2010) suggests that the overall brevity of longitudinal studies 
may not be a shortfall of the literature, with the authors finding that the predictive 
power of safety climate diminishes as the length of time injuries are assessed 
increases. These findings echo the sentiments of some authors who have defined 
safety climate in comparison to safety culture, with safety climate being a surface-
level “snapshot” indicative of the underlying safety culture at a particular time (Cox 
& Cheyne, 2000; Glendon & Stanton, 2000). 
 
Table 3 
Longitudinal Studies Examining the Predictive Validity of Safety Climate 
Author/s Industry Outcomes 
Variable/s 
Length of 
Study (Data 
Points) 
Sample Size 
(level of 
aggregation) 
Hoffman & 
Mark (2006) 
Healthcare Injuries, 
Treatment Errors 
3 months (2) 81 (workgroup) 
Johnson 
(2007) 
Manufacturing Safe Behaviour, 
Injury Frequency, 
Injury Severity 
5 months (2) 17 (workgroup) 
Mearns, 
Whitaker & 
Flin (2001) 
Petroleum Self-reported 
accident 
involvement 
12 months (2) 9 (installation) 
Naveh, 
Katz-Navon 
& Stern 
(2005) 
Healthcare Treatment Errors 12 months (4: 
2 data points 
in 2 hospitals) 
21 & 15 
(workgroup) 
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Neal & 
Griffin 
(2006) 
Healthcare Self-reported 
safety behaviour, 
self-reported 
safety 
motivation, 
accidents 
60 months (5) 33 (workgroup) 
Zohar 
(2000) 
Manufacturing Micro-accidents 5 months (2) 53 (workgroup) 
Zohar & 
Luria (2005) 
Manufacturing Safe behaviour 3 months (2) 401 (workgroup) 
36 (organisation) 
 
 
To date, only Zohar and Luria (2005; 2010) have examined lagged relationships 
between multiple levels of safety climate and safety outcomes, where it was found 
that supervisor safety climate mediated the relationship between manager safety 
climate and safety outcomes. Hence, further research is necessary to explore lagged 
and cross-level relationships, given that Zohar and Luria’s findings have not been 
replicated and because of the overall scarcity of longitudinal and multilevel safety 
climate studies. Given that meta-analyses have found that the association between 
safety and safety outcomes constitute a relatively small/moderate effect (Beus et 
al., 2010, Christian et al., 2009), further research is required to determine whether 
this is due to a distal relationship between these variables or because of the manner 
in which safety climate is operationalization by the majority of researchers.  In 
addition, there are some industries, notably oil and gas, in which there has not yet 
been a theoretically and methodologically sound exploration of safety climate’s 
predictive validity, as discussed in the next section. Therefore, though Zohar (2008) 
suggested that researchers should move beyond testing for associations with safety 
outcomes, with the absence of longitudinal and multilevel studies, such a 
recommendation was perhaps premature.  
 
2.10 Safety Climate Research in the Oil and Gas Context 
The current research project takes place in the oil and gas context, warranting 
further examination of safety climate research in this industry. The oil and gas 
context has long been the subject of safety research, not only because of the many 
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dangers faced by employees working in this industry, but because of widely 
publicised safety failures such as the Piper Alpha oil rig disaster (Cullen, 1990). In 
this disaster, explosions and fires resulting from the ignition of leaking gas led to the 
oil rig collapsing and the loss of 167 lives (Cullen, 1990). As per the Chernobyl 
nuclear reactor disaster, a poor safety culture was deemed to be an important 
indirect determinant of the disaster (Cox & Flin, 1998). Inadequate training, poor 
communication systems, and the emphasis of production over safety were some of 
the organisational factors that led to the disaster taking place (Cullen, 1990).  
 
Such disasters were a likely contributor to a surge of safety climate research in the 
oil and gas industry from the early 1990’s, led by authors such as Rundmo (1992; 
1994; 1995; Ostvik, Rundmo & Sjoberg, 1997; 2000; Tharaldsen, Olsen, & Rundmo, 
2008) and Mearns (Mearns, et al., 1998; Mearns et al., 2001; Mearns et al., 2003). 
Early research by Rundmo (1992; 1994; 1995) assessed a variety of organisational 
factors in line with Zohar’s (1980) early conceptualisation of safety climate, 
assessing dimensions such as communication, training adequacy, availability of 
protective equipment, and perceived risk. He found that these factors were 
associated with employee satisfaction, job stress, and experience of accidents and 
near misses. Ostvik and colleagues’ 1997 study represented the first time a Rundmo 
authored research paper explicitly assessed safety climate, with the authors 
investigating the association between safety climate and emotional reactions in the 
offshore setting. Safety climate was conceptualised as consisting of values, beliefs, 
and attitudes, with their scale including items relating to satisfaction. Hence, while 
the conceptualisation of safety climate evolved from Rundmo’s early studies, it is 
not in line with recent conceptualisations of the construct which consider values, 
beliefs, and attitudes to be the domain of safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000; Beus 
et al., 2010). In Rundmo’s 2000 study safety climate was still considered an 
attitudinal construct, however common safety climate dimensions were assessed 
such as manager and supervisor commitment to safety. Rundmo found that the 
safety climate dimension “acceptability of rule violations” was the most important 
predictor of behaviour, however as per previous studies, the analyses were cross-
sectional in design and safety climate was operationalized as an individual level 
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variable. More recently, Rundmo was an author of a longitudinal study (Tharaldsen 
et al., 2008), which investigated the factor structure of a safety climate survey over 
a two year period. Associations with accidents were also investigated; however 
these were cross-sectional in design despite the two data points. While the study 
aggregated safety climate perceptions, reflecting developments in the literature 
since the earlier studies by Rundmo, their safety climate scale included the 
dimension of individual motivation. Individual motivation is not considered a 
dimension of safety climate but rather an outcome variable (Griffin & Neal, 2000; 
Neal & Griffin, 2006; Flin, 2007). Since individual motivation is theoretically an 
individual variable, by aggregating scores to the platform level the level of theory is 
inconsistent with the level of analysis (see Glick, 1985). Therefore, while Rundmo 
has contributed to the literature in terms of risk perception theory, his safety 
climate research has limited generalizability due to level-of-analysis issues and his 
choice of safety climate dimensions.  
 
Research by Mearns et al. (1998; 2001; 2003) has similar limitations in terms of 
level-of-analysis and dimensionality. Mearns’ early studies (Mearns, et al., 1998; 
Mearns et al., 2001) were all conducted on the individual level, and included a 
number of dimensions related to the overall organisational culture rather than the 
safety climate. For example, subscales assessed such disparate areas as risk 
perception, safety attitudes, and job security. Job security is distinct from an 
organisation’s commitment to safety, while risk perception and attitudes are not 
considered safety climate dimensions in recent conceptualisations of the construct 
(Beus et al., 2010). Mearns aggregated safety climate data to the installation level in 
her 2003 study, and also made changes to the safety climate survey. However, 
safety climate was still operationalized as an attitudinal construct; particularly given 
there were items relating to satisfaction with safety activities (i.e. 
emotional/evaluative responses). The scale also included items relating to the 
frequency of unsafe behaviour, hence there were a mix of safety related attitudes 
and outcomes in the one scale. Mearns authored a study with Rundmo (Mearns et 
al., 2004) to investigate differences in safety climate between the Norwegian and 
UK context; however, the same criticisms can be levelled at the scale. Additionally, 
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despite a number of offshore installations taking part in the survey, no aggregated 
associations with safety outcomes were investigated, with only descriptive 
differences between high and low accident installations explored. Recently, Mearns, 
Hope, Ford, and Tetrick (2010) examined the links between investment in health, 
safety climate, health climate, and safety behaviour in the offshore context.  The 
authors found that investment in health was associated with safety climate, health 
climate, and individual commitment among employees. Data was aggregated and 
multilevel modelling techniques were used, therefore ensuring a more rigorous 
examination of the links between these variables compared to early studies. 
However, items relating to managers, supervisors, and the individual were included 
in the one scale, making it difficult to disentangle the distinct effects that these 
levels of the organisation have on safety outcomes.  
 
Other studies which have investigated safety climate in an oil and gas context 
include those by Høivik, Tharaldsen, Baste, Moen (2009) and Bjerken (2010). These 
studies possess similar limitations to those described previously. Bjerken (2010) 
included risk perception as a safety climate dimension and did not aggregate safety 
climate scores when testing associations with safety outcomes. Høivik and 
colleagues used the same safety climate survey as Tharaldsen and colleagues 
(2008), which included individual motivation and management related items in the 
one scale. Additionally, the data was not aggregated and the focus was on 
descriptive differences between installations/organisations rather than the 
associations that safety climate has with relevant outcome variables. Høivik and 
colleagues acknowledged the severe shortage of studies investigating factors that 
affect health, safety, and the environment in the petroleum industry, and as 
evidenced by my review of relevant research, there is an even more critical 
shortage of studies in this area which are aligned with recent conceptualisations of 
safety climate. Very few studies have examined associations with safety outcomes, 
particularly using a longitudinal design, and fewer still have aggregated data to 
account for the dependency in climate perceptions. In addition, no safety climate 
studies in the oil and gas industry to date have separated perceptions of managers 
and supervisors and examined associations with safety outcomes. Therefore, 
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substantial gaps of knowledge exist in the oil and gas safety climate literature given 
the lack of multilevel and longitudinal studies.  
 
2.11 Summary 
In the climate literature, there has been a history of ambiguity and confusion, with 
the leap to facet specific climates such as safety climate only partially avoiding 
these pitfalls. Developments such as Zohar’s (2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005) Multilevel 
Model of Safety Climate and Flin’s (2007) safety climate model provided a 
framework from which future research can proceed, however, few researchers have 
adhered to these conceptualisations of safety climate despite compelling 
theoretical, empirical, and methodological rationale. In Zohar’s Multilevel Model of 
Safety Climate, researchers are encouraged to aggregate and separate perceptions 
of supervisors and managers. The strength of this approach compared to traditional 
approaches is that it acknowledges the shared nature of climate perceptions 
(Oliver, Tomas, & Cheyne, 2006; Pousette et al., 2008), the distinct influences of 
supervisors and managers (Simard & Marchand, 1997; Tomas, Melia, & Oliver, 
1999; Zohar & Luria, 2005), and corrects for the lack of statistical independence in 
perceptions (see Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998). This approach also has practical benefits 
for organisations, given that the assessment of distinct behavioural domains at 
separate levels of the organisations provides specific and practicable feedback that 
interventions and improvements can be built around (Zohar, 2010).  While Zohar 
has accumulated strong supporting evidence for his model (Johnson, 2007; Zohar, 
2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005), some of his findings are yet to be replicated, and it is 
unknown whether his model generalises to the oil and gas industry. His model could 
also potentially be extended to include perceptions of co-workers, given research in 
related fields which suggest that co-workers are a powerful and distinct influence 
on behaviour (Roy, 2003; Simard & Marchand, 1997; Turner, Chmiel, Hershcovis, & 
Walls, 2010).  
 
Another area of ambiguity in the safety climate literature is the operationalization 
of safety climate at the individual level. Not only are results potentially confounded 
since independence of observations are assumed, resulting in an underestimation 
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of standard error (Twisk, 2006), there is the potential for the pattern of 
relationships at the individual level to be distinct from the pattern of relationships 
at the aggregate level (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). It is unknown whether studies that 
operationalize safety climate at the individual level are generalizable to studies 
conducted at the aggregate level, since no comparisons have been performed 
between individual and aggregate operationalized safety climate.  
 
Overall, despite the considerable progress made since Guldenmund’s (2000) review 
over a decade ago, there are still some areas where the literature needs further 
development. This includes the replication and generalizability of Zohar’s Multilevel 
Model of Safety Climate, the role of co-workers in promoting safety behaviour, the 
absence of multilevel and longitudinal research in the oil and gas industry, and the 
distinction between individual and aggregate level safety climate.  Hence, the 
overarching goal of the current research project is to address these theoretically 
and practically relevant gaps in the literature. 
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Chapter 3 
Aims, Rationale and Hypotheses 
 
3.1 Overview 
The overall aim of the thesis is to explore the relationships between safety climate 
perceptions at three levels of the organisation (manager, supervisor, co-worker), 
and the subsequent impact these separate levels of safety have on safety 
outcomes. By determining the nature and extent of these cross-level relationships, I 
aim to find support and extend upon Zohar’s (2000; 2010; Zohar & Luria, 2005) 
Multilevel Model of Safety Climate. In addition, I aim to test whether Zohar’s model 
generalises to industries other than the manufacturing context wherein it was 
tested. No multilevel safety climate scale has been tested in the oil and gas industry, 
so not only will Zohar’s model and underlying theory be tested, but multilevel safety 
climate scales in the oil and gas industry generally. Additionally, I aim to determine 
whether co-workers are an additional source of behaviour-outcome expectancies, 
distinct from supervisor and managerial influences on behaviour. Despite research 
detailing the important role of co-workers in promoting safety within organisations, 
the dimension has been largely ignored in the safety climate literature and is not a 
component of Zohar’s model. Hence, one of the objectives of this thesis is to test 
the relative importance of co-worker perceptions in predicting injury compared to 
other levels of the organisation. If co-workers are found to be an important 
predictor of safety outcomes, this has important ramifications for the 
dimensionality of safety climate surveys and the formulation organisational safety 
policy. Finally, I aim to examine the effect that level of analysis has on the 
relationship between safety climate perceptions and safety outcomes. Researchers 
have interchangeably operationalized safety climate at the individual and aggregate 
level, despite potential methodological confounds at the individual level and the 
possibility that level of analysis may significantly alter the pattern of relationships 
between safety climate and safety outcomes. Therefore, comparisons will be made 
between safety climate operationalized at the individual and aggregate level to 
further understand the effect that level of analysis and analytical technique has on 
these relationships.  Such a comparison has not been done previously, and may 
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have important ramifications on the interpretation of safety climate research in the 
past, present, and future. 
 
In order to test these aforementioned aims, a number of specific hypotheses will be 
tested, separated into five objectives. Before the rationale behind each hypothesis 
is explained, the organisational context will be described. 
 
3.2 Organisational Context 
The research will take place in a large Australian-based oil and gas exploration and 
production organisation. The focus of the organisation is on liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) projects in the North-West Shelf off Western Australia; however the 
organisation has projects in other Australian states and internationally. These 
include oil and gas assets in Africa, Korea, Brazil, and the Gulf of Mexico, and over 
3000 employees worldwide. 
 
Recently, the organisation introduced a new competency framework aimed at 
improving the overall safety culture (Hayes, Novatsis, & Lardner, 2008). The 
framework was developed by adapting a previously developed framework, 
reviewing the safety literature, and through in-house research such as interviews 
and through the examination of incident review outcomes. This resulted in a 
framework covering four behavioural themes – standards, communication, risk 
management, and involvement. These themes were linked across three 
organisational groups – managers, supervisors, and everyone. By having the same 
behavioural themes across three levels of the organisation, it provided a common 
language for understanding safety culture, and allowed the framework to be 
integrated more easily into safety management and human resources systems. 
Hence, training and inductions referred to the competency framework, incident 
investigations looked at the presence/absence of behaviours listed in the 
framework, and communication in the form of meetings, posters, and magazines 
have all emphasised the framework’s behavioural domains. 
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In order to track improvements in the safety culture over time in the organisation, 
an organisational safety climate survey was developed. As per the competency 
framework, the survey items reflected the four behaviour domains at three levels of 
the organisation. This survey developed by the organisation will be used to test the 
following objectives. 
  
3.3 Objective One 
Before the safety climate survey is used to assess lagged relationships with safety 
outcomes, its factorial validity will be assessed. Zohar (2010) emphasised the 
importance of developing industry-specific multilevel safety climate scales, and so 
the assessment of factorial validity is an important step in ensuring that valid results 
are attained from the survey. Given that some of the behavioural domains are 
similar to those used in Zohar’s (2000; Zohar &Luria, 2005) safety climate scales, the 
assessment of factorial validity will provide further evidence that employees 
distinguish between these targets of their perceptions.  
 
In order to assess each scale’s factorial validity, confirmatory factor analyses will be 
performed, in which a correlated four-factor model will be compared against other 
plausible models using multiple fit indices. A correlated four-factor model should 
demonstrate superior fit indices compared to other models considering that safety 
climate is generally described as a multidimensional construct (Cooper & Phillips, 
2004; Johnson, 2007; Zohar, 1980; Zohar & Luria, 2005), in which all dimensions 
measure distinct aspects of an underlying safety climate. In Zohar’s Multilevel 
Model of Safety Climate, the underlying safety climate refers to manager or 
supervisor commitment to safety. Therefore, a correlated four-factor model, 
reflective of the four related yet distinct dimensions in each scale, should 
demonstrate a superior model fit compared to a one-factor safety climate model 
and a four-factor uncorrelated factors model.   
 
Hypothesis 1: Confirmatory factor analysis of each scale will demonstrate that 
compared to a one-factor model or an uncorrelated four factor model, a correlated 
four-factor model (representing the four behavioural domains measuring distinct 
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aspects of an underlying manager/supervisor/co-worker safety climate) best 
explains the relationships between variables. 
 
3.4. Objective Two 
The second objective will be to assess the cross-sectional criterion validity of each 
safety climate scale. A number of studies have demonstrated that safety climate is 
an important explanatory variable, with safety climate shown to be associated with 
a number of safety outcomes (Neal & Griffin, 2006; Johnson, 2007; Zohar, 2000). 
According to Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate, safety climate perceptions 
indicate the overall priority safety has at any given level of the organisation, leading 
to the development of behaviour-outcome expectancies. In other words, if an 
employee perceives that production speed is rewarded more than working safely, 
their behaviour will reflect this priority, increasing the likelihood of the employee 
becoming injured. Zohar and Luria (2005) state that employees develop 
complementary climate perceptions of multiple levels of the organisation, attending 
to the formal procedures of management and the subsequent implementation of 
these procedures by supervisors.  Hence, it is expected that there will be significant 
associations between manager/supervisor safety climate and individual safety 
outcomes. While not included as a level in Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety 
Climate, it is expected that perceptions of co-worker behaviours will also be 
associated with individual safety outcomes. This extension to Zohar’s model is 
based on research demonstrating the important role of co-workers in promoting 
safe behaviour (e.g. Goldberg et al., 1991; Simard & Marchand, 1997), and 
therefore co-workers may represent a distinct source of behaviour-outcome 
expectancies. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There will be significant negative associations between aggregated 
co-worker/supervisor/manager safety climate and individual safety outcomes.   
 
3.5 Objective Three 
Objective Three is for the predictive validity of the three scales to be assessed, in 
which safety climate scores in Year One will be associated with safety outcomes in 
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Year Two. Given the lack of longitudinal studies in the safety climate literature, 
particularly those which separate perceptions of managers, supervisors, and co-
workers, this will provide some much needed insight into safety climate’s lagged 
effects. In addition, no study to date has examined the predictive validity of a 
multilevel safety climate scale in the oil and gas industry, so not only will this be the 
first methodologically sound exploration of safety climate in the oil and gas 
industry, it will indicate whether Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate 
generalises to the oil and gas industry. As per the cross-sectional analyses, it is 
expected that employees in workgroups/facilities with lower safety climate will be 
more likely to experience an injury.  
 
Hypothesis 3: There will be significant negative associations between aggregated 
co-worker/supervisor/manager safety climate in Year One and safety outcomes in 
Year Two.  
 
3.6 Objective Four 
For Objective Four, a series of five multilevel path models will be compared, as this 
will allow the replication and extension of the work of Zohar and Luria (2005), and 
provide insight into the lagged relationships among the nested levels of safety 
climate and injury given the absence of research on this topic. In each model, safety 
climate will be measured in Year One, while safety outcomes will be measured in 
Year Two. This reflects the work of Zohar and Luria (2005), who tested a mediation 
model consisting of manager safety climate, supervisor safety climate and safety 
behaviour in the same manner.  By comparing a series of increasingly parsimonious 
nested models, a number of key insights will be made about the cross-level and 
lagged associations safety climate has with safety outcomes. The key questions that 
will be answered include: 
1. Can Zohar’s mediation model be replicated, and therefore does it generalise 
to the oil and gas industry? 
2. Should Zohar’s model be extended to include perceptions of co-workers? 
3. If so, does co-worker safety climate mediate the relationship between 
supervisor safety climate and safety outcomes, similarly to how supervisor 
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safety climate mediates the relationship between manager safety climate 
and safety outcomes? 
 
To answer these questions, the model seen in Figure 8 will first be compared with 
the model in Figure 9. This will provide an insight into whether individuals conduct 
unsafe behaviours (and get injured) because they develop behaviour-outcome 
expectancies based on observations of managers, supervisors, and their co-workers, 
or whether management commitment to safety filters down to supervisor and co-
worker commitment to safety, and it is these more proximal group-level 
behavioural norms that an individual bases their own behaviour on. It is 
hypothesised that Model Two will demonstrate superior fit indices given the finding 
of Zohar and Luria (2005) that the relationship between manager safety climate and 
safety behaviour was mediated by the more proximal supervisor safety climate.  
 
Hypothesis 4a: The model shown in Figure 9 will demonstrate superior fit indices 
compared to the model in Figure 8.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Model One: All paths included. 
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Figure 9.  Model Two: Path between manager safety climate and safety 
outcomes removed. 
 
Model Two will then have its fit indices compared to the model in Figure 10. This 
will determine whether manager safety climate directly affects co-worker safety 
climate, or whether co-worker safety climate is the sole product of supervisor safety 
climate. It is hypothesised that Model Three will demonstrate superior fit indices 
compared to Model Two given that frontline employees are rarely in contact with 
managers, and so it is more likely individuals would develop behaviour-outcome 
expectancies based on the actions of those around them (i.e. supervisors and co-
workers).   
 
Hypothesis 4b: The proposed model, as seen in Figure 10, will demonstrate superior 
fit indices compared to the model in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 10.  Model Three: Path between manager safety climate and co-worker 
safety climate removed.  
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The fit indices of the model in Figure 11 will be compared to Model Three. By 
comparing these two models it will be determined whether co-worker safety 
climate makes an important contribution to the prediction of employee safety 
outcomes as expected, or whether supervisor safety climate on its own adequately 
predicts employee safety outcomes.  
 
Hypothesis 4c: The proposed model, as seen in Figure 10, will demonstrate superior 
fit indices compared to the model seen in Figure 11.   
 
 
Figure 11.  Model Four: Path between co-worker safety climate and safety 
outcomes removed. 
 
Finally, Model Three will be compared to the model in Figure 12. In Model Five, the 
relationship between supervisor safety climate and employee safety outcomes is 
mediated by co-worker safety climate. Since it has been found that the relationship 
between manager commitment to safety and safety behaviour is fully mediated by 
supervisor commitment to safety, it is possible that the same relationship may 
apply with supervisor commitment and co-worker commitment to safety. This 
relationship makes a certain amount of intuitive sense given that a workgroup’s 
norms would be influenced by supervisor commitment to safety, with workgroup 
norms perhaps being the predominant influence on an individual’s behaviour. For 
example, research by Wagenaar and Groeneweg (1987) demonstrated that an 
individual’s behaviour is most predicted by the norms of the workgroup rather than 
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the formalised rules and procedures. However, given the large amount of research 
in the safety climate literature espousing the importance of supervisor commitment 
to safety (e.g. Mearns et al., 1998; Zohar, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005; Johnson, 
2007), coupled with the fact that employees in the organisation are assumed to be 
in regular contact with supervisors and are thus likely to develop behaviour-
outcome expectancies from them, Model Three is hypothesised to demonstrate 
superior fit indices compared to Model Five.  
 
Hypothesis 4d: The proposed model, as seen in Figure 10, will demonstrate superior 
fit indices compared to the model seen in Figure 12.  
 
 
Figure 12.  Model Five: Fully mediated model, with the path between supervisor 
safety climate and safety outcomes removed. 
 
3.7 Objective Five 
For Objective Five, comparisons will be made between safety climate 
operationalized at the aggregate and the individual level in order to determine the 
possible ramifications of inconsistent level-of-analysis in safety climate research. 
This will be investigated by comparing individual and aggregate operationalized 
safety climate in terms of their association with safety outcomes. These types of 
comparisons on a single dataset have not been undertaken previously in the safety 
climate literature and therefore there are no firm predictions on the likely results. 
For the comparison between aggregated multilevel and individual level safety 
climate, it is expected that the results will mirror the meta-analyses of Christian and 
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colleagues (2009) and Beus and colleagues (2010), who found that individually 
operationalized safety climate demonstrated weaker associations with safety 
outcomes compared to aggregate safety climate.  
 
Hypothesis 5a: Safety climate operationalized at the individual level will 
demonstrate weaker associations with safety outcomes compared to safety climate 
operationalized at the aggregate level. 
 
While a small number of researchers distinguish between safety climate 
operationalized at the individual and aggregate levels (e.g. Christian et al., 2009; 
Neal & Griffin, 2006), the arbitrary labelling of the constructs by some researchers 
suggest this distinction is not entrenched.  Safety climate operationalized at the 
individual level is potentially a distinct construct compared to aggregate level 
safety, and hence there is the possibility that it will exhibit a different pattern of 
relationships with safety outcomes. Such a finding would reflect other research 
which has demonstrated that level-of-analysis can affect the pattern of 
relationships between constructs (Ostroff & Rothausen, 1997; Kozlowski and Klein, 
2000).  
 
Hypothesis 5b: Safety climate operationalized at the individual level will 
demonstrate a distinct pattern of relationships with safety outcomes compared to 
safety climate operationalized at the aggregate level.  
 
At the individual level, traditional versus multilevel analyses will be compared. For 
the multilevel analyses, corrections will be performed which control for group level 
variance, therefore acknowledging the lack of independence in climate perceptions. 
Though independence of observations is an assumption underlying standard 
analytical techniques (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998), no study to date has 
operationalized safety climate at the individual level and controlled for group level 
variance. Hence, this comparison will indicate how the acknowledgement of 
dependency affects regression coefficients and standard error estimates, therefore 
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determining whether the results of studies which have operationalized safety 
climate at the individual level (and not performed multilevel corrections) are 
potentially misleading. The results are expected to mirror the findings of Twisk 
(2006), who compared multilevel and non-multilevel analyses in the epidemiological 
context and found that multilevel analyses were much more conservative in their 
regression coefficients and standard error estimates. 
 
Hypothesis 5c: Compared to standard analytical techniques, multilevel analyses will 
demonstrate smaller regression coefficients and larger standard errors.  
 
A further test of the effects of level of analysis and analytical technique will be in 
path analysis model comparisons. Path analysis, typically using a structural equation 
modelling approach, is common in the safety climate literature, with a number of 
authors conducting these analyses at the individual level (e.g. Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 
2000; Rundmo, 2000; Huang, Ho, Smith, & Chen, 2006).  As per the previous 
objective, a number of path models will be compared to determine which model 
represents the best fit to the data. Unlike the previous objective, these analyses will 
take place at the individual level.  The aim of this analysis is to determine whether 
the best fitting model at the individual level displays a different pattern of 
relationships compared to the best fitting model at the aggregate level. Given the 
large number of studies utilising path analysis at the individual level, this is an 
important avenue of research as it will further indicate whether safety climate 
assessed at the individual level is a distinct construct compared to safety climate at 
the aggregate level.  This analysis is exploratory in nature, with no specific 
hypotheses about the manner in which the pattern of relationships will differ at the 
individual level compared to the aggregate level.  However, it is expected that level-
of-analysis will impact upon the observed pattern of relationships.  
 
Hypothesis 5d: Compared to the best fitting aggregated multilevel path model, the 
best fitting individual level path model will display a different pattern of 
relationships between the safety climate scales and safety outcomes.  
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Overall, these analyses will provide a valid contribution to the safety climate 
literature. By testing the aforementioned hypotheses, an attempt will be made to 
replicate and extend upon Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate. Furthermore, 
the analyses will go some way towards addressing the lack of longitudinal and 
multilevel studies in the safety climate literature, particularly in the oil and gas 
context.  
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Chapter 4 
Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Research Design 
Data collection consisted of two phases, separated by 12 months. Data from 
the first phase will be referred to as Year 1, and data from the second phase will be 
referred to as Year 2. In each phase, both safety climate and safety outcome data 
were collected from participants. The thesis will consist of both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal analyses. For Objectives 1 and 2, in which factorial and criterion validity 
are investigated, data will be from Year 1. For Objective 3, in which predictive 
validity is investigated, data will be from both Year 1 and Year 2. The safety climate 
data will be from Year 1 and the safety outcomes data will be from Year 2, so as to 
ascertain the lagged effects of safety climate on safety outcomes. For Objective 4, in 
which path models are compared, safety climate data will similarly be from Year 1 
while safety outcomes data will be from Year 2. For Objective 5, in which 
comparisons are made between individual and aggregate levels of safety climate, 
data will be from Year 1. In order to perform longitudinal analyses, data will be 
individually linked from Year 1 to Year 2. Since the analyses involve the analysis of 
self-report questionnaires and injury frequency, the data gathered will be 
quantitative in nature.  
 
4.2 Participants 
All participants were frontline employees and permanent contractors 
working in one organisation in the oil and gas industry. Temporary contractors were 
not included in any analyses due to the possibility of them not having yet formed a 
cohesive perception of safety’s priority, and because of research suggesting that 
temporary employees focus on different levels of the organisation in comparison to 
permanent employees (Luria & Yagil, 2010). Managers and supervisors completed 
the survey; however their data was not included in the analyses, since their 
understanding of the survey items may be very different to frontline employees. In 
comparison to frontline employees, supervisors and managers would likely have 
different working conditions, different exposure to risks, and they would likely have 
80              Research Methodology 
 
different targets of perceptions for items relating to co-
workers/supervisors/managers. Hence, by only retaining the responses of front-line 
employees, a clearer and more relevant pattern of results was expected to emerge. 
The majority of employees participating were involved in the production of oil and 
gas; however a number of support staff, comprising such areas as engineering, 
maintenance, and HR, also completed the survey. Employees were provided with 
the survey as part of the organisation’s ongoing safety culture improvement efforts, 
with the author provided access to the completed surveys in order to independently 
analyse the data. Participants were spread across a number of facilities, with the 
majority located in facilities in Australia, with some based internationally. No 
individually identifiable demographic information was collected in the survey to 
maximise participant anonymity, however organisational data states that 
approximately 75% of employees are male. In terms of age, organisational data 
states that 0.36% are <20, 17.8% are between 21-30, 33.78% are between 31-40, 
29.42% are between 41-50, 16.38% are between 51-60, and 2.27%  are >60.  
Participant numbers per year for each nested level of the organisation can be seen 
in Table 4. In Table 4, “Total Participants” refer to the number of frontline 
employees completing the survey, not including managers, supervisors, or 
temporary contractors. Workgroups referred to a group of employees, ranging in 
size from 4 to 60, who worked in a specific area together performing the 
same/similar duties. These workgroups were identified by the organisation. Eleven 
facilities took part in the survey in each year, however only nine facilities 
participated across both years. 
 
Table 4 
Respondents per Year for each Nested Level of the Organisation 
 Total 
Participants  
Workgroups Facilities Response 
Rate 
Year 1 846 116 11 66% 
Year 2 818 111 11 59% 
 
4.3 Measures 
Research Methodology               81 
 
4.3.1 Demographic Information 
Participants indicated their place of work from a list of facilities, their length of 
employment (less than one year, one to five years, or more than five years), and 
their status as an employee or as a contractor.  If the respondent indicated that 
they were a contractor, there was an additional question asking if they were a 
temporary or permanent contractor. Finally, the respondent was asked whether 
they were a manager, supervisor, or neither. In Table 5 the demographics of the 
initial sample in each year are displayed, hence it includes the managers, 
supervisors, and temporary contractors not included in any of the analyses.  
 
Table 5 
Demographic Information of Initial Sample in Year 1 and Year 2 
 Year 1 Year 2 
Organisational Role   
Manager  81 81 
Supervisor 183 202 
Neither 1005 985 
Employment Status   
Permanent 780 862 
Contractor 496 415 
Temporary Contractor 204 194 
Length of Employment   
Less than One Year 311 215 
One to Five Years 657 580 
More than Five Years 308 480 
 
 
4.3.2 Safety Climate 
While this thesis will be testing aspects of Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety 
Climate, his scales are not being used. Instead, a survey developed specifically for 
the organisation was used. I was not involved in the development of this survey, but 
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rather I was provided an opportunity by the organisation to use data from their 
survey in the thesis. However, as will be discussed, this survey has been through a 
thorough validation process and is theoretically consistent with Zohar’s Multilevel 
Model of Safety Climate. 
 
 The organisation’s safety climate survey is a self-report measure that assesses 
perceptions of commitment to safety at three levels of the organisation. The survey 
was developed in association with the introduction of a new competency 
framework aimed at improving the safety culture of the organisation. This 
competency framework came from a review of previous literature, in addition to 
the organisation’s own in-house research. The framework focused on four 
behaviour themes (standards, communication, risk-management, involvement) at 
three levels of the organisation (manager, supervisor, everyone), which is reflected 
in the safety climate survey. Hence, there are three safety climate scales in the 
survey, with each scale assessing perceptions of a distinct level of the organisation, 
with four subscales in each scale, assessing the four behavioural themes. 
 
In the survey, one scale assessed perceptions of manager commitment to safety, 
with the survey noting that managers are people above the respondent’s direct 
supervisor. Therefore, the respondent’s’ perceptions were directed at management 
in their area/facility, not the top level management (i.e. CEO) of the organisation.  
Data for this scale therefore needed to be aggregated to the facility level. The 
supervisor scale asked respondents to rate the behaviours of their direct supervisor, 
indicating that it was the person the respondent typically reported to on a regular 
basis. This data needed to be aggregated to the workgroup level.  The third scale 
assessed the commitment to safety of employees in the respondent’s area or 
facility, in line with the ‘everyone’ aspect of the competency framework. While the 
level of aggregation necessary for the supervisor and manager scale was self-
explanatory, for the area/facility scale it was somewhat more ambiguous. A number 
of items in the scale referred to fellow frontline employees, since they listed 
behaviours related to communicating with a supervisor. Though the instructions 
generically refer to a respondent’s area/facility, fellow frontline co-workers 
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appeared to be the subject of the items. The reference to a respondent’s 
area/facility suggested aggregation to the facility level. However, given that the 
scale lists specific behaviours it is likely that an employee would relate the items to 
co-workers around them/in the same workgroup, rather than to employees in a 
completely different role in which they have little contact with. Analyses involving 
this scale will therefore be conducted at the group level throughout the thesis. In 
order to avoid level of aggregation being an alternative explanation for any findings, 
in Appendix B all analyses involving this scale will be conducted at the facility level. 
Additionally, the scale will be referred to more succinctly as the co-worker scale, 
given that fellow frontline employees appear to be the subject of the items. 
 
In each of the three scales the respondent rated the perceived frequency of specific 
safety related behaviours on a six point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (never) to 6 
(always). The co-worker and supervisor scales each had 18 items, while the 
manager scale had 22 items. Behaviours belonged to four distinct content themes 
for each of the three scales: standards, communication, risk management, and 
involvement. While the behavioural domains were the same across the three scales, 
the focus of the items differed between the scales to reflect the differences in 
responsibility throughout the organisational hierarchy.  
 
4.3.2.1 Standards 
The standards subscale overall assessed perceptions of the frequency in which 
compliance-type behaviours were performed by members of the organisation. In 
the co-worker scale, the standards subscale listed behaviours related to following 
rules for co-workers, for example, “identify impractical rules and procedures, and 
suggest improvements to their supervisor promptly”. For the supervisor scale, the 
items referred to supervisors ensuring compliance among their subordinates, for 
example, “visits the worksite regularly to check compliance to standards, 
procedures and rules”. For the manager scale, the items referred to management 
setting a high standard when it came to safety concerns, for example, “verify that 
the workforce understands and follows safety expectations”. Given this dimension’s 
focus on compliance-type behaviours, it is similar to the ‘active’ dimension in Zohar 
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and Luria’ s (2005) scale and the ‘safety compliance’ construct featured in Neal and 
Griffin’s (2006) research.  
 
4.3.2.2 Communication 
 The communication subscale overall assed perceptions of the frequency in which 
members of the organisation communicated openly and effectively in regards to 
safety concerns. For the co-worker scale, the communication subscale consisted of 
items related to speaking up, for example “report incidents, near-misses, unsafe 
conditions and sources of error promptly.  For the supervisor scale, the subscale 
consisted of items related to encouraging the team, for example, “recognises and 
rewards good individual and team safety performance”. For the manager scale, the 
subscale consisted of items relating to open communication with the workforce, for 
example, “communicate safety messages in a simple and direct manner”. As per the 
standards subscale, the communication subscale has been featured in Zohar and 
Luria’s scale, albeit under the name ‘declarative practices’. Communication has also 
featured in a number of other safety climate scales (Cheyne et al., 1998; Glendon & 
Litherland, 2001; Mearns et al., 2003), hence it is a commonly used and well 
validated dimension.  
 
4.3.2.3 Risk Management 
The risk management subscale overall related to perceptions of the frequency of 
risk awareness and risk management behaviours were performed by members of 
the organisation. For the co-worker scale, the subscale included items relating to  
mindfulness and vigilance for safety among co-workers, for example, “ take time to 
plan and organise the necessary steps and resources to do the job safely”. For the 
supervisor scale, the items related to the promotion of risk awareness among 
subordinates, for example, “challenge assumptions and any complacency about 
routine work”. For the manager scale, the items related to identifying and 
confronting areas of risk within the organisation, for example, “ensure hazards are 
identified and managed”. The risk management subscale is the only subscale not to 
feature in Zohar and Luria’s safety climate scales, however risk awareness and 
vigilance towards safety is a well-researched area in the safety literature (for a 
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review, refer to Glendon et al., 2006). As will be discussed shortly, this dimension 
performed well in a previous validation study (Heritage, 2008), and conforms to 
Zohar’s definition and operationalisation of safety climate due to its behaviour-
based itemisation and its emphasis on enacted policies, procedures, and practices.  
 
4.3.2.4 Involvement 
The involvement subscale overall related to perceptions of the frequency of 
proactive or voluntary safety behaviours, in others, behaviours that go beyond 
simple compliance. For the co-worker scale, the subscale included items related to 
proactive involvement at the local level, for example “contribute to incident 
investigations”. For the supervisor scale, items were related to the promotion of 
workgroup involvement in safety, for example, “initiates team discussions about 
safety performance:. For the manager scale, the items were related to the 
promotion of safety across the entire workforce, for example, “seek new ways to 
widen workforce involvement. As per the standards and communication subscales, 
the dimension of involvement is featured in Zohar and Luria’s safety climate scale, 
though it was referred to as ‘proactive practices’. The dimension is also known as 
‘safety participation’ in Neal and Griffin’s research (2006).  
 
4.3.2.5 Psychometric Properties 
Assessment of the safety climate survey’s psychometric properties in its pilot year 
indicated that it had acceptable psychometric properties (Heritage, 2008). 
Confirmatory factor analysis performed on each scale demonstrated that a four 
factor correlated model, reflective of the four safety climate themes being assessed, 
exhibited superior fit indices compared to a one factor model and a four factor 
uncorrelated model. All scales demonstrated criterion validity by showing 
significant negative correlations with employee’s self-reported near misses, with 
convergent validity additionally demonstrated as all scales exhibited significant 
positive correlations with scores on Zohar’s (2000) validated safety climate scale. 
Internal consistency reliability, construct reliability and discriminatory capacity of 
items were also demonstrated to be acceptable for all scales. However, it must be 
noted that these findings were based on non-aggregated data obtained from solely 
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self-report measures; hence there is a need for further evaluation of the scale’s 
psychometric properties.  
 
4.3.3 Injury Involvement 
A format similar to that employed by Zacharatos, Barling, & Iverson (2005) and 
Oliver, Tomás, and Cheyne (2006) was utilised, in which respondents indicate 
through a self-report measure the frequency and severity of injuries they have 
experienced. Participants were asked to enter the number of times they had 
experienced a minor injury (requiring first aid), an injury (requiring medical 
treatment or more), and a near-miss (an incident which had the potential to cause 
an injury) in the past one year. This time period was chosen as it allows comparisons 
with annual self-reported injuries, providing an insight into trends over time as per 
the safety climate data. Since it was expected that minor injuries and injuries would 
be relatively rare events, for each participant the frequencies of minor injuries and 
injuries were summated to produce a “total injury” score. Self-reported near-misses 
were not summated with minor injuries and injuries since they were considered a 
distinct subjective perceptual construct. In comparison, minor injuries and injuries 
are less commonly occurring and are likely more clear-cut events of a more 
objective nature. Self-reported outcome variables are extremely common in the 
safety climate literature (e.g. Griffin & Neal, 2000; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998; 
Mearns et al., 2001; Neal & Griffin, 2006; Seo et al., 2004), owing to the difficulty in 
attaining archival data from organisations, particularly workgroup specific injury 
data. While archival data is preferable to self-reported data, Christian and 
colleagues (2009) found no evidence of an inflationary bias when using self-
reported data in comparison to archival data. Hence, it is expected that the self-
reported data will be an accurate and valid indicator of an employee’s actual 
experiences. 
 
4.4 Procedure  
Before any information was collected from participants, approval from Curtin’s 
Human Research Ethics Committee was sought (approval number Psych 2008 06). 
To allow for data aggregation and multilevel analysis, all surveys were coded prior 
Research Methodology               87 
 
to distribution so that each respondent’s facility and work area could be identified. 
Questionnaires were provided to all production employees during the daily 
“toolbox meeting”, with employees not involved in production provided with the 
surveys during their ordinary working hours. Since all surveys were coded for a 
specific workgroup, packs of surveys were placed in a separate envelope for each 
workgroup and provided with specific instructions to ensure they were distributed 
to the intended workgroup. Collection of the data took approximately one month 
due to the geographical isolation of the production facilities coupled with the need 
to assess all employees on different shift rotations. All completed surveys were 
returned in individual envelopes to the company’s behavioural safety advisor by the 
organisation’s internal mail system. The behavioural safety advisor was the only 
person within the organisation who was in contact with the completed surveys, and 
when all surveys were collected from a facility, they were collected by the author. 
 
Employees were asked to provide a unique code that will enable longitudinal data 
matching for individuals – this data will be used to determine the stability of 
workgroups. This item was listed as optional. The unique code was as follows: 
First 3 letters of mother’s maiden name + day of date of birth 
E.g. Johnson + 05/12/1980 = JOH05 
 
4.5 Analytic Approach  
In Objective One, the factorial validity of each scale will be assessed. Safety climate 
data from Year 1 will be used, with data left unaggregated to preserve power. 
Confirmatory factor analyses will then be performed using EQS 6.1, whereby the fit 
indices of a number of possible models will be compared.  
 
For Objective Two, the cross-sectional criterion validity of each scale will be 
assessed. This will require safety climate and safety outcome data from Year 1. 
Safety climate data will be aggregated to the appropriate level (co-worker and 
supervisor scale = group, manager scale = facility) after demonstrating sufficient 
levels of intragroup/facility homogeneity of perceptions, and sufficient intergroup 
heterogeneity of perceptions. Homogeneity of perceptions will be tested by 
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calculating intraclass correlation coefficients, while heterogeneity of perceptions 
will be tested via a series of one-way ANOVAs. Safety outcome data will remain at 
the individual level, so it can be determined whether an individual’s membership of 
a group/facility is related to their possibility of becoming injured. Since safety 
climate data is at the aggregate level of analysis, and safety outcome data is at the 
individual level of analysis, multilevel data analysis techniques will be required. 
Multilevel logistic regression will be performed using MlwiN v.2.17 (Rasbash, 
Charlton, Browne, Healy, & Cameron, 2009), with a random intercept at the group 
level for co-worker/supervisor scale analyses, and a random intercept at the facility 
level for manager scale analyses.   
 
For Objective Three, the predictive validity of each scale will be assessed. This will 
require safety climate data from Year 1 and safety outcome data from Year 2. As 
per the previous analysis, safety climate data will be aggregated and safety 
outcome data will remain at the individual level. In order to conduct this 
longitudinal analysis, the employee’s unique code will be used to match data from 
Year One to Year Two.  
 
For the path analysis comparisons in Objective Four, the fit indices of a number of 
multilevel structural equation models will be compared. Each safety climate scale 
will be aggregated to their respective level and safety outcome data will be 
aggregated to the group level. It was decided to aggregate safety outcome data 
since individual level data will require a three-level multilevel structural equation 
model, which is significantly more complex and requires more power in comparison 
to a two-level model.   
 
For Objective Five, it will be examined whether there are differences in the pattern 
of relationships between safety climate operationalized at the individual level and 
at the aggregate level. This will be examined in two ways. Firstly, cross-sectional 
associations will be compared. It will be examined whether safety climate 
operationalized at the individual level, with no multi-level corrections, 
demonstrates a different pattern of relationships with individual level safety 
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outcomes compared to safety climate operationalized at the aggregate level. It will 
also be seen whether performing multilevel corrections to individually 
operationalized safety will affect the size of regression coefficients and standard 
errors. Logistic regression techniques will be used to assess associations between 
safety climate and safety outcomes for both individual and aggregated analyses. 
Secondly, path models will be compared. It will be determined whether the best-
fitting structural model when all scales are operationalized at the individual level is 
different to the best fitting model when all scales are aggregated to their respective 
levels.  
 
 
4.6 Format of Subsequent Chapters 
As previously stated, the hypotheses will be separated into five objectives, which 
will be assessed in the following five chapters. In Chapter Five, the factorial validity 
of each scale will be assessed, as per Objective One.  Objective Two will be 
investigated in Chapter Six, where the criterion validity of each scale will be 
assessed. In Chapter Seven the predictive validity of each scale will be assessed, as 
per Objective Three. Path Models comparisons will be conducted in Chapter Eight, 
which will fulfil Objective Four.  For Objective Five, comparisons will be made 
between individual and aggregate level safety climate, which will be contained in 
Chapter Nine. Finally, in Chapter Ten the implications of the findings will be 
discussed.
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Chapter 5 
Objective One: Factorial Validity of Safety Climate Survey 
5.1. Introduction 
Despite it being over 30 years since Zohar (1980) originally introduced the term 
‘safety climate’, there still is a lack of consensus over its dimensionality. That is not 
to say that there has been no progress in determining the core dimensions of safety 
climate. Zohar’s (1980) original scale included dimensions such as risk perception, 
effect of safe conduct on social status, work pace, and effects of safe conduct on 
promotion, all dimensions now obsolete and (predominately) not used in 
contemporary scales as the safety climate construct steadily becomes more 
succinctly defined. With the most widely agreed upon definition of safety climate 
referring to perceptions of an organisations commitment/priority to safety (Cooper 
& Phillips, 2004; Huang et al., 2007; Neitzel et al., 2008; Newman et al., 2008; Zohar, 
2000), most recently developed scales do not include items relating to risk or 
attitudes, but rather visible aspects of the workplace which provide an indication of 
safety’s priority. 
While there is lack of consensus on which perceived aspects of the workplace are 
important and the theoretical model underlying these dimensions, there is near 
universal agreement that manager commitment to safety is a key dimension, and is 
featured in the majority of scales (Brown & Holmes, 1986; Cooper & Phillips, 2004; 
Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Johnson, 2007; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; 
Zohar, 1980; Zohar & Luria, 2005; Hahn & Murphy, 2008; Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 
2009). A number of studies also feature the dimension of supervisor commitment to 
safety (e.g. Mearns et al., 1998; Zohar, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005). The frequency of 
these dimensions reflect Zohar’s Multilevel Model of safety climate, however since 
many researchers utilise a different theoretical model, other dimensions are 
commonly noted, such as employee involvement (e.g.  Cheyne, Cox, Oliver, & 
Tomas, 1998; Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Mearns et al., 2003; Seo et al., 2004), 
the safety system (e.g. Cox & Cox, 1991; Mearns et al., 1998; Zohar, 1980) work 
pressure (e.g. Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Mearns et al., 2003; Zohar, 1980), 
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communication (e.g. Cheyne et al., 1998; Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Mearns et al., 
2003), and competence (e.g. Carroll, 1998; Donald & Canter, 1994; Zohar, 1980).  
There are a number of possible reasons for the lack of consensus over safety 
climate’s dimensionality. The primary reason is the different theoretical models 
utilised by authors. According to Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate, 
employees develop safety climate perceptions from their interactions and 
observations of managers and supervisors, and so Zohar assesses various aspects of 
manager and supervisor behaviour. In Zohar’s research, a dimension such as 
communication assesses an aspect of the underlying manager/supervisor 
commitment to safety, while in other studies the dimension of communication is 
considered as distinct to manager/supervisor commitment to safety.  In other 
words, in some studies safety climate dimensions are theoretically loading onto a 
second-order ‘general’ safety climate factor, while in Zohar-based studies the 
second-order factor is explicitly identified as either manager or supervisor 
commitment to safety.  However, an interesting and unintentional finding of Seo 
and colleagues, who used the ‘general’ safety climate factor approach, was that the 
manager and supervisor commitment to safety factor influenced other dimensions 
in their scale when they were testing their factor structure. These cross-loadings 
therefore supported Zohar’s interpretation of the construct.  
Adding to the complexity is that some studies operationalize safety climate as a 
unidimensional construct. For example, Neil and Griffin’s (2006) safety climate scale 
had three items which assessed the general priority of safety demonstrated by 
management, with no specific behaviour or aspects of organisational management 
identified. Similarly, Newman, Griffin, and Mason (2008) assessed safety climate at 
the supervisor and management level, however the scales contained general 
statements regarding safety’s priority rather than any multidimensional assessment 
of behaviour.  Hence, differences in factor structure are unavoidable when there is 
such disparity in the operationalization of the construct due to differences in the 
researcher’s theoretical orientation.  
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Secondly, it is expected that there will be different factor structures depending on 
the industry assessed (Guldenmund, 2000).  Aspects of the organisation which are 
pertinent to employees in a manufacturing context are likely to be different to 
those in a healthcare context for example. Hence, some differences in 
dimensionality between scales are not necessarily a sign of safety climate being 
conceptually underdeveloped. Even Zohar (2010) states that having items specific 
to the industry is important, as it increases the sensitivity of the survey instrument 
for detecting within-unit and within-industry comparisons, however he believes 
that items should still refer to overarching manager or supervisor commitment to 
safety.  
In the current objective, the factorial validity of a safety climate survey developed 
for the oil and gas industry will be assessed. Consistent with Zohar’s Multilevel 
Model of Safety Climate, there will be separate scales assessing perceptions of 
supervisor and manager commitment to safety, reflecting the key role these 
dimensions have in the safety literature. The survey extends upon Zohar’s model by 
including a scale measuring perceptions of co-worker commitment to safety, with 
the factorial validity of this scale also tested. Like Zohar’s scales, perceptions of 
distinct aspects of the organisational environment will be assessed in each of the 
three scales, with these dimensions relating to the underlying 
manager/supervisor/co-worker commitment to safety. The dimensions assessed in 
each scale are standards, communication, risk management, and involvement. The 
standards, communication, and involvement subscales are synonymous with the 
active, declarative, and proactive subscales in Zohar’s multilevel safety climate 
survey. The active and proactive subscales are in turn synonymous with the safety 
compliance and safety participation scales featured in Griffin and Neal’s (2000; Neal 
& Griffin, 2006) studies. The risk management subscale refers to individual vigilance 
towards safety, which is well researched area in the safety literature (Glendon et al., 
2006). Hence all the dimensions are well supported by the literature, with the 
multilevel organisation of the survey theoretically and methodologically aligned 
with Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate. 
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In order to assess each scale’s factorial validity, confirmatory factor analyses will be 
performed, in which a correlated four-factor model will be compared against other 
plausible models using multiple fit indices. A correlated four-factor model should 
demonstrate superior fit indices compared to other models considering that safety 
climate is generally described as a multidimensional construct, in which all 
dimensions measure distinct aspects of an underlying safety climate (stemming 
from manager/supervisor/co-worker commitment to safety). Therefore, a 
correlated four-factor model, reflective of the four related yet distinct dimensions 
in each scale, should demonstrate a superior model fit compared to a one-factor 
safety climate model and a four-factor uncorrelated factors model. 
Hypothesis 1: Confirmatory factor analysis of each scale will demonstrate that 
compared to a one-factor model or an uncorrelated four factor model, a correlated 
four-factor model (representing the four behavioural domains measuring distinct 
aspects of an underlying manager/supervisor/co-worker safety climate) best 
explains the relationships between variables. 
While the safety climate subscales in each scale are considered to load on a second 
order factor representing co-worker/supervisor/manager commitment to safety, a 
hierarchical model will not be tested. In a previous validation study (Heritage, 
2008), it was found that there was no appreciable difference in the fit indices 
between a hierarchical model and a non-hierarchical model, with the non-
hierarchical model having marginally better fit indices due to its increased 
parsimony. Hence, due to its greater parsimony, only the non-hierarchical 
correlated four factor model will be tested.  
5.2 Method 
Data from Year 1 will be used. Please refer to Chapter Four for a full description of 
the participants, measures, and procedure.  
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Year One Data Inspection 
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No item had over 5% data missing, with the highest frequency of missing data 
belonging to an item from the manager scale with 2.8% data missing. Overall, 5.5% 
of respondents had data missing in the co-worker scale, while 7% had data missing 
in the supervisor scale and 7.2% had data missing in the manager scale. Missing 
data analysis suggested that the data was not missing completely at random 
(MCAR) with Little’s MCAR test reaching significance, χ2 = 5312.64, p < 0.05. This 
was likely due to the higher frequency of missing data towards the end of the 
survey (i.e. the manager scale). Since no item had over 5% missing, it was not 
possible to test whether missing data was missing at random (MAR) through the 
separate-variances t-test. Therefore, due to the small amount of missing data, MAR 
was assumed.  
If a participant did not answer over 50% of items in a scale, all the data for the scale 
was deleted, and was not used in the analyses. This resulted in two participants 
having their co-worker scale data removed, six participants having their supervisor 
scale data removed, and five participants having their manager scale data removed. 
If a participant missed more than one item in the standards, communication, risk 
management, or involvement subscale, data for entire subscale was deleted and 
not used in analyses. This resulted in two participants having their data removed for 
the communication and risk management subscales in the co-worker scale. For the 
supervisor scale, two participants had their communication subscale removed, 
three participants had their risk management data removed, and one participant 
had their involvement subscale removed. For the manager scale, four participants 
had their risk management data removed and two participants had their 
involvement scale removed. When a participant had only one item missing in a 
particular subscale, missing data was estimated via expectation maximisation. This 
technique was chosen since listwise or pairwise deletion would not be appropriate 
as the data was not MCAR. Overall, a total of 846 participants were retained for 
analysis. 
5.3.2 Year One Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6 presents the zero order correlations and Table 7 presents descriptive 
statistics for all scales and subscales. Since there was variability in the number of 
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items per subscale, items means were used instead of the combined score for each 
subscale. The correlations between the subscales in a particular scale are indicative 
of their relative independence, and are also high enough to suggest that they are 
measuring the same underlying construct. 
 
It can be seen that the mean scores for the safety climate scales/subscales are all 
between 4 (usually) and 5 (almost always); indicating that participants overall 
perceived managers, supervisors, and co-workers to frequently exhibit safety 
behaviours. 
 
The internal consistency reliability of each subscale was assessed using SPSS 16.0. 
As seen in Table 8, the Cronbach’s alpha each scale achieved by each subscale 
exceeded the 0.70 value recommended by Nunnally (1978).  The lowest value 
achieved was by the standards subscale in the Co-worker scale, which is not 
surprising given it has the least number of items (N = 3) compared to all other 
subscales. Overall, the survey demonstrated acceptable internal consistency 
reliability across all scales and subscales. 
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Table 6 
Zero Order Correlations between Variables 
Variable 1 1a 1b 1c 1d 2 2a 2b 2c 2d 3 3a 3b 3c 3d 4 5 
1. Co-worker Climate                  
1a. Standards .84**                  
1b. Communication .89** .70**                
1c. Risk Management .88** .68** .71**               
1d. Involvement .85** .57** .65** .65**              
2. Supervisor Climate .66** .51** .57** .58** .62**             
 2a. Standards .63** .52** .54** .55** .57** .92**            
2b. Communication .62** .48** .54** .53** .58** .93** .83**           
2c. Risk Management .61** .48** .53** .55** .55** .93** .82** .82**          
2d. Involvement .58** .43** .48** .50** .58** .93** .78** .81** .84**         
3. Management SC .66** .51* .57** .58** .60** .66** .63** .62** .59** .61**        
3a. Standards .63* .50** .57** .54** .57** .63** .61** .59** .58** .58** .93**       
3b. Communication .62* .49** .54** .51** .54** .58** .55** .55** .52** .54** .95** .86**      
3c. Risk Management .61* .52** .57** .54** .57** .63** .59** .59** .57** .58** .95** .85** .87**     
3d. Involvement .58* .51** .52** .54** .55** .64** .62** .59** .57** .58** .93** .81** .83** .85**    
4. Near Miss -.14* -.11** -.18** -.11** -.10** -.07* -.08* -.10** -.06 -.03 -.10** -.13** -.11** -.09** -.09**   
5. Minor Injury -.05 .01 -.06 -.06 -.05 -.03 -.04 -.03 -.02 -.02 -.04 -.03 -.02 -.04 -.05 .16**  
6. Injury -.03 -.02 -.02 -.03 -.03 -.05 -.03 -.07* -.04 -.05 -.00 .01 -.01 .01 -.01 .096** .22** 
* p < .05  ** p < .05 
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Table 7  
Descriptive Statistics for all Variables 
Variable Mean* Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
1. Co-worker Climate 4.63 0.65 1.29 6.00 -0.42 1.38 
         1a. Standards 4.66 0.71 1.00 6.00 -0.38 0.69 
         1b. Communication 4.83 0.69 1.17 6.00 -0.71 1.51 
         1c. Risk Management 4.67 0.72 1.00 6.00 -0.34 0.70 
         1d. Involvement 4.36 0.87 1.00 6.00 -0.43 0.40 
2. Supervisor Climate 4.74 0.84 1.81 6.00 -0.69 0.42 
         2a. Standards 4.74 0.89 1.50 6.00 -0.66 0.16 
         2b. Communication 4.69 0.89 1.00 6.00 -0.59 0.32 
         2c. Risk Management 4.78 0.87 1.60 6.00 -0.71 0.44 
         2d. Involvement 4.74 0.96 1.00 6.00 -0.75 0.47 
3. Management Climate 4.59 0.85 1.49 6.00 -0.60 0.41 
         3a. Standards 4.69 0.86 1.50 6.00 -0.60 0.32 
         3b. Communication 4.55 0.96 1.40 6.00 -0.61 0.17 
         3c. Risk Management 4.67 0.87 1.50 6.00 -0.72 0.64 
         3d. Involvement 4.45 0.95 1.00 6.00 -0.55 0.37 
4. Near Miss .43 1.60 0 20 7.06 61.86 
5. Minor Injury .47 1.19 0 12 4.27 25.41 
6. Injury .05 0.25 0 2 4.98 26.63 
*minimum = 1 (never) maximum = 6 (always) 
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Table 8 
Cronbach’s Alpha Scores of each Subscale in the Safety Climate Survey 
 
 Co-worker Scale Supervisor Scale Manager Scale 
Standards 0.776 0.834 0.898 
Communication 0.870 0.889 0.911 
Risk Management  0.877 0.911 0.915 
Involvement 0.873 0.919 0.927 
 
5.3.3 Factorial Validity 
 
5.3.3.1 Assumption Testing 
The sample size of 846 greatly exceeds the minimum outlined by Kline (1998), who 
suggested having at least 10 participants per parameter. With the safety climate 
scales containing between 51 and 54 parameters, a sample size of 540 was required 
to reliably test the model.  
 
Normality was a concern with the data, with all items achieving a significant 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic when analysed using SPSS 16.0. However, due to this 
test’s sensitivity in larger sample sizes, visual inspection of histograms and box plots 
were undertaken to determine if there were any practically significant deviations 
from normality. A negative skew was visible in the histograms and boxplots, with a 
number of univariate outliers likely contributing to the skew. Though the outliers 
were considered genuine extreme values, an attempt was made to remove them to 
determine if it would rectify the violation of normality. The removal of initial 
outliers did not correct the violation of normality, and so they were retained. 
Examination of Mardia’s normalised estimate also indicated a violation of 
multivariate kurtosis. The 10 cases with the largest contribution to multivariate 
kurtosis were deleted from the dataset in an attempt to rectify the violation; 
though the resulting normalised estimate remained excessive and so these cases 
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were retained. Since the maximum likelihood method (ML) of model estimation is 
based on the assumption of normality, and high multivariate kurtosis has the 
potential to distort the accuracy of fit indices (West, Finch, & Curran, 1995), robust 
fit statistics (Satorra & Bentler, 1994), which corrects for non-normality, were used 
in model estimation. Transformation of data for all items was not deemed 
necessary due to the use of robust fit statistics. 
 
Linearity was assessed by examining randomly selected pairs of scatterplots, with all 
variables demonstrating linear relationships with one another. Multicollinearity and 
singularity was not deemed to be a problem as EQS was able to invert the matrices 
as part of the confirmatory factor analysis. 
 
5.3.3.2 Factor Structure 
Before the confirmatory factor analysis took place, an exploratory factor analysis 
with Varimax rotation was performed. For all three scales, a one factor solution was 
evident, with the scree plot clearly flattening out after one factor. Eigenvalues also 
suggested a one factor solution, with the supervisor and manager scales having only 
one factor with an eigenvalue greater than one, and the co-worker scale having one 
factor with an eigenvalue of 9.1, and the second potential factor having an 
eigenvalue of 1.4. This result was not surprising given the high correlations between 
subscales. However, as compared to exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor 
analysis is theory driven (rather than data driven) and does not capitalise as much 
on chance, and therefore the confirmatory factor analysis results are of greater 
relevance. 
 
Model comparisons were conducted using EQS version 6.1 (Bentler, 2006). 
Comparison between an uncorrelated factor model, a one factor model, and a 
correlated four factor model for all scales can be seen in Table 9. For all scales, the 
four factor uncorrelated model achieved poor model fit, with no fit indices reaching 
their respective values indicative of a good fit. The one factor model achieved 
better model fit, achieving acceptable fit indices for the supervisor and manager 
scales. However, for all scales the correlated four factor model achieved superior fit 
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indices. Though the correlated four factor model exceeded the recommended value 
of three for Satorra-Bentler chi-square divided by degrees of freedom (Kline, 1998), 
it surpassed the recommended value of .85 for the Comparative Fit Index and the 
Non-normed Fit Index (Bentler, 1990; Hu & Bentler, 1999) for all scales. The model 
also achieved a Root Mean Square Error of Approximation value well below the .08 
threshold (Browne & Cudeck, 1993) for all scales, which further indicated that the 
model had a good fit to the data. Refer to Figure A1 in Appendix A where the 
measurement model is provided for the co-worker scale. 
 
Table 9 
Comparison of Models using Robust Fit Statistics 
 
Model S-B χ2 
 
df S-B χ2 
/df 
CFI NNFI RMSEA AIC 
 
Cut-off Criteria   < 3 = / >.85 = / >.85 = / <.08 * 
 
Co-Worker Scale 
       
    Four Factor          
    Uncorrelated 
2067.33 135 15.31 .65 .60 .13 1797.33 
    One Factor 1355.91 135 10.04 .77 .75 .10 1085.91 
    Four Factor Correlated 601.055 129 4.66 .91 .90 .07 343.06 
Supervisor Scale        
    Four Factor 
    Uncorrelated 
2743.77 135 20.32 .65 .60 .15 2473.77 
    One Factor 869.13 135 6.44 .90 .89 .08 599.13 
    Four Factor Correlated 605.07 129 4.69 .94 .92 .07 347.07 
Manager Scale        
    Four Factor 
    Uncorrelated 
3137.19 209 15.01 .69 .66 .13 2719.19 
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    One Factor 1043.57 209 4.99 .91 .90 .07 625.57 
    Four Factor Correlated 725.24 203 3.57 .95 .94 .06 319.24 
Note: S-Bχ
2
= Satorra-Bentler Chi-square statistic, S-Bχ
2 
/df = Satorra-Bentler chi-square divided by 
degrees of freedom, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, NNFI = Non-normed Fit Index, RMSEA = Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation, AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion, * = a lower AIC indicates a 
better fit.  
 
A confirmatory factor analysis was additionally performed on Year 2 data to further 
demonstrate the stability of the factor structure over time (see Appendix A). The 
results mirrored that of Year 1, with a correlated four factor model demonstrating 
superior fit indices for each scale. Finally, a confirmatory factor analysis was 
performed to ensure that participants could differentiate between the three scales 
(see Appendix A). The results demonstrated that respondents clearly differentiated 
between the 3 scales, with a correlated three factor model (scales perceived as 
related yet distinct constructs) achieving far superior fit indices compared to a one-
factor model (scales perceived as a singular homogenous construct).  
5.4 Discussion 
Overall, the survey performed well, demonstrating factorial validity through the 
superior fit indices of the four factor correlated model in comparison to the one-
factor and uncorrelated four factor models. This provides evidence supporting 
Zohar’s multilevel conceptualisation of safety climate, and provides evidence 
against a unidimensional operationalization of the construct. The superior fit indices 
of the correlated four factor model in comparison to an uncorrelated four factor 
model also demonstrates that even though employees differentiate between the 
behavioural themes, they still consider them to be measuring the same underlying 
construct (i.e. manager/supervisor/co-worker commitment to safety). The 
promising fit indices of the survey also provides some confidence to the 
organisation, as they can target interventions at particular behaviours knowing that 
employees are differentiating between the behavioural themes of each scale.  
If the one factor model demonstrated the best fit indices in both the exploratory 
and confirmatory factor analysis, it would have suggested that safety climate was a 
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unidimensional construct, with employees not differentiating between the 
behavioural themes of each scale. This would have supported the research of Neal 
and Griffin (2006) and Newman, Griffin and Mason (2008), whose scales portrayed 
safety climate as an unspecified, overall commitment to safety held by managers 
and/or supervisors. A one factor model having superior fit indices also would have 
suggested that the scales could be shortened, akin to the 3 item scale in Neal and 
Griffin, given that that each scale would have been perceived as analogous to each 
other.  
However, since a correlated four factor model achieved superior fit indices, the 
findings support the majority of research which operationalizes safety climate as a 
multidimensional construct (e.g. Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Johnson, 2007; 
Mohammed, 2002; O'Toole, 2002; Zohar, 1980; Zohar & Luria, 2005).  The benefit of 
this multidimensional structure is that it allows the organisation to target 
interventions at specific behavioural domains at specific levels of the organisation 
(provided the survey demonstrates predictive validity). This is a significant 
advantage over the shorter Neal and Griffin scale. Though a shorter scale has the 
benefit of being less laborious for both respondent and researcher, it does not 
provide the organisation sufficient insight into how to improve any safety climate 
deficiencies that may be found. Therefore, its practicality is limited in comparison to 
a multidimensional multilevel survey such as the one featured in the current 
analysis.   
Overall, this analysis marks an important first step in the validation of a multilevel 
safety climate survey based on a clear theoretical model in the oil and gas industry. 
Unlike some studies which develop scales without a guiding theoretical model, in 
the current thesis Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate provides a basis for 
the structure of the survey.  However, before it can be established whether Zohar’s 
Multilevel Model of Safety Climate can generalise to the oil and gas industry and 
whether it needs to be extended to include perceptions of co-workers, the 
relationship between each scale and safety outcomes needs to be ascertained. 
Hence, the criterion validity of the survey will be assessed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 6 
Objective 2: Cross-sectional Criterion Validity 
6.1 Introduction 
A number of studies have examined the links between safety climate and safety 
outcomes. However, like the lack of consensus over safety climate’s dimensionality, 
there exists substantial ambiguity in the literature on the type of relationship safety 
climate has with safety outcomes. Some researchers have found that safety climate 
has a direct relationship with safety outcomes. For example, Zohar (2000; Zohar & 
Luria, 2005) found that safety climate (at the supervisor level) predicted micro-
accidents and safety behaviour. Johnson (2007), who utilised the same supervisor 
level scale, found that safety climate predicted safety behaviour and injury severity. 
In the healthcare, environment, Hoffman and Mark (2006) found that safety climate 
predicted medication errors and back injuries of nurses.  
Some researchers argue that safety climate indirectly affects safety outcomes, with 
the relationship mediated by more proximal variables such as safety motivation and 
knowledge (e.g. Cheyne et al., 1998; Christian et al., 2009; Flin, 2007; Neal & Griffin, 
2006; Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000). All of these models portray safety climate as 
affecting safety motivation/knowledge, which in turn predicts safe behaviour and 
the potential for injury. Though these models appear quite different to Zohar’s 
Multilevel Model of Safety Climate, the mechanisms in which safety climate affects 
behaviour are very similar. Both Zohar’s model and the previously mentioned 
mediation models include an intervening variable relating to an employee’s 
propensity to work safely. While in the mediation models this is labelled as safety 
motivation/knowledge and measured separately, in Zohar’s model the intervening 
variable is ‘behaviour-outcome expectancies’ and is not measured separately. As 
previously stated, both of these models have empirical support, with Zohar (2000) 
finding that his scale directly predicted micro-accidents, while Neal and Griffin 
(2006) found that the more proximal safety motivation predicted safety outcomes 
better than their measure of safety climate. 
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These inconsistent findings may be explained by the manner in which safety climate 
was operationalized. In Neal and Griffin’s (2006) study, safety climate was 
measured by a 3 item scale that assessed perceptions of management’s general 
safety priority. Hence, rather than examining perceptions of specific manager 
behaviours or organisational processes, it assessed perceptions of the general 
attitude management held towards safety.  These perceptions were than associated 
with other self-reported variables such as motivation, which predicted safety 
participation and safety compliance, which in turn predicted accidents. 
Alternatively, in Zohar’s scales the items were not a general assessment of manager 
commitment to safety, but referred to specific behaviours. Two of the subscales in 
Zohar’s scale were synonymous with the variables of safety participation and safety 
compliance. Hence, the direct associations between safety climate and safety 
outcomes in Zohar’s study may be the result of the behaviour-based 
operationalization of safety climate.  
Adding to the ambiguity in the literature is the methodological deficiencies present 
in a number of studies examining the association between safety climate and safety 
outcomes. For example, many recent published studies still conduct analyses on the 
individual level (e.g. Seo, Torabi, Blair & Ellis, 2004; Wills, Watson, & Biggs, 2006; 
Hahn & Murphy, 2008; Strahan, Watson, & Lennon, 2008; Turnberg & Daniell, 2008; 
Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2009) or combine items relating to supervisor and manager 
behaviour in the same scale, leading to fallacious inferences (e.g. Tharaldsen, Olsen, 
& Rundmo, 2008). Some studies which have performed aggregated analyses have 
not provided any indication that sufficient checks were made on the homogeneity 
of climate perceptions in the workgroup/organisation (e.g. Mearns, Whitaker, & 
Flin, 2003; Neitzel, Seixas, Harris, & Camp, 2008, Johnson, 2007), creating some 
uncertainty about the existence of shared climate perceptions in the organisation. 
Overall, there exists a shortage of studies in the literature which perform 
methodologically sound analyses, in which multilevel techniques are used to reflect 
the shared nature of climate perceptions. Therefore, while Zohar (2008) has stated 
that researchers should move beyond the development of new scales and scale 
validation, and explore new frontiers such as examining relationships between 
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multiple climates in the workplace, such a recommendation may be premature 
given the continued ambiguity in the literature. 
Further research is required to not only to replicate findings supporting a direct 
association between safety climate and safety outcomes, but also to determine 
whether the specification of further levels of organisational hierarchy will result in a 
more accurate prediction of injury. Though the separate assessment of supervisor 
and manager commitment to safety in Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate 
provides a more comprehensive picture of the organisational situation in 
comparison to a single scale, this does not necessarily prohibit further levels of the 
organisation from being separated and assessed. One such level is that of co-
workers, which has been sporadically featured in safety climate scales (e.g. Seo et 
al., 2004; Lu & Tsai, 2008), but has only once been separated and aggregated as per 
the other levels in Zohar’s model (see Brondino et al., 2012). This is despite an 
abundance of research demonstrating the importance of co-workers on safe 
behaviour in the workplace.  For example, Roy (2003) found that peer pressure 
among co-workers was a positive safety influence, for example in the wearing of 
safety equipment or other preventative behaviour, yet could also promote harmful 
norms such as a tolerance for risk. Similarly, Simard and Marchand (1997) 
demonstrated that relations with co-workers was associated with safety 
compliance. 
Hence, a co-worker safety climate could be posited to exist, with co-worker peer 
pressure and group norms being a source of behaviour-outcome expectancies 
distinct from supervisory and managerial influences. In Zohar’s Multilevel Model of 
Safety climate, a supervisor safety climate exists because formal policies do not 
cover every single eventuality and so there is flexibility in interpretation and 
enforcement (Zohar & Luria, 2005). It is possible that a separate co-worker safety 
climate exists because supervisors are unlikely to control every action of frontline 
employees and so there is some flexibility in how tasks are seen to be completed by 
peers when the supervisor is not present. There will also be some differences 
between workgroups in terms of participation in safety discussions and 
investigations, the willingness of members to share their safety knowledge with 
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those around them, the care directed towards other members in warning about 
potential safety concerns, and the likelihood of members identifying impractical 
procedures and suggesting improvements to their supervisor. 
In this chapter, a preliminary assessment of the survey’s association with safety 
outcomes will be assessed using data from the first year of data collection. Since the 
survey conforms to Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate, with multilevel 
methodology being used, the results of the analysis should help address the 
ambiguity evident in the safety climate literature. Furthermore, this will be the first 
time a study has separated and assessed the associations a co-worker level of safety 
climate has with safety outcomes. This will indicate whether Zohar’s Multilevel 
Model of Safety Climate could be expanded to include co-worker perceptions, and 
whether co-workers deserve the relative lack of attention they receive in the safety 
climate literature. 
Testing the criterion validity of the survey will also provide benefits to the 
organisation, given that the primary function of a safety climate survey is as a 
diagnostic tool. A validated, psychometrically sound scale allows an organisation to 
determine whether there is a safety climate deficiency in any facility, identifies 
behaviours in particular need of improvement, and  provides the organisation with 
the confidence that changing organisational processes/personnel/training methods 
in response to these deficiencies will decrease the likelihood of injuries occurring. 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that each scale will demonstrate associations with 
safety outcomes, given previous research demonstrating the important role of 
managers, supervisors, and co-workers. Unlike studies such as Neal and Griffin 
(2006), which did not find a significant association between safety climate and 
safety outcomes, it is expected that the behaviour-based nature of the items in the 
current survey will result in a higher likelihood of significant effects. Since it is 
expected that a high commitment to safety will result in a lower frequency of injury, 
the direction of the relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes will be 
negative.  
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Hypothesis 2: There will be significant negative associations between aggregated 
co-worker/supervisor/manager safety climate and individual level safety outcomes. 
 
6.2 Method 
Data from Year 1 will be used. Please refer to Chapter Four for a full description of 
the participants, measures, and procedure.  
 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Criterion Validity 
In order to perform multilevel analysis, safety climate data needed to be aggregated 
at the group level for the supervisor scales and at the facility level for the manager 
scale. The co-worker scale will additionally be aggregated to the group level. While 
the scale asks respondents to rate the perceived frequency of behaviours of 
everyone in their area/facility, some of the items specifically refer to fellow 
frontline employees. Given that the scale lists specific behaviours it is likely that an 
employee will be relating the items to co-workers around them/in the same 
workgroup, rather than to employees in a completely different role in the facility. In 
order to avoid having level-of-analysis as an alternative explanation for any findings, 
the cross-sectional criterion validity analyses will additionally be performed using 
facility-level perceptions of co-workers (see Appendix B). 
 To justify aggregating data to the group and facility level, a number of analyses 
were undertaken to determine whether there was sufficient within group 
homogeneity and between group heterogeneity in responses. A commonly used 
method to determine the dependency of climate perceptions within a group is the 
intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC). The ICC can be defined as the variance 
between groups (whether that be workgroups or organisations) divided by the total 
variance, hence the ICC informs us of the proportion of variance accounted for by 
group membership (Twisk, 2006). The ICC can vary between 0 and 1, with an ICC of 
0 indicating that all variance is accounted for within an individual, while an ICC of 1 
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indicates that all variance is due to group membership. In the majority of cross-
sectional studies, ICC’s will not be above 0.20 (Twisk, 2006). There is no clear-cut 
minimum ICC that indicates that multilevel analyses are required, however some 
researchers suggest interpreting ICC’s as a measure of effect size (Bliese, 2000; 
LeBreton & Sentor, 2008). Based on the traditional effect size thresholds of Cohen 
(1988), an ICC of 0.01 indicates a small effect size, a value of 0.10 indicates a 
medium effect size, and values in excess of 0.25 indicate a large effect size 
(LeBreton & Sentor, 2008). LaBreton and Sentor suggest numbers as low as 0.05 can 
indicate an important group effect. 
Before the calculation of group level ICC’s were conducted, all respondents from 
groups containing less than three people were deleted (N = 34), given that groups 
with one or two members may artificially inflate the average homogeneity of 
responses within groups. Next, surveys where the workgroup code was not legible 
were also removed from the analysis.  This process resulted in the deletion of 57 
cases. Overall, a total of 95 workgroups were included in the analyses. To calculate 
the ICC for each scale, an intercept only model was created in SPSS v16.0, where the 
workgroup code/facility was the grouping variable and the mean safety climate 
score (co-worker scale/supervisor scale/manager scale) was the dependent 
variable. Though safety climate is a multi-dimensional construct, treating it as a 
unidimensional construct for the calculation of ICC’s was considered justified, as 
correlations between subscales were extremely high and it provided an overall 
indication of the homogeneity of perceptions per level of the organisation.  In the 
intercept only model there are no predictors (though safety climate will be a 
predictor in subsequent analyses), it simply informs us of the proportion of variance 
in safety climate within groups and between groups. The ICC’s for each scale were 
as follows: 0.125 (12.5%) for the co-worker scale, 0.136 (13.6%) for the supervisor 
scale and 0.088 (8.8%) for the manager scale. These numbers are somewhat lower 
than what some authors have achieved, with Zohar and Luria (2005) attaining ICC’s 
of 0.22 and 0.17 for the manager and supervisor scales respectively. However, the 
scores are definitely not abnormally low, with Neal and Griffin achieving scores of 
0.051 and 0.02. These scores indicated that there were sufficient homogeneity of 
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responses within groups and thus multilevel techniques were required to account 
for the dependency in responses.  The ICC for the co-worker scale was 0.101 
(10.1%) when aggregated to the facility level (in the determination of whether the 
group or facility level was the more appropriate level of aggregation). This indicated 
some homogeneity in perceptions; however since the ICC was lower at the facility 
level as compared to the workgroup level, the workgroup level was deemed to be 
the more appropriate level of analysis for the co-worker scale. 
According to Oliver, Tomas, and Cheyne (2006), in addition to determining the level 
of within group homogeneity via ICC’s, to further justify aggregation a test of 
between group variance should be undertaken. Hence, a one-way analysis of 
variance using unaggregated data was tested. A respondent’s workgroup was the 
independent variable when testing the co-worker and supervisor scales, while 
facility was the independent variable when testing the manager scale. The 
dependent variable was the mean safety climate score. Results indicated that all 
safety climate scales exhibited significant between group variance, Co-worker Scale: 
F (95, 751) = 2.03, p < .001 (ηp
2 = .227), Supervisor Scale: F (95, 738) = 2.18, p < .001 
(ηp
2 = .244), Manager Scale: F (10, 736) = 7.83, p < .001 (ηp
2 = .097). These results 
coupled with the ICC’s suggest a need to consider the safety climate perceptions as 
“shared” at the group/facility level, and therefore requiring aggregation and 
multilevel analysis.  
To assess the criterion validity of the survey, a number of multilevel logistic analyses 
were performed using MLwiN v2.17 (Rasbash et al., 2009). The logit link function 
was utilised, with a random intercept added to the model. No significant amount of 
overdispersion was present in the data; hence parameter estimates were calculated 
under the assumption of a standard binomial distribution. Models were first 
computed using 1st order marginal quasi-likelihood (MQL) approximation, from 
where it was determined whether a random slope was required. Second-order 
predictive quasi-likelihood (PQL) approximation was then used, with this process 
resulting in less biased estimates and less chance of convergence problems 
(Rashbash et. al., 2009). Standardised residuals and influence diagnostics were 
inspected to determine the presence of any extreme values. For the majority of 
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subscales there were no outliers detected, however for some subscales between 1 
and 3 outliers were removed. Models were then recomputed using 2nd order PQL 
approximation. The results of the analyses can be seen in Table 10, with significance 
values calculated via the Wald test.  
The results indicate that the co-worker scale is not a good predictor of safety 
outcomes. Though the parameter estimates with self-reported near misses were in 
the correct direction, the estimates for total scale score and for all of the subscales 
failed to reach significance for either self-reported near misses or injuries. For 
injuries, the associations with co-worker safety climate were in the opposite 
direction to that expected, with error scores similar or larger than parameter 
estimates, indicating a negligible or conflicting association.  
Supervisor safety climate scale results were more positive. Parameter estimates 
were in the correct direction for the scale and its subscales for both near misses and 
injuries, with the total scale and three out of four subscales shown to be 
significantly negatively associated with near misses. Similarly to the co-worker scale, 
neither the total scale nor its subscales demonstrated significant associations with 
self-reported injuries.  
The manager safety climate scale additionally did not demonstrate significant 
associations with self-reported injuries; however it did show a significant 
association with self-reported near misses. The Involvement and Communication 
subscales were also seen to be significantly negatively associated with self-reported 
near misses, with the Standards and Risk Management subscales falling marginally 
short of the 0.05 threshold.  Hence, partial support for Hypothesis 2 was found, 
with the supervisor and manager scales demonstrating significant associations with 
self-reported near misses. 
Logistic regression analyses allow the calculation of odds ratios, which indicates the 
relative risk of a particular outcome occurring given the presence of a particular 
factor. It is derived by calculating the exponential function of the regression 
coefficient. For the supervisor scale, the odds ratio is 0.46. This indicates that a 
group with a mean supervisor scale score of 5 has 0.46 times the likelihood of 
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experiencing a near miss compared to a group with a mean supervisor scale score of 
4.  The 95% confidence interval is a relatively large, ranging from 0.24 to 0.86, due 
to the small range of scores. For the manager scale, the odds ratio is 0.26, with a 
95% confidence interval ranging from 0.07 to 0.92.  
Table 10 
Multilevel Logistic Regression Analyses between Injury Involvement and Safety Climate 
 Near Miss 
Estimate (SE) 
 
p Value 
Injury 
Estimate (SE) 
 
p Value 
Co-worker Scale -0.613 (0.445) 0.169 0.315 (0.328) 0.336 
Standards -0.464 (0.389) 0.233 0.273 (0.295) 0.354 
Communication -0.681 (0.424) 0.108 0.155 (0.316) 0.623 
Risk Management -0.701 (0.409) 0.087 0.440 (0.299) 0.141 
Involvement -0.524 (0.345) 0.129 0.181 (0.275) 0.510 
Supervisor Scale -0.785 (0.324) 0.015* -0.280 (0.239) 0.242 
Standards -0.652 (0.291) 0.025* -0.163 (0.216) 0.449 
Communication -0.988 (0.314) 0.002* -0.343 (0.232) 0.139 
Risk Management -0.755 (0.328) 0.021* -0.204 (0.240) 0.395 
Involvement -0.535 (0.302) 0.076 -0.312 (0.227) 0.170 
Manager Scale -1.342 (0.645) 0.037* -0.138 (0.506) 0.784 
Standards -1.267 (0.720) 0.078 0.004 (0.525) 1.000 
Communication -1.100 (0.500) 0.028* -0.211 (0.414) 0.610 
Risk Management -1.373 (0.795) 0.084 0.185 (0.553) 0.738 
Involvement -1.272 (0.560) 0.023* -0.286 (0.456) 0.530 
* p < 0.05 
 
The relationship between the co-worker scale and safety outcomes was also 
assessed with the co-worker scale aggregated to the facility level (See Table A3 in 
Appendix B). Other than the level of aggregation, analyses were conducted in the 
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same manner as before, with one outlier detected and removed from the analysis. 
As per the group level analyses, the co-worker scale did not demonstrate a 
significant association with either self-reported near misses or injuries. Three out of 
four subscales also did not achieve significant associations with self-reported safety 
outcomes, with the exception of the involvement subscale. This subscale achieved a 
marginally significant negative association with self-reported injuries. All subscales 
additionally demonstrated associations with self-reported injuries in the opposite 
direction to that expected.  
6.4 Discussion 
Zohar (2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005) theorised that safety climate affected employee’s 
behaviour-outcome expectancies, which in turn influenced future behaviour. While 
managers and supervisors were viewed as the source of these expectancies in 
Zohar’s model, I proposed that co-workers were another distinct source in the 
current analysis. Therefore, while Zohar and Luria’s (2005) Multilevel Safety Climate 
Scale had two levels, measuring manager and supervisor commitment to safety, this 
analysis attempted to include a third level measuring co-worker commitment to 
safety. Though the co-worker safety climate scale demonstrated sufficient internal 
consistency reliability and factorial validity, the most important feature of a safety 
climate scale is its ability to predict workplace injuries, given that it is used to 
diagnose potential safety concerns in the organisation, thereby promoting the use 
of focused interventions. Unlike the scales assessing the supervisor and manager 
levels of the organisation, the co-worker safety climate scale did not demonstrate 
any significant associations with self-reported near misses or injuries. This was the 
case regardless of whether the scale was aggregated to the group or facility level.  
 
Given evidence from authors such as Roy (2003), who found that co-workers can 
promote harmful norms such as a learned tolerance for risk, and by Simard and 
Marchand (1997) and Goldberg and colleagues (1991), who found that co-workers 
can influence safety compliance and safety participation, the current results are 
surprising. A likely explanation is that co-workers are not an important source of 
behaviour-outcome expectancies. This either indicates that employees, in this 
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company at least, are relatively autonomous and do not coerce other employees to 
act in a particular way and/or that supervisors are a much more influential source of 
behaviour-outcome expectancies. Given that supervisors are responsible for 
punishing/rewarding safe/unsafe behaviour, the prospect of losing one’s job or 
future promotion possibilities is evidently more palpable than trying to fit in with 
fellow employees. Overall, in a high risk company such as the one currently studied, 
where it is inferred that there is a high degree of supervision, perceptions of co-
worker commitment to safety appears to not be as important in determining 
behaviour.  
 
The results of the analysis provide strong support for Zohar’s Multilevel Model of 
Safety Climate. According to Zohar’s model, employees develop behaviour-outcome 
expectancies based on the perceived priority of safety compared to production 
concerns. These behaviour-outcome expectancies stem from management 
(organisational level climate) and supervisors (group level climate), since the 
policies espoused by management do not cover every eventuality, thus leading to a 
degree of supervisory discretion in the manner policies are implemented.  Though 
the scale used in the current analysis is different to that used by Zohar in his 
research, the criterion validity of the Supervisor and Manager Safety Climate Scales 
lend support to his previously discussed model of safety climate. This is an 
important finding, given that this is the first multilevel safety climate scale to be 
validated after Zohar and Luria’s (2005) effort. Since Zohar’s research has taken 
place in the manufacturing sector in Israel, and the current analysis takes place in 
the oil and gas industry in Australia, the findings demonstrate that Zohar’s model 
can be generalised to other industries and it can be used to develop a scale that is 
specific to the needs of a particular organisation. Given the large differences in the 
current objective’s sample and Zohar’s sample, the findings indicate that Zohar’s 
model may be applicable to other industries.  
 
The results also support a largely untested aspect of Zohar’s model.  As stated 
previously, individual employees develop behaviour-outcome expectancies based 
on the perceived priority of safety, with Zohar and Luria (2005, p. 617) stating that 
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“…individual employees, as members of the organization as a whole and of subunits 
in that organization, develop consensual multilevel assessments of the most 
significant environmental features in terms of desired role behavior, and then they 
act accordingly”. Since an individual’s behaviour reflects their perceived priority of 
safety, in environments where safety has a low priority, individuals should therefore 
be more likely to conduct unsafe behaviours and experience injury. Only Zohar 
(2000) has tested the relationship between group level climate and individual injury, 
with no study to date examining the relationship between organisational level 
outcomes and individual injury. While no significant association was evident 
between safety climate and injuries, the current findings, in which both supervisor 
and manager commitment to safety demonstrated associations with individual self-
reported near misses, are supportive of Zohar’s stance that shared safety climate 
perceptions affects individual level safety outcomes.  
 
The significant associations between the supervisor/manager scales and safety 
outcomes also tentatively suggest a direct relationship between safety climate and 
safety outcomes. Though the cross-sectional design of this analysis prohibits causal 
statements from being made, the strong associations between safety climate and 
safety outcomes is more in line with Zohar’s (2000) findings than Neal and Griffin 
(2006), in which a significant association was not found. The findings therefore 
suggest the superiority of a behaviour-based itemisation of safety climate in 
comparison to the shorter, more generalised commitment to safety measure 
featured in Neal and Griffin (2006), and Newman, Griffin, and Mason (2008).  
Overall, the criterion validity of the scales coupled with their ability to pinpoint 
interventions at particular behaviours at particular levels of the organisation 
strongly suggest that behaviour-based safety climate scales would be of greater 
practical value to an organisation. While the results are promising, a longitudinal 
design would allow more definitive statements to be made on the relationship 
between the safety climate scales and safety outcomes. In the next chapter, the 
predictive validity of each scale will be assessed, in which a longitudinal design will 
be employed.   
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Chapter 7 
Objective 3: Predictive Validity of Safety Climate 
7.1 Introduction 
While a number of studies have examined safety climate’s lagged effects since 
Zohar (2000) first found evidence of a predictive relationship between safety 
climate and safety outcomes, few have followed Zohar’s lead by separating 
perceptions of managers and supervisors. This is despite Zohar’s rationale for 
separating perceptions of managers and supervisors having strong theoretical and 
methodological support.  According to Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate 
(Zohar, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005) employees have coexisting perceptions of 
commitment to safety at multiple levels of the organisational hierarchy, with these 
perceptions producing behaviour-outcome expectancies, in other words, they 
provide an indication of the consequences for safe or unsafe behaviour. These 
perceptions are directed towards the enacted policies of management and of the 
implementation of policies by supervisors, reflecting a number of studies which 
have consistently identified manager and supervisor commitment to safety as key 
dimensions of safety climate (e.g. Brown & Holmes, 1986; Cooper & Phillips, 2004; 
Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1991; Johnson, 2007; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; 
Zohar, 1980; Zohar & Luria, 2005).   
Separating perceptions of managers and supervisors also has a number of 
methodological advantages. Firstly, it permits the use of analytical techniques that 
reflect the shared nature of safety climate within workgroups/organisations (Oliver, 
Tomas, & Cheyne, 2006; Pousette, Larsson, & Torner, 2008). Within an organisation, 
there are a number of co-existing climates (Zohar & Luria, 2005), for example, each 
workgroup may develop shared climate perceptions of their supervisor, while 
organisation-wide climates may exist based on overall shared perceptions of 
management.  Zohar therefore aggregated data to the workgroup level (supervisor 
safety climate) or organisational level (manager safety climate) to take into account 
these shared perceptions at different levels of the organisational hierarchy. This has 
significant advantages over studies which conduct their analyses on the individual 
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level (e.g. Seo, Torabi, Blair & Ellis, 2004; Wills, Watson, & Biggs, 2006; Hahn & 
Murphy, 2008; Strahan, Watson, & Lennon, 2008), since aggregating data and 
conducting multilevel analyses takes into account the dependency of observations.  
 A secondary advantage of separating and aggregating safety climate perceptions is 
that it avoids conceptual ambiguity, since safety climate assessed at the individual 
level versus the aggregate level are essentially separate constructs, and are labelled 
as such by some authors (e.g. Neal & Griffin, 2006). Relationships which hold at the 
individual level do not necessarily hold at the aggregate level (Kozlowski & Klein, 
2000), and so by having safety climate aggregated to a level consistent with theory 
the conceptual development of the construct is promoted. 
Despite some strong supporting evidence for Zohar’s methodology and theoretical 
model (e.g. Zohar & Luria, 2005; Oliver, Tomas, Cheyne, 2006; Johnson, 2007), the 
number of studies which have separated the perceptions of supervisors and 
managers and examined lagged effects have been rare. Though a number of 
longitudinal studies have found that safety climate directly predicts safety 
outcomes (e.g. Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Johnson, 2007; Naveh, Katz-Navon, & Stern, 
2005) and others have demonstrated a mediated effect (e.g. Clarke, 2010; Newman, 
Griffin, & Mason, 2008; Neal & Griffin, 2006), to the author’s knowledge, only two 
studies have examined the leading effects of safety climate with separate scales 
assessing perceptions of supervisor and manager commitment to safety. Both of 
those studies were conducted by Zohar and Luria (2005, 2010), who found 
significant associations between workgroup level (supervisor) safety climate and 
safety behaviour, and between organisational level (manager) safety climate and 
safety engineering audit scores in both studies. The authors additionally observed 
that the association between organisational level safety climate and safety 
behaviour was mediated by workgroup level safety climate, with transformational 
supervisors protecting employees from a harmful organisational level safety 
climate. 
A small number of longitudinal studies have also separated perceptions of safety 
climate, yet looked at specifically supervisor or manager commitment to safety. 
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Zohar (2000) was the first to demonstrate a predictive relationship between safety 
climate and safety outcomes, with group level (supervisor) safety climate predicting 
micro-accidents in the manufacturing industry. Johnson (2007) found similar results 
in his validation of Zohar’s group level scale, conducted similarly in the 
manufacturing industry, with perceptions of supervisor commitment to safety 
predicting safety behaviour and injury severity. Neal and Griffin (2006) alternatively 
concentrated on management commitment to safety, and found that it was 
associated with subsequent individual safety motivation in the hospital 
environment. 
Few studies to date have separately examined the lagged effects of other possible 
levels of the organisation hierarchy, for example co-workers. Though supervisors 
and managers are highly influential due to their ability to reward or punish 
behaviour, a number of studies have demonstrated the importance of co-workers in 
promoting safe behaviour (e.g. Roy, 2003; Simard & Marchand, 1997; Zhou, Fang, & 
Wang, 2008). While co-worker commitment to safety is a largely unstudied aspect 
of safety climate, it may have a significant separate influence on safety behaviour in 
comparison to supervisor and managers and therefore represents a potentially 
important direction for safety climate research. 
Overall, there is a shortage of studies which have examined the lagged effects of 
safety climate, and which have also separated perceptions and accounted for the 
dependency of observations at different levels of the organisational hierarchy. The 
current objective aims to address these shortcomings in the literature by examining 
the lagged effects of safety climate via a multilevel safety climate survey that is in 
line with Zohar’s theoretical model. In addition to testing the predictive validity of 
separate scales assessing perceptions of manager and supervisor commitment to 
safety over a period of one year, a scale examining perceptions of co-worker 
commitment to safety will also be assessed. As per the cross-sectional analyses, it is 
expected that all scales will demonstrate significant lagged associations with safety 
outcomes. 
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Hypothesis 3: There will be significant negative associations between aggregated 
co-worker/supervisor/manager safety climate in Year One and safety outcomes in 
Year Two.  
Overall, no study to date has examined the predictive validity of a multilevel safety 
climate scale in the oil and gas context. This provides an opportunity to determine 
whether Zohar’s theoretical model is applicable to the oil and gas industry, given 
that it has only been tested in the manufacturing context. Secondly, this analysis 
will indicate whether perceptions of co-workers deserve a more prominent place in 
the safety climate literature, given their potential to be a key leading indicator of 
safety outcomes. 
 
7.2 Method 
In order to assess lagged associations between safety climate and safety outcomes, 
safety climate data from Year 1 and safety outcome data from Year 2 will be used. 
Refer to Chapter Four for a full description of the participants, measures, and 
procedures. In addition to self-reported outcome data as described in Chapter 4, 
official organisational injury data was available in Year 2.  The organisational records 
did not include near miss data, nor did it include injury data at the workgroup level. 
Since the Year 2 data represents a separate phase of data collection, the data will 
first be inspected and descriptive statistics calculated.  
7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Year Two Data Inspection 
No item had over 5% data missing, with the highest frequency of missing data 
recorded on a single item being 4.8%. Overall, 4.6% of participants had data missing 
in the co-worker scale, 6.3% had data missing in the supervisor scale, and 6.1% had 
data missing in the manager scale. As per the previous year, the data was not 
missing completely at random (MCAR), with Little’s MCAR test reaching significance, 
χ2 = 5312.47, p < 0.05. Since no item has over 5% missing, it was not possible to test 
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whether missing data was missing at random (MAR) through the separate-variances 
t-test. Therefore, due to the small amount of missing data, MAR was assumed.  
If a participant did not answer over 50% of items in a scale, the data for the entire 
scale was deleted. This resulted in six participants having their supervisor scale data 
removed, and 20 participants having their manager scale data removed. If a 
participant missed more than one item in a particular subscale, data for that entire 
subscale was deleted. When a participant had only one item missing in a particular 
subscale, missing data was estimated via expectation maximisation. Overall, a total 
of 818 participants were retained for analysis.  
7.3.2 Year Two Descriptive Statistics 
Table 11 presents the zero order correlations and Table 12 presents descriptive 
statistics for all scales. Since there was variability in the number of items per 
subscale, items means were used instead of the combined score for each subscale. 
The correlations between the subscales in a particular scale are indicative of their 
relative independence, and are also high enough to suggest that they are measuring 
the same underlying construct. 
It can be seen that the mean scores for the safety climate scales/subscales are 
closer to their maximum than their minimum; indicating that participants overall 
considered the organisation to have a good commitment to safety. However, scores 
were on the whole lower than Year 1. Another difference compared to Year 1 was 
the strength of the correlations between safety climate and safety outcomes. While 
virtually all scales and subscales demonstrated a significant negative correlation 
with self-reported near misses in Year 1, in Year 2 no scale or subscale managed to 
achieve this, pointing to an overall weakening of the association between safety 
climate and safety outcomes within the organisation. 
7.3.3 Preliminary Analyses 
In order to determine the leading effects of safety climate on safety outcomes, it 
was initially planned to utilise the personal code present on each survey to link 
individuals’ data from Year 1 to Year 2. This individual data would then have been 
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able to be aggregated to the workgroup/facility level to allow longitudinal multilevel 
analyses to take place. However, the number of respondents with personal codes 
which could be matched to the same workgroup was extremely low, with only 36 
participants having useable data. Since these 36 participants still needed their data 
aggregated for the multilevel analyses, the resulting analyses would be too 
underpowered and the dataset would likely be unrepresentative of the population. 
The lack of personal code data was due to the majority of individuals not 
completing this optional item in the survey. It is difficult to ascertain why 
respondents did not provide a personal code. Since the item clearly stated that it 
was optional and for external research purposes, it is possible that respondents did 
not feel as compelled to provide the code. It is also possible that respondents were 
fearful that the code would lead to their identification. A minority of respondents 
went as far as to obscure or remove the workgroup code found on the front of the 
survey, likely due to this fear of identification, and so there is some evidence for this 
interpretation.  
Since individual data linking was not possible, it was necessary to use aggregated 
data from both years sampled, whereby aggregated safety climate scores in Year 1 
would be tested for association with aggregated safety outcomes in Year 2. Though 
this approach does not have the statistical rigour of multilevel analysis, it is far 
superior to using individual level data since it acknowledges the lack of 
independence among individual respondents. 
  
Table 11 
Zero Order Correlations between Variables (Year 2) 
Variable 1 1a 1b 1c 1d 2 2a 2b 2c 2d 3 3a 3b 3c 3d 4 5 
1. Co-worker Climate                  
1a. Standards .85*                 
1b. Communication .91* .73*                
1c. Risk Management .91* .72* .81*               
1d. Involvement .86* .57* .68* .69*              
2. Supervisor Climate .68* .57* .62* .59* .61*             
 2a. Standards .65* .55* .59* .55* .58* .93*            
2b. Communication .64* .52* .59* .54* .60* .94* .85*           
2c. Risk Management .65* .54* .60* .58* .56* .94* .83* .84*          
2d. Involvement .60* .518 .54* .51* .56* .93* .79* .82* .84*         
3. Management Climate .63* .47* .58* .55* .59* .58* .56* .56* .55* .53*        
3a. Standards .62* .47* .59* .54* .56* .57* .55* .55* .54* .51* .93*       
3b. Communication .56* .41* .52* .48* .54* .51* .49* .49* .48* .47* .95* .86*      
3c. Risk Management .59* .45* .55* .51* .55* .55* .52* .52* .53* .50* .95* .84* .87*     
3d. Involvement .60* .46* .54* .53* .56* .57* .54* .54* .52* .52* .94* .82* .85* .88*    
4. Near Miss -.043 -.018 -.03 -.04 -.06 -.04 -.04 -.02 -.02 -.06 -.03 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.02   
5. Minor Injury -.039 -.026 -.04 .01 -.07 -.07 -.05 -.04 -.06 -.09* -.04 -.05 -.03 -.04 -.04 .35*  
6. Injury -.022 -.022 -.02 .00 -.07 -.04 -.02 -.03 -.04 -.05 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.01 .01 .37* .55* 
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Table 12 
Descriptive Statistics of all Variables (Year 2) 
*minimum = 1 maximum = 6
Variable Mean* Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
1. Co-worker Climate 4.68 0.68 2.35 6.00 -0.42 0.16 
1a. Standards 4.69 0.73 2.00 6.00 -0.39 0.24 
1b. Communication 4.89 0.72 2.00 6.00 -0.74 0.66 
1c. Risk Management 4.75 0.75 2.00 6.00 -0.42 0.04 
1d. Involvement 4.38 0.90 1.40 6.00 -0.39 -0.12 
2. Supervisor Climate 4.71 0.88 1.61 6.00 -0.78 0.58 
2a. Standards 4.74 0.91 1.00 6.00 -0.79 0.75 
2b. Communication 4.64 0.96 1.20 6.00 -0.71 0.43 
2c. Risk Management 4.74 0.89 1.60 6.00 -0.76 0.56 
2d. Involvement 4.73 1.01 1.00 6.00 -0.92 0.67 
3. Management Climate 4.56 0.89 1.45 6.00 -0.59 0.06 
3a. Standards 4.67 0.89 1.17 6.00 -0.70 0.34 
3b. Communication 4.52 0.98 1.40 6.00 -0.63 0.00 
3c. Risk Management 4.61 0.91 1.17 6.00 -0.56 0.10 
3d. Involvement 4.42 0.99 1.00 6.00 -0.58 0.15 
4. Near Miss 0.55 1.82 0.00 30.00 9.05 122.49 
5. Minor Injury 0.67 1.86 0.00 31.00 8.57 117.86 
6. Injury 0.11 0.45 0.00 6.00 6.49 60.93 
1
2
2
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In order to be included in the analysis, each workgroup needed to contain at least 3 
members. Data from participants with no workgroup code were also excluded. This 
resulted in 91 participants nested in 20 workgroups being removed in Year 1, and 
216 participants nested in 31 workgroups being removed in Year 2. Overall, there 
were 95 workgroups in Year 1, and 75 workgroups in Year 2. Before data 
aggregation took place, ICC’s were calculated to assess the homogeneity of climate 
perceptions. In Year 1, the ICC for the co-worker scale was 0.125 (12.5%), 0.136 
(13.6%) for the supervisor scale, and 0.088 (8.8%) for the manager scale. In Year 2, 
the ICC was 11.09% for the co-worker scale, 0.109 (10.9%) for the supervisor scale, 
and 0.044 (4.4%) for the manager scale. Though the scores for the co-worker and 
supervisor scales indicated that there was sufficient homogeneity of perceptions, 
the manager scale ICC was lower, particularly in the second year. However, such a 
small ICC is not uncommon in the literature (e.g. Neal & Griffin, 2006), with an ICC 
as small as 0.01% being shown to increase the Type 1 error rate as high as .17% 
(Barcikowski, 1981). Hence, it was decided that an ICC of this size was not sufficient 
grounds against data aggregation. The data does suggest however that facility 
membership exerts a smaller effect on individual perceptions of management 
commitment to safety in comparison to the medium effect size of group 
membership on supervisor/co-worker perceptions. 
A one-way analysis of variance using unaggregated data was performed to 
determine whether there was sufficient between group variance to justify 
aggregation. A respondent’s workgroup was the independent variable when testing 
the co-worker and supervisor scales, while facility was the independent variable 
when testing the manager Scale. The dependent variable was the total safety 
climate score. Results indicated that all safety climate scales exhibited significant 
between group variance in Year 1, Co-worker Scale: F (95, 751) = 2.03, p < .001 (ηp
2 
= .227), Supervisor Scale: F (95, 738) = 2.18, p < .001 (ηp
2 = .244), Manager Scale: F 
(10, 736) = 7.83, p < .001 (ηp
2 = .097). The results were similarly positive in Year 2, 
Co-worker Scale: F (75, 602) = 1.956, p < .001 (ηp
2 = .218), Supervisor Scale: F (75, 
598) = 1.918, p < .001 (ηp
2 = .216), Manager Scale: F (10, 585) = 4.418, p < .001 (ηp
2 = 
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.071).These results coupled with the ICC’s suggest a need to consider the safety 
climate perceptions as “shared”, and therefore requiring aggregation. 
Since each workgroup and facility needed data in both years to be included in the 
analysis of predictive validity, those workgroups and facilities with data in only a 
single year were also removed from the dataset. This process resulted in 49 
workgroups being included for the analysis of co-worker and supervisor safety 
climate predictive validity, and 9 facilities being involved in the analysis of manager 
safety climate predictive validity. Due to the rarity of injuries in the organisation, 
Poisson regression was performed using SPSS 18.0. Group size was controlled for by 
utilising an offset, which was the log of the workgroup’s size.  
Before any analysis took place, histograms were inspected to ensure safety 
outcomes had an approximately Poisson shaped distribution. While safety 
outcomes at the group level had an approximately Poisson shaped distribution (see 
Figures 14 and 15 in Appendix D), at the facility level the small sample size made 
interpretation difficult, with inspection of histograms, skewness and kurtosis 
statistics in fact suggesting that self-reported safety outcomes adhered to an 
approximately normal distribution (see Figures 16 and 17 in Appendix D). The 
Shapiro-Wilk test for both near misses and injuries at the facility level were non-
significant, suggesting normality. However, given the potential inaccuracy of 
normality tests with a small sample size, coupled with the difficulty in determining 
the distribution of the data, it was cautiously decided to utilise a non-parametric 
test devoid of distributional assumptions for facility level analyses. Therefore, the 
relationship between manager safety climate in Year 1 and safety outcomes in Year 
2 was assessed using Spearman’s Rho correlation. Since it is not possible to have an 
offset controlling for group size with a correlation analysis, mean scores were used 
rather than total injury counts.   
Inspection of possible outliers took place for the group level data, with examination 
of standardised residuals and influence statistics not detecting any outliers. A final 
test for the group-level analyses was determining whether equidispersion was 
present. Not accounting for inequality between the variance and mean can lead to 
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an increased risk of Type 1 errors (Coxe, West, & Aiken, 2009). Determining the 
presence of equidispersion was achieved by inspecting the Pearson Chi-Square 
statistic divided by degrees of freedom. The statistic indicated that overdispersion 
was present and standard Poisson regression may not be appropriate. Hence, a 
number of different models in the Poisson family were tested and compared to 
determine best model fit. The models tested included the standard Poisson model, 
the overdispersed Poisson model and the negative binomial model. Nested model 
comparisons were conducted using the likelihood ratio test, while the Akaike’s 
Information Criterion was used to compare the overdispersed Poisson model and 
the negative binomial model given they are not nested and thus cannot be 
compared using the likelihood ratio test.  The negative binomial and overdispersed 
Poisson models provided more conservative estimates of standard error compared 
to standard Poisson regression, and  provided a better fit to the data given they 
brought dispersion scores closer to one and were a better fit to the data as shown 
by the likelihood ratio test. Overall, the overdispersed Poisson model was the more 
accurate and parsimonious representation of the data given it accounted for the 
substantial overdispersion and achieved superior fit indices compared to the 
negative binomial model. 
7.3.4 Regression Analyses 
The results of the overdispersed Poisson regression analyses are presented in Table 
14. As expected, supervisor safety climate in Year 1 was significantly negatively 
associated with self-reported near misses in Year 2, achieving a regression 
coefficient of -0.592. The 95% confidence interval ranged from -1.158 to -0.027, 
owing to the narrow range of scores and sizable standard error. The regression 
coefficient equates to a rate ratio of 0.55, (0.314 to 0.975), indicating that a mean 
score difference of 1 approximately equates to 45% less near misses experienced. 
The communication subscale additionally was significantly associated with self-
reported near misses. The standards and involvement subscales fell marginally 
short of significance at the 0.05 level, with p = 0.053. As per the cross-sectional 
analyses, the scale and subscales did not significantly predict self-reported injuries. 
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The co-worker scale demonstrated negligible associations with both self-reported 
near misses and injuries. Its subscales also failed to demonstrate leading effects, 
with no subscale coming close to reaching significance. As such, the scale failed to 
provide any evidence of predictive validity.  
The results of the Spearman’s rho correlations, which examined the relationship 
between facility level (manager) safety climate in Year 1 and safety outcomes in 
Year 2, are presented in Table 14. Despite an appreciable correlation of -0.417 (r2 = 
0.174), the manager scale failed to demonstrate a significant association with self-
reported near misses. The involvement subscale did however reach significance, 
with p = 0.050, and r2 = 0.340. According to Cohen’s (1988) effect size conventions, 
an r of .1 indicates a small effect, an r of 0.3 indicates a medium effect, and an r of 
0.5 indicates a large effect. Hence, the manager scale was close to having a large 
effect, with 17.4% of the variability in self-reported near misses explained by 
differences in the mean manager safety climate score in a facility. The involvement 
subscale demonstrated a large effect, with 34% of the variability in self-reported 
near misses explained by differences in the subscale score. The other subscales did 
not demonstrate any significant lagged associations with reported near misses, and 
the scale and all subscales demonstrated negligible associations with self-reported 
injuries. 
Spearman’s rho correlations were also performed between manager scale scores 
and official organisational minor injury/injury data. Since there are large differences 
in the number of employees per facility, the total number of minor injuries/injuries 
was divided by the official numbers of employees per facility, thereby controlling for 
differences in facility size.  Refer to Table A6 in Appendix C for a comparison of self-
reported and official injury statistics for each facility in the organisation. Overall, 
official injury numbers tended to be lower than self-reported numbers, reflecting 
previous research in the safety climate literature that has demonstrate the 
prevalence of incident under-reporting (see Probst, Brubaker, & Barsotti, 2008). 
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Table 13 
Relationship between Group Level Safety Climate in Year 1 and Self-Reported Safety 
Outcomes in Year 2 (N = 49) 
 Near Miss p Value    Injury 
 
p Value 
Co-worker Scale  -0.309 (0.398) 0.437 -0.012 (0.470) 0.979 
Standards  -0.263 (0.380) 0.486 -0.095 (0.450) 0.832 
Communication  -0.390 (0.426) 0.360 -0.154 (0.508) 0.762 
Risk Management  -0.179 (0.370) 0.629 -0.145 (0.435) 0.738 
Involvement  -0.245 (0.309) 0.427 0.217 (0.373) 0.561 
Supervisor Scale  -0.592 (0.289) 0.040* -0.502 (0.336) 0.135 
Standards  -0.467 (0.241) 0.053 -0.419 (0.286) 0.143 
Communication  -0.758 (0.287) 0.008* -0.506 (0.338) 0.135 
Risk Management  -0.364 (0.309) 0.239 -0.298 (0.359) 0.407 
Involvement  -0.518 (0.268) 0.053 -0.559 (0.301) 0.064 
* p < 0.05 
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Table 14 
Spearman’s Rho Correlations between Manager Safety climate and Self-Reported 
Safety Outcomes (N = 9) 
* p < 0.05 
 
As seen in Table 15, the results echoed the self-reported statistics, with the scale 
not significantly correlated with minor injuries or injuries. Like the self-reported 
statistics, the involvement subscale demonstrated the strongest association with 
safety outcomes, achieving a sizeable correlation of -0.524 with injuries. According 
to Cohen’s effect size conventions, this corresponds to a large effect size. Despite 
the sizeable yet non-significant results, once again owing to the inadequate sample 
size (N = 8), the results reflect favourably on the predictive validity of the manager 
safety climate scale. While manager safety climate demonstrated negligible 
associations with the self-reported injury outcome, the associations with official 
data was sizeable and in the anticipated direction. Overall though, the self-reported 
and official data was strongly correlated, with self-reported injury having a 0.571 
correlation with official injury data, and self-reported minor injuries demonstrating 
 Near Miss 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
 
p Value 
Injury 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
 
p Value 
Manager Scale -0.417 0.132 0.000 0.500 
Standards -0.483 0.094 -0.100 0.399 
Communication -0.233 0.273 0.167 0.344 
Risk Management -0.367 0.166 0.100 0.399 
Involvement -0.583 0.050* -0.167 0.334 
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a 0.548 correlation with official minor injury data. The association between self-
reported and official injury statistics therefore represent a large effect.  The strong 
association between self-reported and official safety outcome data supports the use 
of self-reported data as a valid indicator of actual safety outcomes, with the only 
downside of self-reported data appearing to be a slight underestimation of the 
relationship between safety climate and injuries.  
Table 15 
Spearman’s Rho Correlations between Manager Safety Climate and Official Injury 
Statistics (N = 8) 
 
 
Finally, the predictive validity of the co-worker scale when aggregated to the facility 
level was investigated (See Table A4, A5 in Appendix B). As per the analyses 
investigating the predictive validity of the manager scale, Spearman’s rho was used. 
Associations were small, with two subscales demonstrating positive associations 
and two subscales demonstrating negative associations with self-reported near 
misses. The overall association between co-worker safety climate and self-reported 
near misses was 0.033, which is lower than the threshold for a small effect size 
according to Cohen’s (1988) conventions. Hence, it can be surmised that there is a 
 Minor Injury 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
 
p Value 
Injury 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
 
p Value 
Manager Scale -0.190 0.326 -0.333 0.210 
Standards -0.286 0.246 -0.381 0.176 
Communication -0.262 0.265 -0.262 0.265 
Risk Management -0.238 0.285 -0.381 0.176 
Involvement -0.333 0.210 -0.524 0.091 
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negligible association between co-worker safety climate and self-reported near 
misses at the facility level.  Associations were slightly stronger with self-reported 
injuries, with three subscale demonstrating associations in the anticipated direction, 
with the overall association being -0.150. This would be considered a small effect 
size. Associations with official injury data provided similar results. Many of the 
correlation coefficients were not in the anticipated direction, with an overall 
correlation coefficient of 0.167 for minor injuries, and a medium effect size 
association of 0.381 with injuries.  Therefore, both the self-reported and official 
data suggests that the co-worker scale has a negligible or inconsistent association 
with safety outcomes when aggregated to the facility level, with these analyses 
providing no evidence that the co-worker scale should be aggregated to the facility 
level instead of the workgroup level.  
7.4 Discussion 
This analysis tested the lagged effects of a multilevel safety climate survey. In line 
with Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate (Zohar, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005), 
the supervisor scale demonstrated significant leading associations with self-
reported near misses the following year. The involvement subscale of the manager 
scale similarly demonstrated significant associations with subsequent self-reported 
near misses; however the total scale fell short of reaching significance due to an 
inadequate sample size. Therefore, the results provide tentative support for the use 
of multilevel safety climate surveys in the oil and gas industry. In the current 
objective, Zohar’s model was extended to include perceptions of co-workers, 
however contrary to expectations the co-worker scale failed to demonstrate any 
significant lagged effects on any of the safety outcomes. 
These results provide further evidence supporting Zohar’s (2000; Zohar & Luria, 
2005) conceptualisation of safety climate and his Multilevel Model of Safety 
Climate. While traditionally safety climate scales measured a number of distinct 
aspects of the organisational environment in a single scale operationalized at the 
individual level, the modern approach to safety climate heralded by Zohar 
operationalizes the construct at the aggregate level, reflecting the shared/non-
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independent nature of safety climate perceptions. These aggregated perceptions of 
supervisor and manager commitment to safety have been demonstrated to predict 
safety outcomes in a number of studies (Neal and Griffin, 2006; Johnson, 2007; 
Zohar, 2000) with the current analysis the first to have a scale that conforms to 
Zohar’s model and demonstrate associations with a safety outcome in an oil and gas 
context. 
The results further demonstrate the central role that supervisors have in promoting 
safety within organisations. The significant leading effects of the supervisor scale 
demonstrated that groups which perceived their supervisor as having a low 
commitment to safety tended to be at higher risk of self-reported near misses the 
subsequent year. According to Zohar’s model, this indicates that employees have 
developed behaviour-outcome expectancies from their interactions with their 
supervisor, and in those groups which perceive that safety has a high priority, 
individuals tend to behave in a safer manner and therefore are not exposed to as 
many potentially dangerous situations in comparison to groups in which safety is 
perceived to be of a low priority. Therefore, the results suggest that safety 
initiatives directed towards improving the commitment to safety of supervisors 
would be beneficial in improving safety outcomes within organisations, particularly 
given that this finding has now been demonstrated in multiple industries.  
According to Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate (Zohar, 2000; Zohar & 
Luria, 2005), supervisors are an important source of behaviour-outcome 
expectancies since formal procedures do not cover every eventuality, meaning that 
there is supervisory discretion in the interpretation and enforcement of company 
procedures.  It was expected that there would be similar discretion among co-
workers, with supervisors not present at all times leading to differences among 
workgroups in their interpretation and adherence to policies and procedures. 
However, the co-worker scale did not demonstrate any significant lagged 
associations with the safety outcomes, which is in contrast to previous research 
which has espoused the important role of co-workers in promoting safety within 
organisations (e.g. Roy, 2003: Simard & Marchand, 1997). These results therefore 
corroborate the findings of the previous analysis, which found no significant cross-
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sectional associations between co-worker perceptions and safety outcomes. As 
previously mentioned, this is likely due to supervisors being a more palpable source 
of behaviour-outcome expectancies in comparison to co-workers because of their 
ability to punish/reward behaviour. However, in a high risk organisation such as the 
one studied, where there is a high degree of supervision present, less discretion 
may be present among co-workers which makes the weaker associations between 
co-worker safety climate and safety outcomes understandable.  In organisations 
where there is a less hierarchical structure and less supervision in daily tasks (i.e. 
certain healthcare environments), group norms and co-worker perceptions may 
have a more influential role in comparison to perception of supervisors. For 
example, Hansen, Williams, and Singer (2010) found that the safety climate 
perceptions of frontline staff were related to hospital readmission, while the 
perceptions of the less involved management staff were not. Hence, further 
research is required to investigate whether co-worker safety climate has a more 
prominent role in different types of organisations before discounting it in safety 
climate research. 
Though it is difficult to draw conclusions about the predictive validity of the 
manager scale due to the analytical problems encountered, the sizeable 
correlations between the scale/subscales and self-reported near misses were 
promising. While the small sample size likely prohibited the analyses from reaching 
significance, the association between manager safety climate and self-reported 
near misses had a medium to large effect size, while the association between the 
involvement subscale and self-reported near misses had a large effect size. 
Associations with official injury data cross-validated the self-report findings, with 
medium to large effects sizes similarly demonstrated. Given these promising 
findings, coupled with the predictive validity of the supervisor scale, the results 
overall support Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate and provide an incentive 
for other organisations to utilise a multilevel framework in their measurement of 
safety climate. Given the statistical and methodological advantages of the multilevel 
approach, coupled with the ability to pinpoint interventions at particular behaviours 
at particular levels of the organisation, the benefits of a multilevel framework 
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exceed the disadvantage of requiring a larger sample size, and the logistical and 
ethical implications of workgroup identification.  As evidenced by the current 
analysis and Zohar’s findings, a good base for scale development is the 
behaviourally inclined constructs of safety compliance and safety participation 
(Griffin & Neal, 2000), which Zohar and Luria (2005) refers to as active and proactive 
practices, and the current analysis refers to as standards and involvement. Zohar 
and Luria’s scale also includes a subscale assessing declarative practices, which the 
current analysis assesses in the communication subscale. By listing behaviours that 
are reflective of Zohar’s active, proactive, and declarative practices and are relevant 
to the organisation, other organisations can develop multilevel safety climate scales 
which can assist in the reduction of injuries to its employees. 
In conclusion, the results of these analyses further demonstrate the central role of 
supervisors and managers in maintaining a safe working environment. These results 
support previous findings of Zohar and his Multilevel Model of Safety Climate 
(Zohar, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005), in which employees develop behaviour-outcome 
expectancies based on their perceptions of their managers and supervisor’s 
commitment to safety. By utilising Zohar’s model yet developing a new scale 
specific to the organisation, this analysis has demonstrated that Zohar’s multilevel 
framework can be applied to the oil and gas industry and potentially other 
industries. Though the co-worker scale failed to demonstrate any significant 
associations with safety outcomes, this does not rule out an extension of Zohar’s 
model to include perceptions of co-workers. Further research is required in less 
supervised/hierarchical organisations/industries to determine whether co-workers 
have a more influential role.
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Chapter 8 
Path Model Comparisons 
8.1 Introduction 
As evidenced by the lack of an agreement on a conceptual model for safety climate 
and the inconsistencies in findings relating to whether safety climate has a direct or 
indirect effect on safety outcomes, there is a lack of knowledge on the mechanisms 
in which safety climate affects safety outcomes. This is predominately due to the 
ubiquity of scale validation studies, with only a small number of researchers taking 
the next step by placing safety climate within some conceptual model and 
examining the relationships it has with other variables through procedures such as 
path analysis. 
Out of the small pool of studies which have examined path models, most of them 
conduct these on the individual level (e.g. Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000; Rundmo, 
2000; Huang, Ho, Smith, & Chen, 2006; Lu & Tsai, 2010; Christian, Bradley, Wallace, 
& Burke, 2010). While these analyses provide interesting insights into how 
individually operationalized safety climate may affect other variables, the strong 
possibility that relationships on the individual level do not carry over to the 
aggregate level (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000) prohibit generalisations to the wider 
safety climate literature.  
Among those studies which have aggregated their data, results have been mixed. 
Johnson (2007) validated a path model whereby supervisor commitment to safety 
predicted safety behaviour, which in turn predicted injury frequency. These findings 
reflected the work of Zohar and Luria (2005), who found that the relationship 
between manager commitment to safety and safety behaviour was fully mediated 
by supervisor commitment to safety. Newman, Griffin, and Mason (2008), though 
not specifically using path analysis techniques, found a similar pattern of results in 
their examination of the antecedents of self-reported vehicle accidents.  The 
authors found that fleet managers (which had a proximal supervisory role) had a 
direct influence on increasing the motivation to drive safely, in comparison to 
supervisors (which had a comparatively distal managerial role). Supervisor 
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commitment to safety was only responsible for an interaction effect, with 
motivation to drive safely higher among employees who perceived both their fleet 
manager and supervisor valuing safety.  
In comparison, Neal and Griffin (2006), found that management commitment to 
safety predicted safety motivation, which in turn predicted self-reported behaviour. 
While Neal and Griffin did not test the comparative importance of supervisors, their 
findings are in line with a substantial portion of the safety climate literature which 
place management commitment to safety as the central safety climate dimension 
(Griffin & Neal, 2000; Flin, 2006; Neal & Griffin, 2006; Seo, Torabi, Blair & Eliis, 2004; 
Zohar, 1980).  Hence, there are contrasting views on the relationship safety climate 
has with safety outcomes , which is likely due to the differences in the scale used, 
the industry assessed, and the underlying conceptual model followed. These 
findings, therefore, suggest the need for further research, to determine whether 
management or supervisors are more influential in promoting a safe workplace. 
The study by Zohar and Luria (2005) is particularly important given it is the only one 
to separate perceptions of supervisors and managers and examine both lagged and 
cross-level relationships with safety outcomes. While studies by Johnson and 
Newman and colleagues support Zohar and Luria’s findings, no study to date has 
empirically tested these cross-level relationships using path analysis techniques or 
determined whether the pattern of relationships generalise to the oil and gas 
industry. Therefore, in the current analysis, an attempt will be made to replicate 
and extend upon Zohar and Luria’s findings in the oil and gas context.  
In addition to determining whether Zohar and Luria’s findings generalise to the oil 
and gas industry, it will also be determined whether Zohar’s Multilevel Model of 
Safety Climate can be extended to include perceptions of co-workers. While 
supervisors and managers undoubtedly play an important role in promoting safety 
within organisations, this does not prohibit further levels of the organisation being 
specified, particularly given research which has demonstrated the influence co-
workers have on safe behaviour (Simard &Marchand, 1997; Roy, 2003; Zhou, Fang, 
&Wang, 2008).  
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In order to examine these cross-level and lagged relationships with safety 
outcomes, a number of nested multilevel path models will be compared (see Figure 
8 to 12).  In these path models, supervisor and co-worker safety climate will be 
aggregated to the group level while manager safety climate will be aggregated to 
the facility level. Model 1 will first be compared with the model in Model 2. This will 
provide an insight into whether individuals get injured because they develop 
behaviour-outcome expectancies based on observations of managers, supervisors, 
and their co-workers, or whether management commitment to safety filters down 
to supervisor and co-worker commitment to safety, and it is these more proximal 
group-level behavioural norms that an individual bases their own behaviour on. It is 
hypothesised that Model 2 will demonstrate superior fit indices given the findings 
of Zohar and Luria (2005), who found that the relationship between manager safety 
climate and safety behaviour was mediated by the more proximal supervisor safety 
climate. If alternatively Model 1 demonstrates superior fit indices, it suggests that 
the Neal and Griffin conceptualisation of safety climate, in which management 
directly influence employees, is the better representation of the data.  
Hypothesis 4a: The model shown in Figure 9 will demonstrate superior fit indices 
compared to the model in Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 8.  Model One: All paths included. 
Management 
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Safety Climate 
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Figure 9.  Model Two: Path between manager safety climate and safety 
outcomes removed. 
 
Model 2 will then have its fit indices compared with Model 3. This will determine 
whether manager safety climate directly affects co-worker safety climate, or 
whether co-worker safety climate is the sole product of supervisor safety climate. It 
is hypothesised that Model 3 will demonstrate superior fit indices compared to 
Model 2 given that frontline employees are rarely in contact with managers, and so 
it is more likely individuals would develop behaviour-outcome expectancies based 
on the actions of those around them (i.e. supervisors and co-workers).   
Hypothesis 4b: The proposed model, as seen in Figure 10, will demonstrate superior 
fit indices compared to the model in Figure 9.  
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Figure 10.  Model Three: Path between manager safety climate and co-worker 
safety climate removed. 
 
The fit indices of the model in Model 4 will be compared to the model in Model 3. 
By comparing these two models it will be determined whether co-worker safety 
climate makes an important contribution to the prediction of employee safety 
outcomes as expected, or whether supervisor safety climate on its own adequately 
predicts employee safety outcomes.  
Hypothesis 4c: The proposed model, as seen in Figure 10, will demonstrate superior 
fit indices compared to the model seen in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11.  Model Four: Path between co-worker safety climate and safety 
outcomes removed. 
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Finally, Model 3 will be compared to Model 5. In Model 5, the relationship between 
supervisor safety climate and employee safety outcomes is mediated by co-worker 
safety climate. Since it has been found that the relationship between manager 
commitment to safety and safety behaviour is fully mediated by supervisor 
commitment to safety, it is possible that the same relationship may apply with 
supervisor commitment and co-worker commitment to safety. This relationship 
makes a certain amount of intuitive sense given that a workgroup’s norms would be 
influenced by supervisor commitment to safety, with workgroup norms perhaps 
being the predominant influence on an individual’s behaviour. For example, 
research by Wagenaar and Groeneweg (1987) demonstrated that an individual’s 
behaviour is most predicted by the norms of the workgroup rather than the 
formalised rules and procedures. However, given the large amount of research in 
the safety climate literature espousing the importance of supervisor commitment to 
safety, coupled with the fact that employees in the organisation are in regular 
contact with supervisors and are thus likely to develop behaviour-outcome 
expectancies from them, Model 3 is hypothesised to demonstrate superior fit 
indices compared to Model 5.  
Hypothesis 4d: The proposed model, as seen in Figure 10, will demonstrate superior 
fit indices compared to the model seen in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12.  Model Five: Fully mediated model, with the path between supervisor 
safety climate and safety outcomes removed. 
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8.2 Method 
Please refer to Chapter Four for a full description of participants, measures, and 
procedures. Due to sample size limitations, it was determined that multilevel path 
analyses would not be possible. There are a number of sample size rules of thumb 
for SEM, such as 10 participants per parameter (Kline, 1998) or having at least 100 
participants (Hoyle & Kenny, 1999), and with multilevel analysis these participant 
numbers are required at each level. With only 11 ‘participants’ at the organisational 
level, the sample size failed to come close to any generally accepted sample size 
metric. An attempt was made to determine whether a simpler multilevel mediation 
path model using SEM techniques (Preacher, Zyphur, & Zhang, 2010; Preacher, 
Zhang, & Zyphur, 2011) would converge in which the co-worker scale was not 
included, however as expected the model failed to converge due to the inadequate 
sample size.  
Therefore, perceptions of management commitment to safety were aggregated to 
the group level in order to maximise sample size, akin to research by Neal and 
Griffin (2006) and Newman, Griffin, and Mason (2008). Since this operationalization 
does not adhere to Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate, additional cross-
validation analyses will be conducted in order to substantiate any findings and 
provide an opportunity to relate results to Zohar’s theoretical framework. The 
cross-validation analyses will be as followed: 
1. Path model comparisons using cross-sectional data from Year 1 (N = 96).  
2. Path model comparisons using cross-sectional data from Year 2 (N = 75). 
3. Path model comparisons using safety climate data from Year 1 and safety 
outcome data from Year 2 (N = 49) 
4. Multilevel mediation analyses using the three step Baron and Kenny (1986) 
method to replicate Zohar and Luria’s (2005) findings and to substantiate path 
analysis results (N = 96).  
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8.3 Results 
8.3.1 Cross-Sectional Path Analyses 
All path analyses were conducted using the EQS 6.1 program (Bentler, 2006), with 
path models entered as seen in Figure 13. Workgroup safety climate means were 
used for the manager, supervisor, and co-worker scales, with a factor created 
describing self-reported incident frequency (measured through workgroup near 
miss, minor injury, and injury mean).  Self-reported injuries and minor injuries were 
freely estimated paths, while the self-reported near miss path was fixed at one to 
allow estimation of error variance. Though the sample size was not ideal, 
particularly given the number of parameters in the model, other aspects of 
assumption testing did not present any significant problems. Data was skewed, 
particularly the dependent variable, with Mardia’s normalised indicating a violation 
of multivariate kurtosis, however robust estimates were used which corrects for 
non-normality.  Inspection of cases which contributed to multivariate kurtosis 
detected four outliers, which were removed. Multicollinearity and singularity was 
not evident as EQS was able to invert the matrices, with no convergence problems.  
 
Figure 13.  Measurement model as entered in EQS for model three. NM = Near 
Miss, MI = Minor Injury, IN = Injury, E = Error, D = Dispersion (error).  
Firstly, in order to test Hypothesis 4a, Model 1 was compared to Model 2. Model 2 
achieved superior fit indices, with the comparative fit index (CFI) of 0.915 in Model 
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1, compared to 0.938 in Model 2. The non-normed fit index (NNFI) was 0.788 for 
Model 1, compared to 0.868 in Model 2. Hence, Model 2 surpassed the 
recommended value of 0.85 (Hu & Bentler, 1999) for the NNFI, while Model 1 fell 
short. However, the root mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) for both 
models indicated inadequate model fit, with Model 1 attaining 0.136 (0.056 to 
0.217) and Model 2 attaining 0.107 (0.010 to 0.186). With a liberal cut-off of 0.80 
(Browne & Cudeck, 1993), and a conservative cut-off of 0.050 (Hu & Bentler, 1999), 
these models were therefore not close to achieving good model fit. The RMSEA 
does have a tendency to underestimate fit in small sample sizes (Hu & Bentler), 
hence this might have played a role in the poor fit indices achieved and the large 
confidence intervals.  
While the chi-square statistic is used for the assessment of model fit when 
normality is assumed, other indicators are required when normality is violated; 
hence EQS provides a number of distribution-free residual based statistics. The 
Yuan-Bentler residual-based test statistic (Yuan & Bentler, 1998), which is a 
modification of Brownes (1982; 1984) residual-based test that has been extended 
for use in smaller sample sizes, indicated poor model fit for Model 1, with χ2 = 
16.200, p < 0.05. For Model 2 the test indicated good model fit, with χ2 = 11.494, p > 
0.05. The Yuan-Bentler residual-based F-statistic (Bentler & Yuan, 1999) displayed a 
similar pattern of results, with Model 1 demonstrating poor model fit, F (6, 85) = 
3.117, p < 0.05 and Model 2 displaying good model fit, F (7, 84) = 1.760, p > 0.05. 
This statistic is considered to perform the best at small sample sizes (Bentler, 2006); 
with the results overall clearly demonstrate the superiority of Model 2. AIC results 
further provided evidence of Model 2’s superiority, with Model 1 achieving an AIC 
of 3.92, as compared to Model 2 which achieved an AIC of 0.19. Hence, Hypothesis 
4a was supported, with Model 2 exhibiting superior fit indices compared to Figure 
1.  
Model 2 was then compared to Model 3 in order to test Hypothesis 4b. The 
approximate fit indices for Model 3 were appreciably lower than Model 2, with CFI 
= 0.735, NNFI = 0.503, and RMSEA = 0.207 (0.144 to 0.273). The residual-based tests 
of model fit similarly suggest the inadequacy of the model shown in Model 3, with 
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χ2 = 22.251, p < 0.05, and F (8, 83) = 3.420, p < 0.05. Overall, these findings indicate 
the path linking manager safety climate and co-worker safety climate is important, 
and more closely reflects the ‘true’ model of the data. Hence, Hypothesis 4b was 
not supported, with Model 2 demonstrating superior fit indices compared to Model 
3. 
In order to test Hypothesis 4c, Model 3 was compared to Model 4, which ascertains 
the importance of the path linking co-worker safety climate to safety outcomes. 
While Model 3 displayed overall poor model fit, Model 4 displayed substantially 
worse model fit (CFI = 0.662, NNFI = 0.437, RMSEA = 0.221 (0.161 to 0.282)). Both 
residual-based tests were also significant, further indicating poor model fit, χ2 = 
24.580, p < 0.05, F (9, 82) = 3.438, p < 0.05. The findings therefore indicate the 
importance of co-worker perceptions in the prediction of safety outcomes, 
supporting Hypothesis 4c.  
Lastly, in order to test Hypothesis 4d, Model 5 was compared to Model 3, which 
determines whether a fully mediated model is present and tests the importance of 
a direct path linking supervisor safety climate to safety outcomes. Both residual-
based tests were significant χ2 = 29.219, p < 0.05, F (9, 82) = 4.403, p < 0.05, with CFI 
= 0.627, NNFI = 0.379, and RMSEA = 0.232 (0.172 to 0.293). The results therefore 
suggest the importance of the path linking supervisor safety climate to safety 
outcomes, with a fully mediated model not supported.  Hence, Hypothesis 4d was 
supported, with Model 5 demonstrating inferior fit indices compared to Figure 3. 
Overall, Model 2 was found to have the best fit indices out of all the models, and 
despite the high RMSEA, it overall demonstrated adequate model fit. In an 
exploratory effort to determine whether any parameters could have been added to 
improve model fit, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test was performed. The LM test 
indicated that model fit could be improved by the addition of a path between 
manager safety climate and self-reported near misses. Given that the path between 
these variables was theoretically reasonable, the parameter was added and fit 
indices recalculated. The new model (Model 6) demonstrated superior model fit 
compared to the unmodified model (Model 2), with both residual based tests non-
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significant, χ2 = 7.875, p > 0.05, F (6, 85) = 1.360, p > 0.05. Other fit indices 
demonstrated excellent model fit, with CFI = 0.979, NNFI = 0.948, RMSEA = 0.067 
(0.000 to 0.162). AIC comparisons also indicated that model 6 was superior, 
achieving an AIC of -0.36 in comparison to the 0.19 achieved by Model 2. All fit 
indices therefore suggested that Model 6 was a good representation of the data, 
with only the RMSEA being sub-optimal due to its large confidence interval. Figure 
14 presents the best fitting structural model, with standardised parameter 
estimates added. Robust estimates were used for the estimation of standard error 
and the significance of the estimates due to the non-normality of the data. A 
comparison of fit indices for all models can be found in Table 16.  
 
Figure 14.  Structural model for best fitting model (Model 6). 
Self-reported minor injury and injury loaded significantly on the self-reported injury 
frequency factor, indicating that despite their low frequency in comparison to self-
reported near misses, they are all an adequate representation of self-reported 
injury frequency. While the near miss variable appears to load non-significantly on 
the self-reported injury frequency factor, its non-standardised parameter estimate 
was fixed at 1.00, meaning no test of significance took place. The path between 
supervisor safety climate and co-worker safety climate was non-significant, with 
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manager commitment to safety being the predominant influence, reflecting the fact 
that Model 2 had superior fit indices compared to the Model 3. 
 
Table 16 
Comparison of Select Fit Indices for Path Models 
 Yuan-Bentler 
Residual-Based  
F Statistic 
  CFI NNFI            RMSEA 
Cut-Off Criteria  = / >.85 = / >.85 = / <.08 
Model 1 3.117* 0.915 0.788 0.136 (0.056 to 0.217) 
Model 2 1.760 0.938 0.868 0.107 (0.010 to 0.186) 
Model 3 3.420* 0.735 0.503 0.207 (0.144 to 0.273) 
Model 4 3.438* 0.662 0.437 0.221 (0.161 to 0.282) 
Model 5 4.403* 0.627 0.379 0.232 (0.172 to 0.293) 
Model 6 1.360 0.979 0.948 0.067 (0.000 to 0.162) 
Note. * indicates significance at p < 0.05. Non-significance indicates good model fit.  
 
In the prediction of the self-reported injury frequency factor, both supervisor safety 
climate and co-worker safety climate had a significant relationship. While the 
relationship between supervisor safety climate and the self-reported injury 
frequency factor was in the negative direction as expected, the relationship 
between co-worker safety climate and the self-reported injury frequency factor was 
positive. This counter-intuitively indicates that as co-worker commitment to safety 
increases, the possibility of becoming injured increases. The R2 of the self-reported 
injury frequency factor was 0.25, indicating that 25% of the variability in self-
reported ‘accident’ events was explained by co-worker and supervisor safety 
climate scores.  
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8.3.2 Cross-validation of results 
Particularly when exploratory analyses such as the LM test are performed, cross-
validation of results is recommended. This is because when modifying models based 
on statistical criteria such the LM test, there is the possibility of “over-fitting” a 
model, in which the specific pattern of relationships between variables become 
sample specific (Byrne, 2006). Therefore, the model fit of Model 6 was examined in 
two additional datasets. Firstly, since the previous analyses have only involved Year 
1 data, the model was assessed using the data in Year 2. Secondly, the model was 
assessed using climate data from Year 1 and safety outcome data from Year 2, in 
order to examine predictive relationships. As per the previous analysis, outliers 
were first screened by inspecting cases which contributed to multivariate kurtosis, 
resulting in one outlier being removed from the Year 2 data, and four outliers being 
removed from the Year 1  Year 2 data.  
The results of the cross-validation using Year 2 data supported the previous finding 
that the Model 6 model represented a good fit to the data (see Table 21). Both the 
Yuan-Bentler residual based statistic and the Yuan-Bentler residual-based F statistic 
were highly non-significant, χ2 = 4.894, p > 0.05, F (6, 69) = 0.815, p > 0.05. Fit 
indices also suggested excellent model fit, with CFI = 1.000, NNFI = 1.017, RMSEA = 
0.000 (0.000 to 0.142). Parameter estimates also supported the previous findings.  
Self-reported minor injuries and injuries both significantly loaded on the self-
reported incident frequency factor, further demonstrating that they were a reliable 
measure of self-reported injury frequency. While the path between supervisor 
safety climate and co-worker safety climate in the previous path analysis was non-
significant, in the current analysis the path was significant. In comparison to the 
path models using Year 1 data, this result suggests that supervisors may play a role 
in influencing the commitment to safety of co-workers. 
The parameter estimates provide further evidence of the role managers have in 
influencing the commitment to safety of the workforce, with significant paths to 
supervisor safety climate and co-worker safety climate. As per the previous path 
analysis, supervisor safety climate significantly predicted self-reported injury 
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frequency, while the path between co-worker safety climate and the self-reported 
injury frequency factor was non-significant, highlighting the anomalous nature of 
the counter-intuitive results arising from Year 1 data. Similarly, the path between 
manager safety climate and self-reported near misses was non-significant, which 
suggests that this modification was sample specific. The non-significant association 
may also reflect the overall weakening of association between safety climate and 
safety outcomes in Year 2 data. The self-reported injury frequency factor achieved 
an R2 of 0.25 in Year 1, while in Year 2 it was considerably smaller, with R2 = 0.098. 
Hence, the model explained 25% of the variance using Year 1 data, while in Year 2 
the model explained only 9.8% of the variance. Standardised parameter estimates 
for this model can be seen in Figure 15.  
 
Figure 15.  Structural equation model for Model 6 using Year 2 data.  
 
As a secondary cross-validation, the fit indices of Model 6 were assessed using 
safety climate data from Year 1 and safety outcomes data from Year 2. This similarly 
demonstrated that the model was a good representation of the data, with both 
Yuan-Bentler residual-based test statistics being non-significant, with χ2 = 5.859, p > 
0.05, F (6, 39) = 1.002, p > 0.05. The fit indices were also generally demonstrative of 
excellent model fit, with CFI = 0.972, NNFI = 0.931, RMSEA = 0.091 (0.000 to 0.227). 
Only the RMSEA fell short of its recommended cut-off, however the very small 
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sample size (N = 45) may be the primary contributor of its high score and associated 
large confidence interval. Parameter estimates were also generally similar to the 
previous path analyses. Self-reported minor injury and injury had a strong yet non-
significant association with the self-reported incident frequency factor, with the 
high standard error of the parameter estimates indicating that the low sample size 
may have been a factor. Supervisor safety climate demonstrated a significant 
association with the self-reported incident frequency factor, with co-worker safety 
climate falling slightly short of a significant association.  Manager safety climate was 
once again a powerful predictor of supervisor safety climate and co-worker safety 
climate, with results aligning with the original path analysis in that the relationship 
between supervisor safety climate and co-worker safety climate was non-
significant. Additionally, the added path between manager safety climate and self-
reported near misses was significant, therefore providing evidence that the 
modification was warranted. The overall R2 of the self-reported injury factor 
indicated a large effect size, with R2 = 0.350. Standardised parameter estimates with 
significance calculated through robust standard errors can be seen in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16.  Structural equation model for Model 6 using Year 1  Year 2 data.  
Though there was overall similar results for the two cross-validations, some of the 
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to the link between supervisor safety climate and the self-reported incident 
frequency factor. Both cross-validations demonstrated that co-worker safety 
climate was not significantly associated with the self-reported incident factor, 
providing evidence that the significant positive association found using Year 1 data 
was anomalous However, it should be noted that the relationship between co-
worker safety climate and safety outcomes in the secondary cross-validation was 
still positive, and overall suggests that co-worker safety climate is not a viable 
predictor of safety outcomes at the group level. In the Year 1 data and one of the 
cross-validations, the link between supervisor safety climate and co-worker safety 
climate was not significant, providing an inconclusive indication that supervisor 
safety climate does not affect co-worker safety climate at the group level.  Similarly, 
the added path between manager safety climate and near misses was supported by 
one cross-validation and not the other, thereby providing limited support for the 
path’s addition.  
 
Table 17 
Fit Indices for Model 6 Using Data from Year 1, Year 2, and Year 1 Year 2 
 Yuan-Bentler 
Residual-Based 
F Statistic 
   CFI NNFI RMSEA 
  = / >.85 = / >.85 = / <.08 
Year 1 1.360 0.979 0.948 0.067 (0.000 to 
0.162) 
Year 2 0.815 1.000 1.017 0.000 (0.000 to 
0.142) 
Year 1 Year 2 1.002 0.972 0.931 0.091 (0.000 to 
0.227) 
 
8.3.3 Mediation Analyses  
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Due to manager safety climate being assessed at the group level, it was decided to 
cross-validate the key path analysis findings using multilevel mediation techniques 
methodologically and theoretically consistent with Zohar’s Multilevel Model of 
Safety Climate.  The key finding to be cross-validated will be whether the 
relationship between manager safety climate and safety outcomes is mediated by 
supervisor safety climate, as observed by Zohar and Luria (2005) and suggested by 
the path analysis results. If previous analyses suggested that co-worker safety 
climate predicted safety outcomes, it would have also been tested whether the 
relationship between supervisor safety climate and safety outcomes was mediated 
by co-worker safety climate. However, both cross-validation path analyses and 
previous regression analyses have indicated that in this organisation co-worker 
safety climate has a lesser role in the prediction of safety outcomes compared to 
other levels of the organisation and so this mediation analysis will not be 
attempted.  
The mediation analysis was conducted with MLwiN 2.2 (Rasbash et al., 2009), using 
data from Year 1, with this data chosen to maximise sample size. As per Zohar’s 
Multilevel Model of Safety Climate, supervisor safety climate was aggregated to the 
workgroup level, while manager safety climate was aggregated to the facility level. 
Logistic regression was used in the association between safety climate and safety 
outcomes, with a logit link function selected and random intercepts included. For 
the association between manager safety climate and supervisor safety climate, 
standard multilevel regression procedures were used given the absence of a 
dichotomous outcome variable. Examination of histograms and normality statistics 
for the aggregated supervisor and manager scale scores indicated that the data was 
approximately normal. Models were first computed using 1st order MQL 
approximation, from which it was determined whether a random slope was 
required. Second-order PQL approximation was then used, with this process 
resulting in less biased estimates and less chance of convergence problems 
(Rashbash et. al., 2009). Standardised residuals and influence diagnostics were 
inspected to determine the presence of any extreme values, with one outlier being 
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removed at the group level.  Significance was calculated via the Wald test, which 
employs a chi-square distribution.  
To test mediation, the three-step Baron and Kenny (1986) method was employed. 
Firstly, manager safety climate needs to be significantly associated with safety 
outcomes. Then manager safety climate must be significantly associated with 
supervisor safety climate. Lastly, the relationship between manager safety climate 
and safety outcomes should be greatly reduced (indicating partial mediation) or 
non-existent (indicating complete mediation) when controlling for supervisor safety 
climate.  Contrary to expectations, the difficult to interpret results only partially 
supported a mediation process taking place. While manager and supervisor safety 
climate individually predicted self-reported near misses  as previously found, when 
both levels of analysis were entered into the regression equation, the variance of 
the intercepts at the facility level could not be estimated (i.e. became zero). A 
printout of this analysis can be found in Appendix E.  Twisk (2006) states that the 
inability of MLwiN to accurately estimate this random facility level intercept 
indicates that it is unimportant. In other words, in the prediction of supervisor 
safety climate or safety outcomes, differences between workgroups are far more 
important than differences between facilities (such as manager safety climate). 
Though these analyses do support the notion that supervisors play an important 
and direct role in promoting safety, the lack of facility level variance in the 
prediction of supervisor safety climate via manager safety climate prevents a 
mediation model from being fully supported.   
8.4 Discussion 
The path analyses provided a number of interesting results that generally reflect the 
findings of Zohar and Luria, despite some hypotheses not being supported. The 
important finding was that supervisor safety climate was the most important 
influence on safety outcomes, reflecting Zohar and Luria’s study which found that 
the relationship between manager safety climate and safety outcomes was 
mediated by supervisor safety climate. Though a full multilevel mediation model 
was not supported by subsequent analyses, the path analyses demonstrated that a 
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path between manager safety climate and the self-reported injury frequency factor 
resulted in a poor fitting Model 1, in comparison to the superior fit indices of Model 
2 in which only supervisor and co-worker safety climate were associated with safety 
outcomes (refer to Figure 8 and 9). 
 
 
Figure 8. Model One: All paths included.  
 
Figure 9. Model Two: Path between manager safety climate and safety 
outcomes removed. 
Though the model in which a path was added between co-worker safety climate 
and safety outcomes demonstrated better fit, in both cross-validation attempts the 
parameter estimates were slightly positive and non-significant. Hence, for the sake 
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co-worker perceptions at the group level have a negligible impact on safety 
outcomes.  Overall, other than the unexpected path between manager safety 
climate and co-worker safety climate, the results are overall consistent with that of 
previous studies in this thesis, and of other studies in the literature which have 
drawn upon Zohar’s conceptualisation of safety climate. Though some of the 
analyses need to be interpreted with caution, they overall suggest that the 
mediating role of supervisors is generalizable to the oil and gas industry, and 
therefore not limited to the manufacturing context wherein Zohar has tested all of 
his hypotheses.  
Before this analysis, the only other non-Zohar investigation into the separate effects 
of manager and supervisor commitment to safety has been by Newman, Griffin, and 
Mason (2008). Newman and colleagues found that fleet manager safety climate was 
the predominant influence on safety, with supervisor safety climate having no 
direct effect but interacted with fleet manager safety climate to increase overall 
motivation to drive safely. Given that fleet managers may play a proximal 
supervisor-like role and supervisors play a distal management-like role in the driving 
context, the results of the current analysis are therefore in line with Zohar and 
Luria.  Importantly, the context of these three studies is extremely different, yet the 
results are similar. While Zohar and Luria and the current analysis are in the 
manufacturing and oil and gas industries, which would likely have similar 
organisational structures, in the driving context the fleet manager distributes keys 
and possibly alerts employees to safety standards and issues. However, unlike 
supervisors in the previously mentioned contexts the fleet manager does not have 
authority over drivers and therefore does not reward/punish behaviour. Hence, 
despite large differences in the organisational context and supervisory role, what 
these studies demonstrate is that the central importance of a proximal, supervisory 
figure in promoting safety is a generalizable finding, contrasting with traditional 
safety climate research (e.g. Neal & Griffin, 2006) which has focused on 
management commitment to safety.  
What make the generalizability of the findings even more important are the large 
differences in the operationalization of safety climate in the three studies.  While all 
154              Path Model Comparisons  
 
studies used different scales, Zohar and Luria and the current analysis had very 
similar subscales and behaviour-based wording of the items. In contrast, Newman 
and colleagues used Neal and Griffin’s (2006) shorter scale for their assessment of 
safety climate, which assesses a general perception of commitment to safety rather 
than specific behaviours.  Secondly, while Zohar and Luria assessed manager safety 
climate at the organisational level, reflecting the shared perceptions of 
management, both Newman and colleagues and the current analysis measured 
managers and supervisors at the group level. Despite these substantial differences 
in operationalization, the overall pattern of results was highly similar; suggesting 
that the increased importance of a proximal supervisory figure in comparison to a 
distal management figure in promoting a safe workplace is a relatively robust effect. 
While past research has made apparent that safety climate at the individual level 
displays a different pattern of results at the aggregate level (Kozlowski & Klein, 
2000), the findings tentatively suggest that the same between-level inconsistency 
does not plague comparisons between manager safety climate measured at the 
group or organisational levels. In practice, this suggests that researchers who do not 
have access to a large pool of organisations can assess manager safety climate at 
the group level, with some confidence that their findings can still be generalised. 
Though level-of-analysis did not affect the relationship between 
manager/supervisor safety climate and safety outcomes, it may have affected the 
relationship between supervisor safety climate and co-worker safety climate. In 
contrast to hypotheses, the best fitting path model and one of the cross-validations 
showed that only manager safety climate predicted co-worker safety climate. It is 
unknown whether this relationship would hold if manager safety climate was 
aggregated to the facility level , and given the absence of other research exploring 
this relationship, the findings must be interpreted with caution.  
In addition to further supporting the mediated relationship between manager 
safety climate and safety outcomes, comparisons between the path models and 
examination of parameter estimates provide some compelling results. While 
supervisor safety climate clearly has a direct influence on safety outcomes, the path 
analysis demonstrates the important role of management as an antecedent of 
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climates lower in the organisation. In addition to its strong association with 
supervisor safety climate, it was also the primary predictor of co-worker safety 
climate. In comparison, supervisor safety climate had far weaker associations with 
co-worker safety climate, with the association between supervisor safety climate 
and co-worker safety climate reaching significance in only the Year 2 data. This was 
an unexpected finding, as it was assumed that supervisors, with their more proximal 
role in rewarding/punishing behaviour and communicating safety concerns, would 
be a more important influence on group norms and therefore the co-worker safety 
climate. While co-worker safety climate was not associated with safety outcomes, 
highlighting the importance of the supervisory role in shaping behaviour, it 
demonstrates that if employees perceive that their manager is committed to safety, 
they generally feel their workplace is more committed to safety. The path added 
through the LM test between manager safety climate and self-reported near misses 
similarly indicate that management commitment to safety may promote an overall 
perception of safety within an organisation, which is separate from the direct 
prediction of injuries. Given that management commitment to safety is predictive of 
job satisfaction, organisational commitment, and job performance (Michael, Evans, 
Jansen, & Haight, 2005), its ability to travel down through the organisation, as 
shown through the path analyses, may have positive outcomes for the organisation 
that go beyond safety.   
The results of the multilevel mediation analyses were also contrary to expectations. 
Though earlier studies have demonstrated that manager and supervisor safety 
climate predicted self-reported near misses in isolation, when both levels were 
included in the same equation, the facility level variance of the intercepts were not 
able to be estimated. While this result is generally supportive of previous research 
and the path analyses when taken at face value, given it demonstrates that 
supervisors are much more important than managers at predicting safety 
outcomes, the results need to be interpreted with caution. While Twisk (2006) 
states that the inability to estimate variance of the intercepts indicates that the 
level is unnecessary, another possible explanation could be that the inadequate 
sample size at the facility level (N = 11) prevented accurate estimation.  This 
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alternate interpretation is supported by the inability of manager safety climate to 
predict supervisor safety climate, with the inability to estimate the facility level 
variance of the intercepts suggesting that facility level variables (such as manager 
safety climate) do not predict supervisor commitment to safety. This finding 
contrasts with the path analysis results, Zohar and Luria (2005), and a large body of 
research which has shown climate and culture to stem from management (Griffin & 
Neal, 2000; Hofstede et al., 1993; Neal & Griffin, 2006; Seo et al., 2004). Hence, 
while the sample size of the path analyses was likely adequate since the program 
was able to distinguish between poorly and well-fitting models (Bentler, 2006), a 
larger sample size was required for the multilevel mediation analyses.  
In conclusion, results of the current analysis support the mediation model tested by 
Zohar and Luria (2005). The model in which a path existed between manager safety 
climate and safety outcomes demonstrated inferior fit indices to one in which this 
path was removed. This analysis contributed to the literature by demonstrating that 
Zohar and Luria’s mediation model generalises to the oil and gas industry. It 
additionally showed that the operationalization of manager safety climate at the 
group level does not result in a different pattern of results compared to the 
organisational level, with the results not only reflecting Zohar and Luria, but 
Newman and colleagues, whose safety climate scales were worded with a less 
behavioural emphasis. The results suggest that this non-behavioural wording of the 
safety climate scales by Newman and colleagues and Neal and Griffin (2006) may 
have contributed to the weaker associations that safety climate had with safety 
outcomes in their studies. Finally, this analysis again failed to find evidence that co-
worker safety climate influences safety outcomes. The results support Zohar’s 
Multilevel Model of Safety Climate, which found that supervisors were the main 
influence on behaviour due to their proximity and ability to 
punish/reward/communicate to employees.  
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Chapter 9 
 
Objective Five: 
Comparisons between Safety Climate Operationalized at the Individual and 
Aggregate Level 
 
9.1 Introduction  
Like its parent term, organisational climate, safety climate has historically suffered 
from inconsistency in its definition, conceptual boundaries, and operationalization.  
While some of this inconsistency may be the product of the rapid evolution of the 
construct in the years since it was first developed, its links to organisational climate 
may be another contributing factor. When Zohar (1980) introduced the term safety 
climate, it was described as a particular type of organisational climate, consisting of 
some shared set of cognitions concerning safety, in particular management 
commitment to safety. Even at this formative stage, safety climate was described 
and operationalized as an aggregate variable. Zohar referred to ‘shared cognitions’ 
and assessed criterion validity by aggregating scores to the facility level. However, 
other authors have since measured safety climate at the individual level (e.g. 
Rundmo, 1994; Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 2001; Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000; 
Seo et al., 2004; Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2009). Out of the 32 safety climate studies 
included in Christian and colleagues (2009) meta-analysis, 18 operationalized safety 
climate at the individual level, while in my own review of the literature over the 
past decade, approximately one third of studies operationalized safety climate at 
the individual level. This variation in level of analysis reflects similar ambiguity in the 
wider organisational climate literature, whereby researchers either categorised 
climate as being an attribute of the organisation (organisational climate) or the 
individual (psychological climate) (James & Jones, 1974). Despite pleas from some 
authors (e.g. Glick, 1985) to use the correct term based on the level of analysis, a 
recent review by  Kuenzi and Schminke (2009) found that over 100 articles 
purported to measure organisational climate despite the unit of analysis being the 
individual, and therefore psychological climate being measured.  
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Some authors in the safety climate literature have similarly called for the 
differentiation of safety climate at the individual and group levels, with Neal and 
Griffin (2006) referring to individual level safety climate as “perceived safety 
climate” and Christian and colleagues defining it as “psychological safety climate” 
(Christian et al., 2009, p. 1104). However, such suggestions are yet to be entrenched 
among researchers, with new research being published regularly (e.g. Lu & Yang, 
2011; Baek et al., 2008; Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2009) which purport to measure 
safety climate when psychological/perceived safety climate is being measured. Such 
an arbitrary approach to labelling the construct among a number of researchers is 
extremely problematic for a variety of reasons. Firstly, it hinders the conceptual 
development of both constructs. Since safety climate is generally considered to 
consist of shared perceptions (Zohar, 2000, Oliver, Tomas, & Cheyne, 2006; Flin, 
2007; Pousette et al., 2008), by conducting analyses at the individual level the unit 
of analysis is inconsistent with the unit of theory. Safety climate should be assessed 
at the group level in order to make conclusions about group-level processes, while 
perceived/psychological safety climate should be assessed at the individual level to 
draw conclusions about individuals.  
In other words, differentiating between safety climate at the individual and the 
group level reduces conceptual ambiguity since it allows researchers to distinguish 
between individual and group level theory. By labelling a construct as “safety 
climate” yet assessing it at the individual level, a researcher promotes ambiguity, 
since there is the presumption that any pattern of relationships found are 
comparable to research which has aggregated data. Such an assumption has been 
found to be incorrect, with Kozlowski and Klein (2000) stating that relationships 
between constructs at the individual level may not hold at the group level. This was 
evident in a study by Ostroff and Rothausen (1997), where it was found that person-
environment fit was affected by whether or not climate data was aggregated. 
Perhaps most importantly, it has been found that safety climate perceptions tend to 
be shared within groups (Zohar, 2000; Oliver, Tomas, & Cheyne, 2006; Pousette et 
al., 2008), and therefore standard individual level analyses are not appropriate 
given that they assume independence of observations (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998). 
Individual and Aggregate Comparisons         159 
 
Operationalizing safety climate at the group level acknowledges this lack of 
independence. Studies which operationalize safety climate at the individual level 
may have inaccurate regression coefficients and standard error estimates (Twisk, 
2006). This would be less problematic if safety climate assessed at the individual 
level was generally considered a separate construct, however as stated previously it 
is the effect these studies have in promoting ambiguity in the wider safety climate 
literature which is the cause for concern.  
Though the dependency in observations suggests that individually operationalized 
safety climate should be eradicated as a construct, this is not necessarily the case. 
Psychological/perceived safety climate can still be operationalized at the individual 
level if multilevel corrections are performed which control for the shared 
experiences of individuals at the group level. For example, in the educational setting 
the test scores of children tend to lack independence due to the shared experience 
of having the same teacher, or by being in a school of a specific socio-economic 
status.  Such dependency in observations does not prohibit the operationalization 
of test scores at the individual level; however it does necessitate controlling for 
variance at the class/school level in order to get the most accurate assessment of 
what predicts individual test scores. Similarly, as long as there is some conceptual 
model which explains that climate perceptions can exist at the individual level, 
controlling for variance at the group level may allow for a methodologically sound 
exploration of individual level perceptions.  No study to date, however, has 
operationalized safety climate at the individual level and controlled for group level 
variance, with this failure to do so likely resulting in biased regression coefficients 
and standard error estimates.  
In the current analysis, the effect that level-of-analysis and analytical technique has 
on research findings will be investigated, with the aim of determining the 
ramifications of not only operationalizing safety climate at the individual level, but 
operationalizing at the individual level and not taking into account the innate 
dependency of observations. While previous meta-analyses by Christian and 
colleagues (2009) and Beus and colleagues (2010) have compared the overall effect 
sizes of individual and aggregate operationalized safety climate, no study to date 
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has investigated the effect of level-of-analysis on a single dataset.  Hence, a number 
of analyses will be conducted in which multiple levels-of-analysis will be compared. 
Firstly, the assessment of criterion validity seen in Objective One will be reanalysed 
with both aggregated multilevel and individual level data. This will provide an 
insight into whether safety climate operationalized at the individual level displays a 
different pattern of results compared to the more methodologically and 
theoretically supported aggregate level analyses. Additionally, the standard 
methodologically unsophisticated individual level analyses will be compared with 
individual level analyses with multilevel corrections made for group level variance. 
This comparison will indicate how the acknowledgement of dependency affects 
regression coefficients and standard error estimates, therefore determining 
whether the results of studies which have assessed what could be labelled as 
psychological safety climate are possibly misleading.    
Since these types of comparisons have not been undertaken previously in the safety 
climate literature, there are no firm predictions on what will be the likely results. 
For the comparison between aggregated multilevel and individual level safety 
climate, it is expected that the results will mirror the meta-analyses of Christian and 
colleagues (2009) and Beus and colleagues (2010), who found that individually 
operationalized safety climate demonstrated weaker associations with safety 
outcomes compared to aggregate safety climate.  
Hypothesis 5a: Safety climate operationalized at the individual level will 
demonstrate weaker associations with safety outcomes compared to safety climate 
operationalized at the aggregate level. 
Since safety climate operationalized at the aggregate level is a distinct construct 
compared to individual level safety climate, there may also be a different pattern of 
results. Kozlowski and Klein (2000) stated that relationships at the group level may 
not hold at the individual level, and this is the anticipated finding in the current 
analysis.  
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Hypothesis 5b: Safety climate operationalized at the individual level will 
demonstrate a distinct pattern of relationships with safety outcomes compared to 
safety climate operationalized at the aggregate level.  
In the comparison between individual single level analyses and individual analyses 
with multilevel corrections, it is expected that the results will mirror that of Twisk 
(2006), who conducted similar comparisons in an epidemiological context. Twisk 
referred to the non-corrected individual analyses as “naïve” analyses in comparison 
to multilevel analyses, and so this more succinct terminology will be used hereafter. 
Twisk found that that when groups were balanced in terms of size, the difference 
between naïve and multilevel analyses was only in their standard error, with naïve 
analyses reporting lower standard error. When groups were unbalanced however, 
the regression coefficients and standard errors were much more divergent, and 
what were previously significant associations in the naïve analysis became non-
significant when multilevel corrections were employed. Since the dataset is 
unbalanced in the current analysis (and in most organisational contexts), it is 
expected that the multilevel analyses will be far more conservative in terms of their 
regression coefficients and standard error, with results more likely to be non-
significant.  
Hypothesis 5c: Compared to the naïve analyses, the individual level multilevel 
analyses will produce more conservative results.   
A further test of the effects of level of analysis and analytical technique will be in 
path analysis model comparisons. Path analysis, typically using a structural equation 
modelling approach, is common in the safety climate literature, with a number of 
authors conducting these analyses at the individual level (e.g. Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 
2000; Rundmo, 2000; Huang, Ho, Smith, & Chen, 2006). As per the previous 
objective, a number of path models will be compared to determine the pattern of 
relationships between manager, supervisor, and co-worker commitment to safety 
and safety outcomes, with the difference being that all scales will be assessed at the 
individual level.  The aim of this analysis is to determine whether the best fitting 
model at the individual level displays a different pattern of relationships compared 
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to the best fitting model at the aggregate level. Given the frequency of research 
utilising path analysis at the individual level, this is an important avenue of research 
since it will further indicate whether safety climate assessed at the individual level is 
a distinct construct compared to safety climate at the aggregate level.  This analysis 
is exploratory in nature, with no specific hypotheses about the manner in which the 
pattern of relationships will differ at the individual level compared to the aggregate 
level. However, it is expected that level-of-analysis will impact upon the observed 
pattern of relationships.  
Hypothesis 5d: Compared to the best fitting aggregated multilevel path model, the 
best fitting individual level path model will display a different pattern of 
relationships between the safety climate scales and safety outcomes.  
Overall, given the absence of research examining the impact of level-of-analysis and 
analytical technique in the safety climate literature, this analysis should provide 
much needed insight into the possible consequences of operationalizing safety 
climate incorrectly and using methodologically unsound analytical techniques. 
 
9.2 Method  
Please refer to Chapter Four for a full description of participants, measures, and 
procedure. In this chapter, data from Year One will be used. 
9.3 Results 
9.3.1 Cross-sectional Criterion Validity 
As per Objective One, criterion validity was assessed with logistic regression using 
MLwiN v2.17 (Rasbash, Charlton, Browne, Healy, & Cameron, 2009). Data from Year 
1 was used, which after the removal of groups with less than 3 members and cases 
with an illegible workgroup code, resulted in 749 individuals nested in 96 
workgroups, nested in 11 facilities. The logit link function was utilised, with models 
first computed using first order MQL approximation, followed by second-order PQL 
approximation. For the aggregated multilevel analyses, safety climate scores were 
Individual and Aggregate Comparisons         163 
 
aggregated to the workgroup/facility level, with the intercept allowed to vary 
randomly. For the individual level multilevel analyses, intercepts were allowed to 
vary randomly and safety climate scores remained non-aggregated.  For the naïve 
analyses, safety climate scores were at the individual level and intercepts remained 
fixed, in other words, no multilevel component was added. For all of the analyses, 
the safety outcome remained at the individual level. As per previous studies, the 
safety outcomes consisted of self-reported near misses, and self-reported injuries, 
which was a composite variable consisting of the sum of self-reported minor injuries 
and injuries. The presence of outliers was determined through inspection of 
standardised residuals and influence diagnostics. One outlier was removed at the 
group level. Individual level analyses were conducted after the removal of the 
outlier, since the aim of the analysis was to determine differences due to the 
analytical technique, with these differences potentially obscured by the presence of 
an outlier at a particular level. Since maximum likelihood estimation techniques 
were used, statistical significance was ascertained via the Wald test. The results of 
these analyses can be seen in Table 18.  
  
 
 
 Naïve 
 
 
Near Miss 
Individual 
Multilevel 
 
Near Miss 
Aggregated 
Multilevel 
 
Near Miss 
Naïve 
 
 
Injury 
Individual 
Multilevel 
 
Injury 
Aggregated 
Multilevel 
 
Injury 
Co-worker Safety Climate -0.476 (0.152)* -0.440 (0.159)* -0.613 (0.445) -0.084 (0.130) -0.095 (0.134) 0.315 (0.328) 
            Standards -0.232 (0.138) -0.200 (0.145) -0.464 (0.389) 0.039 (0.119) 0.026 (0.122) 0.273 (0.295) 
            Communication -0.453 (0.140)* -0.409 (0.146)* -0.681 (0.424) -0.025 (0.123) -0.027 (0.126) 0.155 (0.316) 
            Risk Management -0.414 (0.137)* -0.430 (0.165)* -0.701 (0.409) -0.111 (0.117) -0.133 (0.120) 0.440 (0.299) 
            Involvement -0.324 (0.112)* -0.291 (0.117)* -0.524 (0.345) -0.117 (0.096) -0.116 (0.099) 0.181 (0.275) 
Supervisor Safety Climate -0.323 (0.115)* -0.289 (0.122)* -0.785 (0.324)* -0.115 (0.100) -0.102 (0.103) -0.280 (0.239) 
           Standards -0.341 (0.108)* -0.311 (0.115)* -0.652 (0.291)* -0.086 (0.094) -0.077 (0.098) -0.163 (0.216) 
           Communication -0.290 (0.109)* -0.242 (0.115)* -0.988 (0.314)* -0.117 (0.094) -0.101(0.097) -0.343 (0.232) 
           Risk Management -0.283 (0.111)* -0.267 (0.117)* -0.755 (0.328)* -0.077 (0.097) -0.068 (0.099) -0.204 (0.240) 
           Involvement -0.194 (0.102) -0.166 (0.107) -0.535 (0.302) -0.120 (0.088) -0.106 (0.090) -0.312 (0.227) 
Manager Safety Climate -0.217 (0.114) -0.155 (0.114) -1.342 (0.645)* 0.104 (0.101) 0.074 (0.101) -0.138 (0.506) 
           Standards -0.228 (0.111)* -0.165 (0.111) -1.267 (0.720) 0.122 (0.099) 0.090 (0.100) 0.004 (0.525) 
           Communication -0.216 (0.101)* -0.154 (0.101) -1.100 (0.500)* 0.126 (0.091) 0.105 (0.091) -0.211 (0.414) 
           Risk Management -0.138 (0.111) -0.083 (0.110) -1.373 (0.795) 0.116 (0.099) 0.083 (0.099) 0.185 (0.553) 
           Involvement -0.213 (0.102)* -0.169 (0.102) -1.272 (0.560)* 0.022 (0.090) 0.000 (0.090) -0.286 (0.456) 
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Table 18 
Comparisons between Naïve, Individual Multilevel, and Aggregated Multilevel Analyses using Data from Year One 
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As seen in Table 18, there were some similarities in findings between the three 
analysis types, such as the non-significant associations between safety climate and 
self-reported injury; however, there were some key differences. Aggregated 
multilevel analyses achieved higher regression coefficients compared to the 
individual analyses, with a paired samples t-test comparing the regression 
coefficients  of individual multilevel and aggregated multilevel analyses reaching 
significance, t (14) = 3.58, p < 0.05. However, with the smaller sample size in 
aggregated analyses, the standard errors tended to be much larger, t (14) = -7.70, p 
< 0.05. Hence, while aggregated analyses demonstrated larger regression 
coefficients, and therefore would have a larger effect size, the confidence intervals 
of the effect size would also be larger. The smaller standard errors of the individual 
level analyses resulted in more safety climate subscales significantly predicting self-
reported near misses, particularly when naïve analyses were performed. Hypothesis 
5a was therefore not supported. However, the results were not clear-cut. The target 
of perceptions (co-worker, supervisor, manager) interacted with level of analysis to 
influence the strength of the relationship between safety climate and safety 
outcomes.  
In the aggregate multilevel analyses, the co-worker scales demonstrated the 
weakest associations with near misses, while in the individual level analyses it 
demonstrated the strongest associations with near misses.  If at the individual level 
the co-worker scale achieved significant yet weaker associations with near misses 
compared to individual level supervisor and manager safety climate, these findings 
could simply be explained by the increase in power at the individual level. However, 
the contrasting pattern of results at the individual and aggregate levels suggests 
that the dimensions that are important at the individual level differ to that at the 
aggregate level. This is further highlighted by the manager scale results, with 
aggregated analyses demonstrating significant associations with self-reported near 
misses and individual multilevel analyses failing to reach significance. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 5b was supported. 
In the comparison between naïve analyses and multilevel analyses at the individual 
level, the multilevel analyses generally had lower regression coefficients, t (14) = -
166             Individual and Aggregate Comparisons  
 
7.19, p < 0.05, and higher standard errors, t (14), = -2.77, p < 0.05. The more 
conservative results for the multilevel analyses therefore support Hypothesis 5c. 
The inclusion of a random intercept slightly lowered the regression coefficients for 
the co-worker and supervisor scales, however for the manager scales the random 
intercept drastically lowered the regression coefficients, resulting in previously 
significant naïve associations becoming non-significant. This indicates that when 
facility level variance is taken into account, individual perceptions of management 
become considerably less important in predicting individual safety outcomes.  
 
9.3.2 Path Model Comparisons 
In the previous chapter it was demonstrated that supervisors were the primary 
influence on safety outcomes, with the model that included paths from supervisor 
safety climate and co-worker safety climate to safety outcomes achieving the best 
fit indices. Hence, the same path analysis comparisons will be performed to 
determine whether there is a different pattern of results at the individual level. 
Please refer to Chapter Eight (Figure 8 to Figure 12) for a description of the models 
compared. 
Path analyses were performed using EQS 6.1. Mean scores were used for the co-
worker, supervisor, and manager safety climate scales, with an injury frequency 
factor created which consisted of paths to self-reported near misses, minor injuries, 
and injuries.  Self-reported injuries and minor injuries were freely estimated paths, 
while the self-reported near miss path was fixed at one to allow estimate of error 
variance. Data was skewed, particularly the dependent variable, with Mardia’s 
normalised indicating a violation of multivariate kurtosis. This prompted the use of 
robust estimates which corrects for non-normality.  Inspection of cases which 
contributed to multivariate kurtosis detected four outliers, which were removed. 
Multicollinearity and singularity was not evident as EQS was able to invert the 
matrices, with no convergence problems. 
Firstly, Model 1 was compared to Model 2, and as per the group level results, Model 
2 achieved superior fit indices (see Table 19). Model 1 still demonstrated good 
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model fit, with the Yuan-Bentler residual-based and F statistic being non-significant, 
χ2 (1) = 7.001, p > 0.05; F (6. 719) = 1.170, p > 0.05. Fit indices similarly 
demonstrated good model fit, with CFI = 0.999, NNFI = 0.998, RMSEA = 0.008 (0.000 
to 0.050). Model 2 additionally achieved highly non-significant Yuan-Bentler 
residual based statistics, χ2 (1) = 7.806, p > 0.05; F (7, 718) = 1.118, p > 0.05. Fit 
indices were marginally better than Model 1, with CFI = 1.000, NNFI = 1.001, RMSEA 
= 0.000, (0.000 to 0.045). Therefore, the more parsimonious model, in which is no 
direct path between manager safety climate and self-reported injury frequency 
demonstrated the better model fit. 
Model 2 was then compared against Model 3, in which there is no direct path 
between manager and co-worker safety climates. As per the group-level analyses, 
the removal of this path resulted in the model achieving poor model fit, with both 
Yuan-Bentler residual-based statistics becoming significant, χ2 (1) = 49.316, p < 0.05; 
F (8, 717) = 6.552, p < 0.05. Fit indices also suggested model misspecification, with 
CFI = 0.835, NNFI = 0.690, RMSEA = 0.116 (0.094 to 0.138).  The results therefore 
mimicked the group level analyses, with managers having an important influence on 
co-workers, regardless of the level of analysis.  
Model 3 was then compared with Model 4, in which the path between co-worker 
safety climate and self-reported injury frequency was removed. Unlike the group 
level analyses, Model 4 achieved slightly better fit indices. Model 4 similarly had 
highly significant Yuan-Bentler residual-based statistics, with χ2 (1) = 49.606, p < 
0.05, F (9, 716) = 5.852, p < 0.05, CFI = 0.843, NNFI = 0.738, RMSEA = 0.107 (0.086 to 
0.128).  Therefore, contrary to the previous criterion validity analyses, co-workers 
were not considered to be an important indicator of self-reported safety outcomes, 
with the more parsimonious model in Model 4 achieving better fit indices.  
Finally, Model 3 was compared to Model 5, in which a full mediation model was 
tested. Both models demonstrated inadequate model fit, and achieved extremely 
similar fit indices. Model 5’s Yuan-Bentler residual-based statistics were highly 
significant, with χ2 (1) = 49.394, p < 0.05; F (8, 717) = 6.552, p < 0.05, with the CFI 
and RMSEA superior in Model 3, and the NNFI superior in Model 5, CFI = 0.826, 
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NNFI = 0.711, RMSEA = 0.112 (0.092 to 0.133).  This finding further suggests that the 
effect of different organisational levels of safety climate on self-reported safety 
outcomes could not be adequately estimated in the analysis, given the near 
identical results of the two-path models. 
Table 19 
Fit Indices for Individual Level Path Models 
 Yuan-Bentler  
Residual-Based F 
Statistic 
CFI NNFI RMSEA 
Cut-Off 
Criteria 
 = / 
>.85 
= / 
>.85 
= / <.08 
Model 1 1.170 0.999 0.998 0.008 (0.000 to 
0.050) 
Model 2 1.118 1.000 1.001 0.000 (0.000 to 
0.045) 
Model 3 6.552* 0.835 0.690 0.116 (0.094 to 
0.138) 
Model 4 5.852* 0.843 0.738 0.107 (0.086 to 
0.128) 
Model 5 6.552* 0.826 0.711 0.112 (0.092 to 
0.133) 
 
Hence, the hypothesis that the pattern of relationships at the individual level would 
be different to the pattern of relationships at the group level was not supported, 
with the second model achieving the best fit indices in both studies. Examination of 
parameter estimates (see Figure 17) showed that as per the group level analyses, 
there were strong and significant associations between manager safety climate and 
co-worker/supervisor safety climate. Similarly, supervisor safety climate was 
significantly associated with co-worker safety climate. However, the associations 
between the safety climate scales and self-reported safety outcomes were all non-
significant. While co-worker safety climate demonstrated the strongest association 
with self-reported safety outcomes, no scale came close to reaching significance. 
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The lack of relationship between safety climate and self-reported safety outcomes 
explains the different findings compared to the previous chapter, as more 
parsimonious models with fewer paths to self-reported safety outcomes were 
rewarded in the current comparisons. Given that the majority of respondents did 
not experience a self-reported near miss or injury, it appears that the analyses were 
not able to pick up on the differences between individuals. This is reflected in the R2 
of 0.009 for the self-reported injury frequency factor, as compared to the R2 of 0.25 
in the previous chapter. While a path analysis based on a Poisson or binomial 
distribution would likely provide a different pattern of results, path analyses which 
test generalised linear models have not yet made it into mainstream statistical 
software. Therefore, though the overall pattern of results are the same at both 
levels of analysis, the relationships that the different safety climate scales have with 
self-reported safety outcomes may not be entirely accurate due to the nature of the 
data. 
 
Figure 17. Parameter estimates for best fitting structural model (Model 2). 
 
9.3.3 Cross-Validation Analyses 
While there is confidence in the reported pattern of relationships between the 
different safety climate scales, the extremely low associations between safety 
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climate and safety outcomes at the individual level require further cross-validation, 
particularly given that the findings contrast the previous cross-sectional criterion 
validity analyses. Hence, individual level analyses were performed using MlwiN 
v2.17 (Rasbash et al., 2009), with self-reported near misses as the dependent 
variable, and all three safety climates scales as independent variables.  Like the path 
analyses, this analysis will determine which safety climate scales are significantly 
associated with self-reported safety outcomes, even after controlling for the effects 
of one another. As per the cross-sectional criterion validity analyses, logistic 
regression with a logit link function was utilised, with data from the first year. 
Models were first computed using first order MQL approximation, followed by 
second-order PQL approximation. Though corrections due to the non-independence 
of data were not possible in the path analyses, in these analyses random intercepts 
were added to the workgroup and facility level. The presence of outliers was 
ascertained by the inspection of standardised residuals and influence diagnostics, 
with one outlier removed at the facility level, and one outlier removed at the group 
level. Since maximum likelihood estimation techniques were used, statistical 
significance was ascertained via the Wald test. The results of these analyses 
supported the original cross-sectional criterion validity analyses as the co-worker 
scale was significantly associated with self-reported near misses, with a regression 
coefficient of -0.494 (0.238), χ2 (1) = 4.307, p < 0.05. In contrast, the supervisor scale 
failed to reach significance, with a coefficient of -0.240 (0.181), χ2 (1) = 1.758, p > 
0.05. Similarly, the manager scale was not significantly associated with self-reported 
safety outcomes and had a mildly positive relationship, with a regression coefficient 
of 0.222 (0.192), χ2 (1) = 1.338, p > 0.05.  Therefore, the analyses suggest that the 
previous path analyses may not be correct in terms of the relationship that safety 
climate has with self-reported safety outcomes. While the path analyses suggested 
that none of the safety climate scales at the individual level were associated with 
safety outcomes, these results suggest that perceptions of co-workers are the 
strongest individual influence on safety outcomes – even after controlling for 
higher-level variance.  
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9.3.4 Exploratory Multilevel Mediation Analyses 
The analyses in the thesis so far have found that perceptions of co-worker 
commitment to safety at the group level are not predictive of safety outcomes. This 
was clearly shown in the cross-sectional criterion validity analyses, the predictive 
validity analyses, and the path analysis comparisons. However, at the individual 
level, a different pattern of results emerge, with co-worker safety climate being a 
stronger indicator of safety outcomes compared to supervisor and manager safety 
climate. The significant association between co-worker safety climate and safety 
outcomes remained even after controlling for group and facility level variance, 
indicating that perceptions of co-workers at the individual level have a role in 
predicting safety outcomes that is separate from aggregated supervisor and 
manager safety climate. Given that this thesis has supported the notion that 
supervisor safety climate mediates the relationship between manager safety 
climate and safety outcomes, the strong predictive power of individual level co-
worker safety climate suggests that it may mediate the relationship between 
supervisor safety climate and safety outcomes.  
In order to test this tentative hypothesis, the Baron and Kenny (1986) 3-step 
method for testing mediation was used. Hence, supervisor safety climate should 
predict safety outcomes, supervisor safety climate should predict co-worker safety 
climate, and when co-worker safety climate is added to the supervisor safety 
climate  safety outcomes regression equation, the relationship between 
supervisor safety climate and safety outcomes should diminish or become non-
existent.  
These analyses were performed using MLwiN v2.2 (Rasbash et. al., 2009). In the 
analysis, supervisor safety climate was assessed at the group level, while co-worker 
safety climate and safety outcomes were assessed at the individual level. Safety 
outcomes were operationalized as self-reported near misses, assessed as a 
dichotomous variable (no near misses, one or more near misses). Hence, logistic 
regression was used in the associations between safety climate and safety 
outcomes, with a logit link function selected and random intercepts included. 
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Models were first estimated with 1st order MQL approximation, followed by 2nd 
order PQL approximation in order to achieve the most accurate estimates. Since the 
association between supervisor safety climate and co-worker safety climate does 
not involve dichotomous outcome variables, standard multilevel regression 
techniques were used. Given that normality is assumed in such analyses, a square 
root transformation with a reflection was carried out on both supervisor and co-
worker safety climate to correct the slight negative skew. Standardised residuals 
and influence diagnostics were inspected to determine the presence of any extreme 
values, with one outlier being removed at the group level for the safety climate  
safety outcomes analyses, and 6 outliers being removed at the group level for the 
supervisor safety climate  co-worker safety climate analysis.  Significance was 
calculated via the Wald test, which employs a chi-square distribution with one 
degree of freedom. 
The results supported a mediation process taking place. Firstly, supervisor safety 
climate predicted self-reported near misses, χ2 (1) = 5.787, p < 0.05. Secondly, 
supervisor safety climate predicted individual level co-worker safety climate, χ2 = 
7.530, p < 0.05. Lastly, when both supervisor and co-worker safety climate were 
included in the prediction of self-reported near misses, supervisor safety climate fell 
slightly short of significance, χ2 (1) = 3.161 , p > 0.05, while co-worker safety climate 
remained significant, χ2 (1) = 5.664, p < 0.05. Hence, the relationship between group 
level supervisor safety climate and safety outcomes was mediated by individual 
level co-worker safety climate.  
 
9.4 Discussion 
This chapter uncovered a number of interesting and important findings, with the 
overarching finding being that safety climate at the individual level (i.e. 
perceived/psychological safety climate) displays a different pattern of results 
compared to aggregated safety climate. While there were similarities between 
individual and aggregate analyses in terms of the lack of relationship with self-
reported injuries, the pattern of relationships each scale had with safety outcomes 
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differed. Co-worker safety climate had the weakest relationship with safety 
outcomes when aggregated to the group level, though when it was analysed at the 
individual level it displayed the strongest relationship, even after controlling for 
group and facility level variance. The analyses further demonstrated the potential 
problems faced by researchers who operationalize safety climate at the individual 
level and who do not take into account the dependency of perceptions at higher 
levels. These analyses were the first to compare different analysis methods on the 
same dataset in the safety climate literature, and found that regression coefficients 
tended to be smaller and standard errors tended to be larger in individual level 
analyses which adequately accounted for higher level variance, compared to naïve 
analyses in which no such correction was made.  Possibly the biggest contribution 
to the literature is the finding that the relationship between supervisor safety 
climate and safety outcomes is mediated by individual level co-worker safety 
climate.  This indicates that in the prediction of individual safety outcomes, it is an 
employee’s perception of the commitment to safety of those around them (i.e. a 
co-worker psychological/perceived safety climate) which is the most proximal. This 
finding therefore suggests an extension to Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety 
Climate to include individual perceptions of co-workers, and additionally sheds light 
on the processes in which climate perceptions may affect behaviour and ultimately 
safety outcomes.  
Researchers in the safety climate literature have commonly operationalized safety 
climate at the individual level with little regard to the possible consequences, both 
in terms of the effects on the analytical findings and on the conceptual 
development of the construct. While the arbitrary operationalization of safety 
climate clearly fosters ambiguity and impedes conceptual development, it was not 
known before this analysis how results may be affected by the level of analysis and 
analytical technique. Cross-sectional associations at the individual level found that 
perceptions of co-workers had stronger associations with self-reported near misses 
compared to supervisor or manager safety climate. These findings contrasted with 
group level analyses, where the opposite pattern of results emerged. Before this 
analysis, the only comparison between individual and aggregate level analyses was 
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in the form of meta-analysis, with Christian and colleagues (2008) finding that 
individual level analyses tended to have weaker associations with safety outcomes. 
Though authors such as Zohar argued for the aggregation of safety climate data on 
conceptual and methodological grounds, there was little direct evidence to suggest 
that findings at the individual level were not generalizable to the wider safety 
climate literature. While the analyses upheld the findings of Christian, with 
regression coefficients weaker at the individual level, the dichotomy in findings 
based on level of aggregation suggests that level of analysis does affect the manner 
in which certain safety climate scales/subscales interact with safety outcomes. This 
therefore calls into question the generalizability of findings at the individual level.  
While co-worker commitment to safety is a relatively rare dimension in the safety 
climate literature, researchers that include the dimension (e.g. Seo et al., 2004; 
Turner et al., 2010) may find that their findings will not generalise when scores are 
aggregated to the group level.  In addition, while supervisor safety climate at the 
group level will have a direct association with group level safety outcomes, at the 
individual level this relationship is mediation by co-worker safety climate. 
Therefore, the level of safety outcomes needs to be taken into account in addition 
to the level of safety climate when ascertaining the generalizability of findings. 
This analysis was the first to operationalize climate at the individual level and 
control for higher level variance, with comparisons between naïve and corrected 
analyses producing compelling results.  Compared to the standard ‘naïve’ analyses 
in which no correction is made, the individual multilevel analyses tended to be 
more conservative, with lower regression coefficients and higher standard error.  
Hence, the results reflect that of Twisk (2006) who achieved similar results in his 
comparisons in the epidemiological context. While the correction did not change 
the overall pattern of results for the co-worker and supervisor scales, the regression 
coefficients for the manager scale declined significantly. The standard error 
remained relatively unchanged, possibly because the small sample size at the 
facility level (N = 11) was insufficient for the detection of the relatively small 
differences in standard error as per the group level analyses. However, the 
correction to regression coefficients alone was enough for previously significant 
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associations between subscales and self-reported near misses to become non-
significant. Given that manager safety climate is the most commonly used 
dimension in the safety climate literature, this has concerning implications for 
research at the individual level which does not correct for the dependency in 
climate perceptions. The results suggest that research utilising naïve analyses (e.g. 
Seo et al., 2004; Turner et al., 2010; Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2008; Wills, Watson, & 
Biggs, 2006) may be overestimating the relationship that safety climate has with 
safety outcomes. In the case of manager commitment to safety, the results suggest 
that once facility/organisational variance is accounted for, individual level 
perceptions of management commitment to safety become far less important in 
the prediction of safety outcomes. In other words, once differences between 
facilities are accounted for, differences between individuals in terms of their 
perception of manager safety climate become redundant. Additionally, in datasets 
where there is high within-group homogeneity and high between-group 
heterogeneity in climate perceptions, the effect of not accounting for the 
dependency in perceptions would be heightened. The intraclass correlation 
coefficients in the current analysis, particularly at the facility level, were relatively 
low, and therefore the potential for confounded results when corrective steps are 
not taken by the researcher is made clear by these findings.  
The finding that the relationship between supervisor safety climate and individual 
outcomes is mediated by individual level co-worker safety climate is an important 
and unexpected result that sheds new light on the processes in which climate 
perceptions affect safety outcomes. Before this analysis, the dominant perspective 
was that individual employees reach a consensus on the priority of safety through 
their shared experiences and interactions with the supervisor (i.e. observing reward 
and punishment), and these perceptions inform desired behaviours, which in turn 
affect individual behaviour and the subsequent possibility of injury (see Zohar & 
Luria, 2005). The current analysis has demonstrated that there is an additional link 
between supervisor safety climate and individual safety outcomes. It appears that 
based on perceptions of commitment to safety at higher levels of the organisation, 
individuals develop their own perception of safety’s priority among fellow frontline 
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employees in their area, and it is these more proximal perceptions that most 
strongly predicts safety outcomes for that individual. In other words, employees 
synthesise higher level climate perceptions, which when combined with their own 
characteristics and experiences (i.e. individual variability), result in the formation of 
a perception of “the way things are done around here” among fellow frontline 
employees, which informs behaviour and therefore safety outcomes.  
 Though managers and supervisors are predictive of an individual’s co-worker safety 
climate, the significant associations with safety outcomes after controlling for group 
and facility level variance demonstrates that it is a distinctively individual level 
phenomena. Hence, while there are similarities between individuals when it comes 
to their perceptions of co-workers (as shown by the non-zero ICC’s), the results 
demonstrate that individual variability remains important in the prediction of safety 
outcomes and that a psychological/perceived safety climate construct can coexist 
with the more theoretically and empirically supported aggregated safety climate 
construct.  This is an important finding, given that research generally describes 
safety climate as consisting of shared perceptions (Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Oliver et 
al., 2006; Zohar, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005), thereby requiring aggregation and 
multilevel analysis to avoid confounding results. While safety climate perceptions 
still need to be aggregated to the appropriate level, an individually operationalized 
psychological/perceived safety climate can be seen to exist as a distinct, important, 
and non-confounded predictor of safety outcomes, provided that adequate 
multilevel corrections are implemented. 
 The fact that co-worker perceptions were more important than supervisor and 
manager perceptions at the individual level makes it easier to differentiate among 
psychological/perceived safety climate and safety climate and therefore reduce the 
probability of future conceptual ambiguity. While perceptions of supervisor and 
manager commitment to safety remain the domain of safety climate and are always 
aggregated to their respective level, these individually relevant perceptions of co-
workers can remain at the individual level in the assessment of 
psychological/perceived safety climate. This distinction can form the basis for the 
development of conceptual models which explain the role psychological/perceived 
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safety climate has in the prediction of safety outcomes and its relationship with 
other variables such as safety climate.  
Overall, the current analysis has uncovered a number of findings which should 
promote the conceptual development of safety climate. Firstly, it was demonstrated 
that individually operationalized safety climate displays a different pattern of results 
compared to aggregated safety climate, with perceptions of co-workers having a 
much stronger relationship with safety outcomes at the individual level. These 
analyses also demonstrated the potential inaccuracy of research findings which 
operationalize safety climate at the individual level without correcting for the 
dependency in observations, with non-corrected analyses underestimating standard 
error and overestimating regression coefficients. Lastly, it was found that the 
relationship between group-level supervisor safety climate and individual safety 
outcomes was mediated by individual level co-worker safety climate. These findings 
suggest an extension to Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate, offer further 
insight into the processes in which safety climate affects individuals, and provide a 
platform from which safety climate and psychological/perceived safety climate 
research can proceed in a conceptually and methodologically distinct manner
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Chapter 10 
General Discussion 
10.1 Overview 
In this thesis, the psychometric properties of a recently developed safety climate 
scale were investigated. In addition, a number of other analyses took place, all with 
the aim of shedding light on key areas of ambiguity in the safety climate literature. 
The implications of these findings will be discussed in the following sections. After a 
review of the major findings in each chapter, the theoretical implications will be 
discussed, with a focus on the role of co-workers, supervisors, and managers in 
promoting safety within organisations. The major methodological limitations will 
then be addressed. Next, directions for future research will be discussed, both in 
terms of the psychological/perceived safety climate literature, and the safety 
climate literature generally. Practical implications will then be discussed, followed 
by concluding comments.  
10.2 Review of Aims and Major Findings 
This thesis aimed to explore the relationships between safety climate perceptions at 
three levels of the organisation (manager, supervisor, co-worker), and the 
subsequent impact these separate levels of safety have on safety outcomes. The 
importance of co-workers in promoting safety was of particular interest, given the 
lack of multilevel studies examining the lagged effects of co-worker safety in the 
literature. By examining these lagged and cross-level effects, the aim was to 
replicate and extend upon Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate. Finally, the 
thesis explored some of the methodological issues that may potentially impede 
progress in the safety climate literature. Safety climate has been operationalized at 
the individual and aggregate level, and so the aim was to examine the effect that 
level-of-analysis has on the pattern of relationships between safety climate and 
safety outcomes. In order to achieve these aims, a number of analyses were 
conducted to address the five research objectives. 
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Objective One was to assess the factorial validity of each scale in the safety climate 
survey. This was an important analysis, not only to ensure that the survey was 
psychometrically sound, but to determine whether safety climate was perceived to 
be a multidimensional or unidimensional construct. Though the survey was 
developed with a multidimensional framework in mind, authors such as Neal, 
Griffin, and Hart (2000) have operationalized safety climate as a unidimensional 
variable. Results of a confirmatory factor analysis indicated that employees 
perceived safety climate as a multidimensional construct at each level of the 
organisational hierarchy, a finding in line with the majority of research (e.g. Cooper 
& Phillips, 2004; Johnson, 2007; Seo, et al, 2004; Zohar, 1980; Zohar & Luria, 2005). 
Additionally, given the acceptable fit indices of the multidimensional model, each 
scale demonstrated factorial validity.  
Objective Two was to investigate the criterion validity of the survey by performing 
cross-sectional associations between each safety climate scale and self-reported 
safety outcomes.  The ability of a scale to achieve significant associations with 
safety outcomes is of particular importance given the overall role of a safety climate 
scale is to predict areas of the organisation that are at increased risk of injury. The 
multilevel analyses found that the scales assessing supervisor and manager 
commitment to safety were significantly associated with self-reported near misses, 
while the co-worker scale failed to achieve significant association with any of the 
safety outcomes.  These results reflected the work of Zohar (2000; Zohar & Luria, 
2005) and Johnson (2007), who operationalized safety climate using a similar 
multilevel behaviour-based approach and who previously demonstrated the central 
of role of management and supervisors in promoting safety within the organisation. 
The results indicated that individuals within workgroups with supervisors deemed 
to possess high commitment to safety experienced less self-reported near misses, 
and similarly, individuals within facilities with committed managers experienced less 
self-reported near misses.  The non-significant co-worker results suggested that 
aggregated perceptions of co-workers had less of an impact in promoting safety 
compared to supervisors and managers, and suggested at this stage that Zohar’s 
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Multilevel Model of Safety Climate need not be extended to include perceptions of 
co-workers.  
Objective Three was to ascertain the predictive validity of each scale. Longitudinal 
studies are relatively rare in the safety climate literature, particularly those that 
aggregate safety climate scores to account for the dependency in perceptions. The 
benefit of longitudinal analyses over cross-sectional analyses is that it avoids the 
potential confound of employees providing low safety climate scores because they 
recently experienced a near miss/injury, and instead determines whether scores in 
the first year of data collection is associated with safety outcomes the subsequent 
year. The predictive validity analyses mirrored the cross-sectional analyses. 
Perceptions of supervisor commitment to safety at the group level predicted self-
reported near misses at the group level. Aggregated perceptions of management 
commitment to safety had strong yet non-significant associations with safety 
outcomes, with medium to large effect sizes. These results were cross-validated 
when using official injury data, with manager safety climate similarly demonstrating 
non-significant yet medium to large effect sizes. Hence, the small sample size and 
non-parametric analyses were the likely cause of the conservative results. Co-
worker commitment to safety once again failed to achieve significant associations 
with safety outcomes. The results supported the cross-sectional findings, indicating 
that the central role of supervisors in promoting safety was a robust effect, and 
demonstrated that Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate could be generalised 
to the oil and gas industry.  
Objective Four was to assess the cross-level effects of safety climate on safety 
outcomes through a series of path analyses. The aim was to determine whether the 
mediated relationship between manager safety climate and safety outcomes could 
be replicated in the oil and gas industry, and whether perceptions of co-workers 
separately mediated the relationship between supervisor safety climate and safety 
outcomes. Due to sample size restrictions, it was not possible to perform multilevel 
path analyses as originally intended, hence it was necessary to aggregate all three 
scales and safety outcomes to the group level to maximise sample size. Despite this 
setback, the path analyses supported the findings of Zohar and Luria, with the path 
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model in which there was a direct path between supervisor safety climate and 
safety outcomes and an indirect path between manager safety climate and safety 
outcomes achieving the best fit indices. In addition, manager safety climate was 
seen to be strongly associated with supervisor and co-worker safety climate, 
reflecting Zohar’s theory that management is the progenitor of safety climates at 
lower levels in the organisation. Validation analyses partially supported the path 
analysis findings, with the relationship between facility level manager safety climate 
and individual safety outcomes becoming non-significant when group-level 
supervisor safety climate was added to the regression equation. However, a non-
significant association between manager safety climate and supervisor safety 
climate, possibly due to the inadequate sample size, prevented a mediation model 
being fully supported. Nevertheless, the results demonstrated the important and 
proximal influence of supervisors on safety outcomes.  
Finally, Objective Five was to compare aggregate and individual level safety climate, 
given the ambiguity promoted by a lack of consistency in the literature when it 
comes to level of analysis. It was found that level-of-analysis had the potential to 
change the pattern of results, with co-worker safety climate demonstrating the 
strongest association with safety outcomes at the individual level. Additionally, 
when corrections were made for the dependency in climate perceptions at the 
individual level, previously significant associations became non-significant, a 
concerning result given the large number of studies which operationalize safety 
climate at the individual level and do not perform these corrections. The strong 
associations between individual level co-worker safety climate and safety 
outcomes, even after controlling for higher level variance, led to the testing of a 
mediation model with individual level co-worker safety climate mediating the 
relationship between group-level supervisor safety climate and individual level 
safety outcomes. The mediation model was supported, indicating that individual 
perceptions of co-workers were the most proximal indicator of safety outcomes. 
These results suggested that Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate could be 
extended to include individual perceptions of co-workers, however only when 
perceptions of co-workers were operationalized as an individual level variable. 
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Hence, this analysis providing further insight into the processes in which safety 
climate affects individual behaviour.  
10.3 Theoretical Implications 
There have been a number of safety climate models proposed (Christian et al., 
2009; Flin, 2007; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005), each with their own 
advantages and areas of focus. For example, while Griffin and Neal’s focus was on 
the individual variables that shape behaviour, Zohar’s model was focused on group 
and organisational variables that an organisation can target in their safety activities.  
In this thesis, the analyses and the interpretation of findings were framed according 
to Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate. According to Zohar’s theory, 
employees form behaviour-outcome expectancies through their multilevel 
perceptions of the commitment to safety of supervisors and managers. Upon 
developing this theory, Zohar (2000; 2003; Zohar & Luria, 2005) operationalized 
safety climate in a manner different to other researchers and his original 
conceptualisation of the construct (Zohar, 1980). Most researchers other than 
Zohar assessed safety climate as a single-level construct, with disparate dimensions 
such as management commitment to safety, supervisor commitment to safety, 
safety communication, safety systems, and competence all assessed as separate 
subscales on a single scale (e.g. Williamson et al., 1997; Hoffman & Stetzer, 1998; 
Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 2001). This was the approach taken by Christian 
and colleagues and Griffin and Neal in their safety climate models, with Griffin and 
Neal focusing on manager commitment to safety in their scale.  In comparison, 
Zohar operationalized safety climate as a multilevel construct, with dimensions 
assessing distinct behaviours loading onto separate supervisor or manager second 
order factors. Perceptions of supervisors were considered a group level construct, 
and therefore aggregated to the group level, while perceptions of management 
were considered a property of the organisation, and were therefore aggregated to 
the organisational level.  
Despite these advantages of separating perceptions and aggregating to the 
appropriate level, very few researchers have followed Zohar’s lead in abandoning 
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the traditional method of safety climate scale construction.  Johnson (2007) is the 
only author to have reused one of Zohar’s scales, while Newman, Griffin, and 
Mason (2008) authored the only other non-Zohar authored article to have 
separated perceptions of supervisor and managers and examined cross-level 
effects, albeit with a very different itemisation. Given the absence of studies 
replicating Zohar’s findings with a similar operationalization of the construct, the 
acceptable psychometric properties of the supervisor and manager scales in this 
thesis contribute to the literature by providing much needed support for Zohar’s 
Multilevel Model of Safety Climate. With a similar multi-level structure and similar 
behavioural domains assessed, the factorial validity, criterion validity, and 
predictive validity demonstrated by the supervisor and manager scales suggests 
that Zohar’s model generalises to other industries. This is a significant finding, given 
that Zohar’s scales have only been tested in the manufacturing industry to date. 
There are likely substantial differences in the working environment between the 
manufacturing industry in Israel, where Zohar has tested his theory, and the oil and 
gas industry in Australia. Therefore the similar pattern of results in both 
environments suggests that Zohar’s model is relatively robust and can be applied to 
the oil and gas context.  
While the results overall supported Zohar’s conceptualisation of safety climate, 
there are some specific areas where the results suggest some modifications or 
extensions could be made. Hence, in the following sections the implications of the 
results will be discussed in relation to the three levels of the organisation assessed.  
10.3.1 Co-worker Safety Climate 
It was originally hypothesised that co-workers would be a distinct source of 
behaviour-outcome expectancies at the group level. It was believed that in a similar 
manner to supervisor safety climate arising from the discretion that supervisors 
possess in their interpretation and implementation of management policy and 
procedure, a co-worker safety climate would arise from similar discretion among 
workgroups in their adherence to supervisory directives. Despite co-workers safety 
climate being included in a dimension in only a handful of safety climate studies 
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(e.g. Lu & Tsai, 2008; Seo et al., 2004), such a hypothesis was justified  given the 
number of studies which have demonstrated the important role co-workers have in 
promoting safety (e.g. Goldberg et al., 1991; Simard & Marchand, 1997; Turner et 
al., 2010) 
Based on these findings it was believed that a group level co-worker safety climate 
dimension would be a proximal indicator of safety outcomes. In some groups 
behavioural norms may consist of warning other members of potential dangers, 
adhering to all higher level directives, and earnestly treating safety as the top 
priority, and these groups were hypothesised to have lower injury rates compared 
to groups with low safety priority norms, despite co-workers not having any formal 
powers to punish or reward behaviour. The saliency of co-worker perceptions in 
comparison to supervisors and managers were believed to stem from their 
immediacy, or as Turner and colleagues state “Since workers are relationally closer 
and more directly affected by the work practices of their coworkers, respondents 
may have been more likely to attend to cues from coworkers than from supervisors 
or senior managers about the importance of safety under demanding conditions” 
(p. 489).  
 
Contrary to expectations, this did not turn out to be the case, with co-worker safety 
climate demonstrating consistently weaker associations with safety outcomes 
compared to supervisor and manager safety climate. In both cross-sectional and 
lagged analyses, the co-worker scale and its subscales failed to demonstrate 
significant associations with safety outcomes, with some associations being in the 
positive direction. In comparison, even when the supervisor scale did not reach 
significance in its associations with self-reported injuries, regression coefficients 
were still very much in the negative direction. In short, the results suggested the 
absence of a relationship between group-level co-worker safety climate and safety 
outcomes. While there was some uncertainty over whether perceptions of co-
workers existed at the group or facility level, the level of aggregation did not change 
the pattern of results, with facility level co-worker safety climate similarly not 
significantly associated with safety outcomes.  
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The results did not suggest the absence of shared climate perceptions at the group 
or facility level. Intraclass correlation coefficients were of comparable size to the 
supervisor and manager scales, indicating that shared perceptions did exist at these 
levels.  These shared perceptions, in the form of mean safety climate scores per 
group, were however not predictive of safety outcomes. Individuals within groups 
with a low average safety climate score were not more likely to experience self-
reported near misses or injuries compared to groups with a high average safety 
climate score, a surprising result.  
 
Given that the supervisor and manager scales all achieved significant associations 
with safety outcomes, reflecting past research (Zohar 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005; 
Johnson, 2007), the poor co-worker scale results suggested that co-workers were 
not as salient of an influence on behaviour as previously thought. It suggested that 
supervisors, with their ability to punish and reward behaviour, were a much more 
salient source of behaviour-outcome expectancies. Hence, the results could be 
interpreted as suggesting that the prospect of losing one’s job, or inversely praise or 
the possibility of promotion, were the key drivers of behaviour, rather than trying to 
follow any co-worker specific norms established by fellow employees. It was 
thought that the formalised, highly supervised environment of the oil and gas 
industry may have been another contributing factor to the lesser saliency of co-
worker perceptions. Turner and colleagues (2010), who found that co-worker 
support was the most salient indicator in the railroad maintenance context, 
similarly suggested that the less formal presence of supervisors in their study may 
have contributed to their results differing to Zohar’s.   
 
However, when perceptions of co-workers were left unaggregated in order to gauge 
the effect of level-of-analysis, a more complex picture emerged. While co-workers 
demonstrated the weakest association with safety outcomes at the group level, 
when operationalized at the individual level it proved to be the strongest indicator 
of safety outcomes. Even after controlling for variance at the group and facility level 
the same pattern of relationships remained, with supervisor and management 
186             General Discussion  
 
commitment to safety demonstrating non-significant associations when all three 
scales were added in the regression equations in the prediction of self-reported 
near misses. Hence, the results ended up mirroring that of Turner and colleagues. 
These results suggested that level-of-analysis had a substantial role in affecting 
safety climate results, with relationships at the aggregate level not holding at the 
individual level and vice versa.  
 
A more surprising result emerged when a mediation model was tested, with the 
relationship between group-level supervisor commitment to safety and individual-
level safety outcomes mediated by individual-level co-worker commitment to 
safety. In line with the individual level analyses, this mediation model was 
supported, with group level perceptions of supervisor commitment to safety 
becoming non-significant when individual level co-worker commitment to safety 
was included in the regression equation. This indicated that while supervisor 
commitment to safety directly predicted group level safety outcomes, in the 
prediction of individual level safety outcomes, individual perceptions of co-worker 
commitment were the most proximal predictor. These results therefore suggest 
that Turner and colleagues and Zohar’s results are not contradictory at all, but 
rather demonstrate that the level of analysis of the safety outcome does determine 
what level of the organisation is the most proximal. This is a key finding, and if 
replicated in future studies, may reduce ambiguity in the literature given it explains 
contradictory findings such as the one mentioned previously, and suggests that 
analyses with an individual level safety outcome are only comparable to other 
studies which have similarly assessed safety outcomes at the individual level, with 
the same applying to aggregated outcomes.    
 
Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate positioned supervisors as the most 
proximal influence on employee behaviour due to their ability to form behaviour-
outcome expectancies among frontline employees through reward/punishment. 
The results suggest an additional link between supervisor commitment to safety 
and individual safety outcomes. It appears that employees develop multilevel 
perceptions of commitment to safety from observing supervisors and managers as 
General Discussion                 187 
 
per Zohar’s theory, but instead of these perceptions directly informing behaviour, 
these multilevel perceptions contribute to an employee’s own perception of 
safety’s priority among fellow frontline employees. This individual perception of 
safety’s priority among co-workers becomes the strongest indicator of an 
employee’s propensity to get injured. 
 
There are some potential reasons why this relationship exists at the individual level 
and not at the aggregate level. While the non-zero intraclass correlation coefficients 
(ICC) demonstrate that there are similarities among employees in their perception 
of co-workers, the strong associations with safety outcomes after controlling for 
group and facility variance indicates that it is a distinctively individual level 
phenomena. The significant associations between manager/supervisor safety 
climate and individual level co-worker safety climate suggests that employees 
synthesise climate perceptions from multiple levels of the organisation, which when 
combined with their own characteristics and experiences (i.e. individual variability), 
form a perception of “the way we do things around here” among fellow frontline 
employees. These subjective perceptions of co-workers then inform behaviour and 
therefore safety outcomes. Given that psychological climate is suggested to arise 
from the interaction of quasi-facts and intersubjectivity (Field & Abelson, 1982), and 
is affected by worldviews, perceptual biases, and previous experience (Ostroff & 
Bowen, 2000), it can be seen how employee subjectivity in conceptualising how safe 
similarly ranked employees behave can result in individual level perceptions being 
more predictive of individual safety outcomes compared to mean group scores. In 
comparison, perceptions of supervisors and managers may be based in a more 
objective reality (Hardin & Higgin, 1995; Zohar, 2003), whereby social interaction 
validates and promotes a perceptual consensus of these more distant figures, 
resulting in shared perceptions having a stronger relationship with aggregated 
safety outcomes.  
 
Another possible reason for individual perceptions of co-workers demonstrating a 
stronger relationship with safety outcomes compared to supervisor/manager 
commitment to safety is that co-worker perceptions may serve as a proxy for an 
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employee’s own behaviour. At the beginning of the research project it was 
suggested that one potential benefit of assessing perceptions of co-workers is that 
it may provide a less biased insight into the behaviour of the employee compared to 
a scale that asks the individual to rate their own commitment to safety. It is widely 
known that when individuals report on their own behaviour, there is a tendency to 
over-report desired behaviours and underreport undesired behaviour, in other 
words, a social desirability bias (Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002; Moorman & 
Podsakoff, 1992). In the organisational setting, this social desirability bias may be 
more acute, due to fear of employers taking action against them due to their 
responses, even if the possibility is remote (Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002). 
Therefore, by measuring perceptions of co-workers, an unguarded insight into the 
behaviour norms present among frontline employees may be achieved. If the 
behaviours of co-workers did in fact reflect an individual’s own behaviour, this 
would explain why individual perceptions of co-workers were the most proximal 
predictor of individual safety outcomes.  
 
While the mechanisms in which individual level co-worker perceptions affect 
behaviour are not clearly understood, this mediating variable may resolve the 
dichotomy of findings in the safety climate literature. While authors such as Zohar 
(2000) and Johnson (2007) have found that safety climate directly predicts safety 
outcomes, many other authors believe this relationship is mediated by individual 
variables such as safety motivation/knowledge (Neal & Griffin, 2006; Flin, 2007; 
Christian et al., 2009). Previously, the dichotomy in findings could be explained by 
the different operationalization of the construct by the two groups of authors. 
While Zohar and Johnson used scales with which assessed perceptions of specific 
behaviours, authors such as Neal and Griffin assessed safety climate though 
perceptions of a non-specified commitment to safety, with no behaviours listed.  
This less specific interpretation of safety climate was then seen to indirectly predict 
self-reported safety compliance and participation, which in turn predicted accidents 
at the aggregate level. Two subscales in Zohar’s scale assessed safety compliance 
and participation behaviours, potentially explaining the more proximal predictive 
power of safety climate in his studies.  
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However, in the current study a behaviour-based operationalization of safety 
climate was utilised with strong similarities to Zohar’s scales, and yet an individual 
level variable was seen to mediate the relationship between supervisor safety 
climate and safety outcomes. Hence, the current study supports an individual level 
mediation process taking place as espoused by models of Flin (2007) and Neal and 
Griffin (2006). While in the previously mentioned models the mediating variable 
was safety motivation, in the current study it was psychological/perceived safety 
climate, assessed through the perceptions of co-worker commitment to safety.  
Both variables may be similar conceptually, with Flin regarding motivation as 
relating to expectations regarding the outcome of behaviours, and Neal and Griffin 
defining it as the willingness of an employee to act safely and the valence 
associated with these behaviours.  Individual level perceptions of co-workers would 
also relate to behaviour-outcome expectancies and the willingness to act safely, 
with perceptions of how safe employees in a similar position behave (and the 
ramifications of behaviour) likely acting as a motivational driver on the individual, as 
seen through their direct and proximal prediction of safety outcomes.  In other 
words, these subjective perceptions of co-workers, which reflect “the way we do 
things around here”, may motivate and direct behaviour as per the mediating 
variable in Flin/Neal and Griffin’s model.  
 
Overall, these findings suggest that Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate could 
be extended to include individual perceptions of co-workers, in order to more 
comprehensively describe the cross-level processes in which safety climate affects 
individuals. Though it is uncertain exactly why individual level perceptions of co-
workers predict safety outcomes and group level perceptions do not, the results 
suggest that at the individual level, co-worker commitment to safety is more 
proximal than supervisor and management commitment to safety. Even after 
controlling for group and facility level variance, the results suggest that co-worker 
commitment to safety is the most proximal predictor of safety outcomes. In this 
sample, individual level co-worker safety climate is a distinct predictor of safety 
outcomes; however it is unknown whether it achieves this by providing an insight 
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into an individual’s own commitment to safety, or by simply being the outcome of 
an employee’s multilevel perceptions of the workplace coupled with their individual 
characteristics and experiences.  
 
10.3.2 Supervisor Safety Climate 
The scale assessing supervisor commitment to safety was the most consistently 
performing scale of the survey. It demonstrated acceptable factorial validity, and 
suggested criterion and predictive validity through its associations with self-
reported near-misses, a feat not achieved by the co-worker or manager scales.  
Such findings are reflective of Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate, which 
championed the role of supervisors as a key influence of behaviour, in comparison 
to other researchers who concentrate solely on management (e.g. Neal & Griffin, 
2006). According to Zohar’s model, the policies, procedures, and practices 
stemming from management do not cover every eventuality, and so supervisory 
discretion results in a group level supervisor safety climate being formed. This 
climate is a more proximal predictor of safety outcomes since supervisors provide 
punishment/reward more frequently and immediately than managers. This aspect 
of Zohar’s theory was partially supported by the findings. The path analyses 
demonstrated that the model with supervisor and manager safety climate 
predicting safety outcomes had poorer fit indices than the model with supervisor 
safety climate alone predicting safety outcomes, however, since manager safety 
climate was assessed at the group level it is unknown how this may have affected 
the pattern of relationships. It is possible that this mediation finding would not hold 
if manager safety climate was aggregated to the facility level where it belongs. 
Multilevel mediation analyses were similarly obtuse. The association between 
manager safety climate and safety outcomes became non-significant when 
supervisor safety climate was added to the regression equation; supporting a 
mediated relationship, however it could not be determined whether manager 
safety climate predicted supervisor safety climate. In both cases, inadequate sample 
size was the cause of these ambiguous findings. Since in both analyses the results 
were generally supportive of a mediation process occurring, reflecting the findings 
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of Zohar and Luria, the weight of the evidence is in favour of this process taking 
place and supervisors being a more proximal influence on group level safety 
outcomes as compared to management.  
The best performing subscale was the communication subscale, which shares 
similarities with Zohar and Luria’s declarative practices subscale. In the declarative 
practices subscale the focus is more on declared, publically espoused messages to 
employees, while in the communication subscale a two-way approach to 
communication is depicted. Items in the communication subscale relate to 
supervisors listening and acting upon safety concerns raised by employees, rather 
than just declarative behaviours. Items additionally relate to recognising good 
behaviour and punishing poor safety performance, and so the strong associations 
with safety outcomes are not surprising. As previously stated, supervisors play an 
important role due to their ability to reinforce/punish behaviour, resulting in the 
formation of behaviour-outcome expectancies and demonstrating the priority of 
safety. While the items relating to punishing/rewarding behaviour are obvious in 
their links to Zohar’s theory, the items which assess listening behaviours also relate 
to the reinforcement of behaviour. As Zohar and Luria and other researchers have 
stated (e.g. Luthens, 2000), simple attention and recognition are powerful 
reinforcers. Having a supervisor who not only earnestly listens to safety concerns 
and ideas, but acts upon them, likely operates as a significant reinforcer for 
employees. This reinforcement would demonstrate to employees in the group the 
priority that safety holds, and increase the likelihood of similar safety orientated 
behaviour occurring in the future. Hence, while the other subscales are 
undoubtedly important, and list behaviours which demonstrate the overall priority 
of safety, the superior predictive and criterion validity of the communication 
subscale stems from the fact that it taps into the core meaning of safety climate 
more closely.  
The predictive power of this reinforcement based subscale is also explainable by 
other related organisational theories. For example, in expectancy-valence theory, 
employees engage in particular behaviours due to an expectation of attaining some 
sort of desired outcome from that behaviour (Vroom, 1964). Hence, in an analogous 
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manner to behaviour-outcome expectancies, if an employee perceives that acting 
safely or suggesting safety improvements will result in reinforcement from their 
supervisor, they will be more motivated to engage in this behaviour (Neal & Griffin, 
2006). Similarly, if other employees perceive this reinforcement occurring, 
according to social learning theory this will affect the frequency in which they 
themselves engage in the behaviour (Sims & Manz, 1982).  
10.3.3 Manager Safety Climate 
As previously stated, manager safety climate appeared to be an indirect predictor of 
safety outcomes, providing support for Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate. 
This is an important finding, not only because it demonstrated that Zohar’s theory 
was generalizable to the oil and gas industry, but because mid-level management 
was being assessed rather than top management. In Zohar’s studies, manager 
safety climate was aggregated to the organisational level, with items directed at top 
management. In contrast manager safety climate in the current study was 
aggregated to the facility level, with items directed towards facility-level 
management, i.e. middle management. The possibility of such intermediary levels 
of safety climate was discussed by Zohar and Luria, who suggested that when top 
management define policies, management levels below re-interpret them to reflect 
their own priorities, with this process cascading down the organisation. Zohar and 
Luria therefore proposed that supervisors use mid-level management as a referent 
for their perceptions and expectations. They suggested that this could be 
investigated by assessing perceptions of frontline employees, since it is likely they 
are aware of mid-level management priorities, or through the perceptions of 
supervisors themselves. The former was tested in the current study, and so the 
general support for Zohar’s mediation findings suggest that this multilevel cascade 
model does extend to mid-level management and frontline employees are aware of 
their priorities.  
While the path analyses showing manager safety climate predicting lower levels of 
climate are to be treated with some caution due to level of analysis issues, the 
results are overall supportive of previous research which has positioned 
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management as a key figure in the establishment of climate and culture throughout 
an organisation (Hofstede et al., 1993; Flin, Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000; 
Zohar & Luria, 2005; Zohar, 2003; Arboleda, Morrow, Crum, & Shelley, 2003). 
Therefore, while manager commitment to safety appears not to be a direct 
predictor of safety outcomes, its position as safety climate’s most commonly 
assessed dimension is not under threat by the study findings. However, the findings 
do highlight the importance of separating perceptions of different organisational 
levels in safety climate scales. Studies which include manager commitment to safety 
and supervisor commitment to safety in a singular scale may result in an 
underestimation of the association with safety outcomes. 
 
10.4 Limitations of Study 
While every possible step was undertaken to ensure that analyses were undertaken 
in a methodologically rigorous manner, some limitations are present, potentially 
affecting the generalizability and robustness of the research findings.   
10.4.1 Sample Size and Characteristics 
The most significant problem encountered in the study was the relatively small 
sample size at the aggregate level. Though there were a large number of individual 
respondents, the manner in which workgroups were organised meant that some 
had in excess of 30 employees and others were much smaller.  Given that there 
needed to be at least three employees in a group for it to be included in aggregated 
analyses, a number of groups had to be removed since less than three members 
replied/had useable data. This was exacerbated in the longitudinal analyses, given 
that it was necessary to have groups with sufficient members over consecutive 
years. The lower than expected sample size was particularly evident when 
attempting to do individual data matching so that true longitudinal analyses could 
be attempted. Less than 40 employees completed the optional data matching item 
and had useable data in both years, which prevented these analyses from being 
conducted and suggested that employees were concerned about identification. 
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Given the apparent concern over identification, there is the possibility that 
respondents may have provided inaccurate data, with less safety minded or 
previously injured personnel potentially less likely to complete the survey. The 
anonymous nature of the survey was clearly stated on the participant information 
sheet, and so it is possible that uncontrollable organisational events may have 
contributed to this phenomenon. While the number of respondents who completed 
the personnel code item was very low, overall response rate was quite high (Year 1 
= 66%, Year 2 = 59%), with the vast majority of workgroups represented. Hence, it is 
hoped that that the data reflects the experience of individuals employed in the 
organisation, however further replication is required.    
While sample size at the group level was not optimal, there appeared to be 
sufficient power for the group level analyses. For the path model comparisons, 
Bentler (2006) states that as long as EQS can reject certain models (i.e. differentiate 
between poor and well-fitting models), the sample size is likely sufficient. For the 
tests of criterion and predictive validity, the supervisor scale significantly predicted 
self-reported near misses while the co-worker scale did not, reflecting past research 
findings and demonstrating the ability of the dataset to differentiate between a 
poor and good predictor of safety outcomes.  
Given that data was collected from a single organisation, the small sample size at 
the facility level was a more serious dilemma that prevented certain analyses from 
being performed. While it was originally envisioned for the path analyses to be 
performed using multilevel techniques, with only nine facilities sampled over 
subsequent years, this vision turned out to be unrealistic. Since manager safety 
climate had to be aggregated to the group level instead of the facility level, the 
pattern of relationships may not hold when the manager scale is correctly 
aggregated. While the path analyses largely reflected Zohar’s research in which the 
scale was correctly aggregated, the strong associations with co-worker safety 
climate is potentially a misleading result. Since no previous research has examined 
the cross-level relationships with co-worker safety climate, it is difficult to make any 
firm conclusions and points for the need for future research to replicate the results 
in a more methodologically sound manner.  
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 The low facility sample size also may have prevented the predictive validity 
analyses of the manager scale reaching significance, with a conservative Spearman’s 
rho analysis needing to be used due to uncertainty over the distribution of the data. 
Lastly, the multilevel mediation analyses may also have been confounded by the 
low facility sample size. MlwiN was unable to detect any facility level variance, 
which likely contributed to the manager scale failing to predict the supervisor scale 
so as to support a mediation model taking place. Twisk (2006) states that the 
inability of the program to detect variance may be due to it being unimportant, and 
there is always the possibility that group level variance is much more important 
than facility level variance in the prediction of supervisor safety climate. However, 
given the extremely small sample size, it is more likely that facility level variance 
could simply not be calculated. Therefore, while the inability of the manager scale 
to predict supervisor safety climate led to a mediation model not being supported, 
there is a possibility that with a larger sample size the mediation model would have 
been supported, reflecting the findings of Zohar and Luria (2005).  
The suboptimal sample size at the aggregate level is not a unique limitation of the 
current study. For example, Cooper and Phillips (2004) had a sample size of six, 
Johnson (2007) had 17, Neal and Griffin had 33, and Mearns, Whitaker, and Flin 
(2001) had nine. Getting a large number of organisations to agree to administer the 
same safety climate survey over a number of years is a gargantuan task, and 
possibly explains the lack of multilevel path analyses in the literature. One positive 
outcome of the current study is that analyses at the facility level assessing mid-level 
management appear to be analogous to organisational level analyses assessing 
upper management, in terms of the relationship with supervisor safety climate and 
safety outcomes. Hence, even if a researcher has access to only one large 
organisation, being able to examine cross-level effects that include manager 
commitment to safety is still possible. Overall, while the small sample size is a 
definite limitation, it is a limitation shared by most research in the literature where 
an attempt is made to aggregate data in order to perform more methodologically 
rigorous analyses.  
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10.4.2 Quality of Outcome Variables 
Another serious limitation of the study was the quality of the outcome variables, 
which consisted of self-reported injury data. Self-reported data was used in the 
current study since the organisation did not collect group level injury data, and 
individual injury data was not sought since the survey was designed to protect 
employee anonymity. The primary problem with self-report data for both predictor 
and criterion variables is that common method variance may explain the pattern of 
relationships between variables (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003; 
Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Employees may form illusory correlations between the 
two self-report measures, where they possess assumptions concerning the co-
occurrence of items resulting in the systematic distortion of correlations (Berman & 
Kenny, 1976). Social desirability and negative affectivity can also alter how 
participants respond, masking true relationships (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The fact 
that there were significant associations with self-reported near misses, which have 
subjective perceptual characteristics, may therefore be a product of common 
method biases rather than an actual relationship.  
Self-reported data is relatively common in the safety climate literature, with a meta-
analysis by Christian and colleagues (2009) finding that 92% of studies used self-
reported data when safety climate was operationalized at the individual level, and 
32% used self-reported data when safety climate was aggregated to the group level. 
Christian and colleagues also found that it did not lead to inflated associations; 
instead they cautiously suggested that self-reported data has a tendency to 
suppress the relationships between variables.  In a recent review, Spector (2006) 
suggests that the threat of common method variance has been distorted and 
exaggerated over time, becoming a methodological ‘urban legend’. While Spector 
notes that biases do exist in research, he states that there is little evidence of 
variables such as social desirability or negative affectivity influencing associations. 
Spector referred to the comprehensive review of Cramptom and Wagner (1994), 
who compared the strength of correlations in 581 articles. They found that studies 
which utilise one source of data (e.g. self-reported surveys) were not significantly 
different in terms of correlation strength compared to studies which utilised 
General Discussion                 197 
 
multiple sources of data in the majority (62.2%) of cases. Overall, Spector argues 
that common method variance is not a universal inflator of correlations, but 
appears to only affect a small number of variables and only some of the time. My 
own analyses found no evidence of an inflationary effect when comparing self-
reported to official organisational injury data. The associations between manager 
safety climate and official injury data was stronger than manager safety climate and 
self-reported injury data, suggesting an attenuating effect of self-reported data if 
anything. Therefore, due to the weight of previous research findings, coupled with 
my own findings, the threat of common method variance, while it cannot be 
completely dismissed, is minimal.  
10.4.3 Possible Confounding Variables 
There are a number of variables that were not measured which may have affected 
the pattern of relationships between safety climate and safety outcomes. As 
previously stated, negative affectivity and social desirability can distort correlations, 
prompting Neal and Griffin (2006) to control for negative affectivity in their 
analyses. However, Neal and Griffin stated that by controlling for negative 
affectivity, there was the possibility that true relationships may have been masked 
since negativity affectivity may be a source of stability in climate perceptions and 
behaviour over time.  
A potentially more important variable not controlled for in the current study was 
risk. In a large organisation such as the one studied, there would be some 
employees involved in risky work (e.g. maintenance in offshore platforms) and 
some employees in relatively risk free work (e.g. office based personnel). It is 
unknown how the different exposure to risk may have masked or attenuated the 
results. Some exploratory analyses were conducted to determine if removing 
employees from office roles would strengthen associations, and this was not the 
case. This may be because a number of office based employees make regular visits 
to worksites offshore.  Even in the same workgroup, employees may experience 
different exposure to risks due to different conditions (Zohar, 2000), and so an 
individual item measuring the perception of risk may have provided a clearer 
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picture on the relationship safety climate has with safety outcomes. The lack of 
assessment of risk may not have confounded results however. Zohar (2000) 
assessed level of risk in his study and found it did not predict injury, suggesting that 
unsafe behaviour was far more important than unsafe conditions in the prediction 
of injury.  
While measuring these additional variables may have provided more defensible 
conclusions, the downside of including additional scales is that it places a higher 
burden on the employee. While Neal and Griffin’s (2006) scales were only a few 
items in length, the safety climate survey used in the current study had in excess of 
50 items, and included additional open-ended questions. Research has shown that 
as survey length increases, respondents are less likely to finish the survey, and 
spend less time on the questions and provide more uniform answers to questions 
later in the survey (Galesic & Bosnjak, 2009). Hence, while there may have been 
advantages for including additional items, there is the possibility of an overall 
reduction in the quality of data collected.  
 
10.5 Future Directions for Research 
10.5.1 Future Directions for Perceived/Psychological Safety Climate 
Before I outline possible future directions for the perceived/psychological safety 
climate literature, it must be noted that these conclusion are based on findings 
from one organisation, using one instrument, and in one context. In addition, 
significant associations were only found between safety climate and self-reported 
near misses, with no significant association demonstrated with self-reported 
injuries. Hence, there is a need for these findings to be replicated before any firm 
conclusions can be made. However, despite these obvious limitations, in the 
forthcoming section I will describe the manner I believe the construct of 
perceived/psychological safety climate can progress conceptually and empirically, 
based on the current research findings.  
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As the results of individual and aggregate level safety climate comparisons suggest, 
safety climate assessed at the individual level is a distinct construct to safety climate 
assessed at the aggregate level, reflecting the research of Kuenzi and Schmidt 
(2009). Since patterns of results at the individual level do not appear to hold at the 
aggregate level, the findings of authors who operationalize at the individual level 
are likely not generalizable to findings at the aggregate level. The findings therefore 
suggest that researchers and journal editors need to be vigilant in how safety 
climate is named and operationalized, so as to promote the conceptual 
development of the constructs and to avoid the ambiguity that plagued the 
organisational climate literature. 
 Research and theory such as Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate support 
the notion that safety climate exists solely at the aggregate level. This is because 
perceptions of safety climate tend to be shared among workgroups/organisations; 
with individuals having similar perceptions of the priority safety is afforded by 
supervisors/managers (Oliver, Tomas, & Cheyne, 2006; Pousette, Larsson, Torner, 
2008). The shared nature of climate perceptions therefore make traditional 
individual level analytical techniques flawed since they violate the assumption of 
independence of observations (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998). Though such 
methodological and theoretical arguments suggest that safety climate research at 
the individual level should be discontinued, this is not necessarily the case. In order 
for individually operationalized safety climate research to continue and prosper, it is 
proposed that two criteria need to be met.  
1. It needs to be placed within a conceptual model distinct from aggregate safety 
climate theory which clearly outlines what it is (e.g. definition, dimensionality), 
what causes it, and how it affects other variables of interest. 
2.  Despite it being an individual level variable, multi-level corrections should be 
utilised to ensure that group/organisational homogeneity in perceptions does not 
confound results.  
The first aspect of promoting the development of a coherent individual level safety 
climate research is in the choice of its name. A number of names have been 
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mentioned in the literature to date, for example psychological safety climate 
(Christian et al., 2009), which borrows its name from a similar distinction between 
individual and aggregate perceptions in the organisational climate literature, and 
perceived safety climate (Neal & Griffin, 2006).  For the sake of parsimony and the 
reduction of ambiguity, it is best for researchers to stick with one name.  Though 
the term psychological safety climate makes a lot of intuitive sense due to its 
previously mentioned links to the organisational climate literature from which 
safety climate was derived from, there is one foreseeable disadvantage. Another 
facet specific climate emerging from the organisational climate literature has been 
psychosocial safety climate, which refers to an organisation’s commitment to 
promoting the psychological wellbeing of its employees (Law, Dollard, Tuckey, & 
Dormann, 2011). Though its definition alone is enough to promote confusion with 
psychological safety climate, some authors in the psychosocial safety climate 
literature interchangeably use the term psychological safety climate to describe the 
construct (e.g. Bradley, Postlethwaite, Klotz, Hamdani, & Brown, 2012). Given 
climate’s rich history of ambiguity and the misnaming of constructs, the use of the 
term psychological safety climate is potentially ambiguous.  There is no such similar 
potential for confusion with the term perceived safety climate, with no similar 
named terms and a name which clearly refers to safety climate, rather than another 
of the facet specific climates.  
Secondly, there needs to be a generally agreed upon definition of the construct. For 
safety climate, it is generally agreed that it consists of shared perceptions of 
commitment/priority of safety in the workplace (Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Johnson, 
2007; Huang et al., 2007; Neitzel et al., 2008; Newman et al., 2008; Vinodkumar & 
Bhasi, 2009).  Since perceived safety climate is a distinct construct from safety 
climate, its definition needs to differentiate itself from safety climate in order to 
reduce ambiguity. Neal and Griffin (pp. 946-947) defined perceived safety climate as 
“individual perceptions of policies, procedures, and practices relating to safety in 
the workplace”. Christian and colleagues, drawing on the work of a number of other 
authors (James & James, 1989; James, Hater, Gent, & Bruni, 1978; James & Sells, 
1981) defined perceived safety climate as “individual perceptions of safety-related 
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policies, practices, and procedures pertaining to safety matters that affect personal 
well-being at work” (p. 1106). Such definitions are a good starting place in 
describing the construct, given that they point to perceptions of policies, practices 
and procedures, allowing links to Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate, where 
safety’s priority is ascertained through perceptions of enacted policies, practices, 
and procedures (Zohar & Luria, 2005).  The definitions also clearly state that it 
consists of individual perceptions, clearly delineating it from safety climate which 
consists of shared perceptions that exist at an aggregate level. Christian and 
colleagues then go on to state that perceived safety climate is driven by an 
emotional evaluation of the work environment; however such a conceptualisation 
of the construct may promote ambiguity, given that emotion and evaluation are 
considered aspects of attitudes (Jones & James, 1979). In comparison, climate is 
generally of a descriptive and cognitive nature, regardless of whether organisational 
climate or safety climate is the construct of interest (James & Jones; Zohar & Luria, 
2004). Hence, the descriptive and cognitive nature of perceived safety climate 
should be stressed in any conceptualisation of the construct. Guldenmund (2000) 
notes that recent conceptualisations of attitudes emphasise a cognitive component, 
however to reduce ambiguity, perceived safety climate should be operationalized 
solely through perceptions. While perceived safety climate perceptions may be 
subjective and biased (Ostroff & Bowen, 2000), focusing on perceptions rather than 
attitudes has a number of advantages. Firstly, it’s conceptually congruent with the 
safety climate literature, with most authors specifying the perceptual nature of 
safety climate (e.g. Zohar, 1980; Brown & Holmes, 1986; Glennon, 1982; Niskanen, 
1994; Neal & Griffin, 2006; Oliver, Tomas, & Cheyne, 2006; Hahn & Murphy, 2008). 
Secondly, it prevents a definitional ‘creep’ occurring. A non-specific 
conceptualisation of the construct may result in perceived safety climate 
encountering similar problems to organisational climate, where there was confusion 
over the differences with organisational culture and the conceptual boundaries of 
the construct.  Lastly, research has progressively supported the distinctiveness of 
attitudes and safety climate (Beus et al., 2010; Pousette et al., 2008), and so there is 
little conceptual or empirical support for the addition of attitudes in any 
conceptualisation of perceived safety climate.  
202             General Discussion  
 
 
What may also promote the conceptual development of safety climate is if its 
definition specifies what the targets of perceptions are. Perceived safety climate 
should not simply be a non-aggregated form of safety climate, given that the target 
of perceptions, and therefore the dimensionality of the scales, differs between the 
levels of analysis. While the perceptions can relate to enacted policies, procedures 
and practices, in safety climate the target of these perceptions are either 
supervisors or managers, with data aggregated to reflect the innate dependency of 
perceptions directed towards these levels of the organisation. In a scale assessing 
perceived safety climate, I suggest that it is not necessary to assess supervisor or 
management commitment to safety, not only because the perceptions exist at an 
aggregate level, but because perceptions of co-workers appear to be a far more 
proximal predictor of safety outcomes at the individual level. Hence, if a perceived 
safety climate definition specified that co-workers are the target of perceptions, 
then this would be far more specific and promote less ambiguity in the 
operationalization of the construct compared to definitions that broadly refer to the 
workplace as the target of perceptions. Therefore, a revised definition of perceived 
safety climate is that it is individual level perceptions of co-worker commitment to 
safety, with commitment to safety expressed through enacted practices, policies, 
and procedures. Such a definition clearly informs the reader that perceived safety 
climate only exists at the individual level, that it consists of perceptions of fellow 
frontline employees, and that the behaviours assessed reflect enacted instead of 
formal policies, procedures, and practices. However, it should be noted that the 
definition does not inform what a ‘co-worker’ actually is. In the analyses, 
perceptions of co-workers at the group or facility level were not related to safety 
outcomes. This suggested that there was no cohesive co-worker climate which 
affected individual behaviour-outcome expectancies. It is unknown whether 
individual co-worker perceptions are directed more generally at fellow employees 
in the same workgroup, in the same facility, or whether the most palpable events 
involving fellow employees in multiple areas lead to the formation of these 
perceptions. The original competency framework the scale was based on referred 
to the co-worker level as ‘everyone’, which may be an accurate description of the 
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target of employee perceptions despite my initial belief that these perceptions 
would be based solely on employees in the same workgroup. However, ‘everyone’ 
is a highly ambiguous term, and given items in the scale do appear to relate to 
similarly ranked employees (i.e. not supervisors or managers), I am still of the belief 
that ‘co-worker’ best describes the scale and the target of perceptions. Possibly, 
future research can more accurately ascertain the target/s of these individual, 
subjective perceptions of co-workers.  
 
Due to the conceptual links with safety climate, items in a perceived safety climate 
scale can relate to the behavioural domains of standards, involvement, and 
communication, otherwise known as active practices/safety compliance, proactive 
practices/safety participation, and declarative practices. This approach was used in 
the current study, and was effective in the prediction of safety outcomes. A 
secondary benefit of this approach is that a safety climate scale assessing 
perceptions of supervisors or managers needs only minor alterations for it to 
measure perceived safety climate. Additionally, it allows the researcher to 
investigate whether deficiencies in certain behavioural domains at higher levels of 
the organisation result in similar deficiencies at the lowest level of the organisation.  
 
To further outline this proposed conceptualisation of perceived safety climate, 
some discussion on what causes perceived safety climate perceptions, what the 
perceptions represent, and how they affect behaviour is warranted.  A detailed 
description in Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate is one of the primary 
strengths of his model, as it clearly defined the boundaries of the construct and 
made possible the testing of key components of his model. Based on the study’s 
path and mediation analyses, it appears that perceived safety climate is predicted 
by management and supervisor commitment to safety. For example, if supervisors 
and management reward speed over safety, it is likely that co-worker behaviour will 
reflect this priority. However, individual level variance was also very important, 
reflecting the fact that individual climate perceptions are affected by worldviews, 
perceptual biases, and previous experience (Ostroff & Bowen, 2000). Hence, while 
higher level climates affect the behaviour of frontline employees, which in turn 
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affect an employee’s perception of co-workers and thus their perceived safety 
climate, these perceptions are subjective in nature. In comparison, safety climate is 
a more pervasive group-level phenomena (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000) rooted in a 
more objective reality (Zohar, 2003).  
 
These perceived safety climate perceptions serve to inform the behaviour of an 
employee. If an employee perceives that co-workers generally treat safety as a low 
priority, they will be likely to act in a manner congruent with the perceived low 
priority of safety so as to adhere to the behavioural norms present. The following 
three steps describe the process by which safety climate and perceived safety 
climate lead to safety outcomes:  
1. Co-worker behaviours are influenced by safety climates emerging from higher 
levels of the organisation. 
2. These behaviours of co-workers are subjectively interpreted by individual 
employees, resulting in an understanding of “the way we do things around here” 
[perceived safety climate].   
3. This subjective interpretation acts as a motivational driver, directing individual 
behaviour and thus the likelihood of becoming injured. 
 
While there are other possible interpretations for the co-worker results, for 
example co-worker perceptions acting as a proxy for individual behaviour, there is 
no direct evidence for such speculation and so it will not be part of this proposed 
conceptualisation of the construct. Hence, in this description of the construct there 
are not many deviations to existing perceived safety climate theory. The main 
change to theory is in the focus of perceptions being on co-workers, rather than the 
workplace in general, therefore distinguishing perceived safety climate from 
aggregated safety climate.  
 
The final suggestion to improve the perceived safety climate literature is that 
multilevel corrections should be implemented to analyses to control for any 
dependency in perceptions at higher levels. While perceived safety climate is an 
individual level variable, due to the shared nature of experiences in the 
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organisational setting it cannot be said there is complete independence of 
observations. In the current study it was found that controlling for higher level 
variance resulted in slightly lower regression coefficients and higher standard error. 
While the results were more conservative, co-worker safety climate still managed 
significant associations with self-reported near misses, indicating that controlling for 
higher level variance does not suddenly invalidate the construct. By controlling for 
higher level variance it eliminates the possibility that higher level effects were the 
cause of any associations, resulting in more defensible conclusions.  
 
Currently in the literature, perceived safety climate is the methodologically unsound 
sibling of safety climate, the apparent progeny of safety climate research in which 
aggregation was not possible and where the results may be confounded by the 
innate dependency in perceptions. Rather than suggesting the abandonment of the 
construct, my proposed conceptualisation suggests that research can flourish if 
certain conceptual and methodological changes are made to distinguish it from 
safety climate and improve the defensibility of conclusions. By focusing on co-
workers, ambiguity in the literature is reduced since previously perceived safety 
climate was assessed as simply a non-aggregated, dimensionally equivalent form of 
safety climate. Such an approach was found to be untenable in the current study, 
since the pattern of relationships at the individual level were found to be different 
at the aggregate level. By focusing on these subjective perceptions of co-worker 
commitment to safety, and by correcting for higher level variance, the construct’s 
role as a mediating variable between safety climate and safety outcomes represents 
an important avenue of future research.  
 
10.5.2 Other Areas for Future Research 
The current study provided support for Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate 
and additionally suggested that individual perceptions of co-workers mediate the 
relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes. However, as previously 
stated, some of the findings lack credibility due to the previously mentioned 
limitations, and so my proposed extension to Zohar’s model requires replication 
206             General Discussion  
 
before it can be seriously considered. Analyses involving the manager scale were 
the most inconclusive due to the small facility level sample size, and so the pattern 
of relationships that manager safety climate has with co-worker safety climate will 
need to be investigated. It is possible that with a larger facility level sample size, the 
associations that co-worker safety climate has with safety outcomes may diminish 
or disappear, with higher level variance being more important in the prediction of 
injury. Therefore, only through the replication of the analyses will it be known 
whether perceived safety climate deserves a place as a distinct predictor of safety 
outcomes. Preferably, this replication will involve better quality outcome variables, 
since only self-reported safety outcomes were available in the current study. No 
associations were found between safety climate and self-reported injuries/minor 
injuries, and so it is possible that the significant associations with self-reported near 
misses were not due to it being the most frequently occurring safety outcome, but 
because of common-method variance. Only through replication with objective 
injury data will this possibility be ruled out. Secondly, the analyses suggesting an 
extension to Zohar’s model to include perceived safety climate were all conducted 
using a cross-sectional design due to an insufficient number of respondents 
completing the individual data linking item. This increases the possibility of common 
method variance confounding results and does not reveal whether perceptions of 
co-workers predict injury, or whether experience of injury predicts perceptions or 
co-workers.  
Multilevel analyses examining the cross-level effects of safety climate also need to 
be conducted in a diverse range of industries to examine whether this affects the 
pattern of results involving supervisors and co-workers. While previous multilevel 
studies have not examined the role of co-workers, they have been performed in 
industries which are highly supervised, such as manufacturing, and so the strong 
associations found between supervisor safety climate and safety outcomes are not 
surprising. The current study was conducted in similarly highly supervised 
environment, potentially explaining the proximal supervisor influence on group 
safety outcomes and the comparative lack of associations between group-level co-
worker safety climate and safety outcomes. While Newman and colleagues 
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demonstrated that supervisors do not need to be closely observing behaviour and 
rewarding/punishing employees for them to be influential, their study was 
conducted in the driving context, with driving primarily an individual activity with 
less opportunity for co-worker behavioural modelling compared to other industries. 
Therefore, there needs to be further investigation in industries which are less highly 
supervised to determine if co-worker perceptions at the group level are a stronger 
predictor of safety outcomes. For example, Turner and colleagues found that co-
workers were the most salient social force in promoting safety in demanding 
conditions compared to supervisors and managers in the railway maintenance 
context. The authors suggested that this was due to the less formal presence of 
supervisors in the industry compared to the more proximal and numerous co-
workers. While the analyses were all conducted on the individual level and did not 
acknowledge the dependency in perceptions, future multilevel analyses in a similar 
industry may provide the same pattern of results. Similarly, the healthcare industry 
may be another environment in which co-workers are more influential. Research 
has shown that nurses are highly autonomous in their work (Bahadori & Fitzpatrick, 
2009), and so it is possible that co-worker based group norms are more influential 
than supervisors or managers. This may especially be the case among nurse 
assistants, who operate with little direct supervision (Joel, 2006).  
Further research needs to determine whether the association between safety 
climate and safety outcomes is mediated by individual level variables such as 
knowledge and motivation. While Zohar does not explicitly include such variables in 
his studies, a number of other researchers believe that safety climate indirectly 
affects safety outcomes (Neal & Griffin, 2006; Flin, 2007; Christian et al., 2009). It is 
difficult to draw conclusions about these disparate findings due to large differences 
in the operationalization of safety climate between the studies, however Flin 
suggests that the two perspectives are compatible since the behaviour-outcome 
expectancies referred to (yet not measured) in Zohar’s model serve as an individual 
motivator.   Though the current study was not able to reconcile these perspectives 
since safety motivation was not assessed, what it did find was that a different 
individual variable, perceived safety climate, mediated the relationship between 
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safety climate and safety outcomes. Like safety motivation, it is possible that these 
subjective perceptions of co-workers serve a motivational role, with employees who 
perceive that co-workers prioritise safety more motivated to act in a similar 
manner. It remains to be seen whether perceived safety climate and individual 
motivation are generally tapping into the same construct, or whether they each 
represent a distinct step in the safety climate to injury relationship. Hence, further 
research is required to examine whether safety motivation acts as mediator, 
preferably with a behaviour-based and multilevel operationalization of safety 
climate so that methodological factors can be ruled out as the cause of the 
conflicting results between these two perspectives.  
 
10.6 Proposed Safety Climate Model  
Based on the findings of the current study, an extended version of Zohar’s safety 
climate model is proposed (See Figure 18). This model combines safety climate and 
perceived safety climate into the one model through the inclusion of individual level 
perceptions of co-worker commitment to safety.  
 
Figure 18.  Proposed Safety Climate Model.  
Co-worker 
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Most aspects of this model have been previously discussed, and so will not be 
repeated in great detail. The organisational and group levels of the model remain 
the same as Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate; climate perceptions stem 
from management and their enacted policies, practices and procedures. This was 
demonstrated in the current study by the strong associations between 
management safety climate and lower levels of climate in the path analyses. While 
sample size problems, particularly when multilevel analyses were conducted, 
prevented firm conclusions being made, a large body of research supports this 
central role of management as the origin of climate and culture (Hofstede et al., 
1993; Flin, Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2005; Zohar, 2003; 
Arboleda, Morrow, Crum, & Shelley, 2003). Hence, in the model there is a path from 
manager safety climate to supervisor safety climate and co-worker safety climate.  
 Given that policies and procedures do not cover every eventuality, supervisory 
discretion results in a separate group level safety climate, as per Zohar’s model. 
Supervisors directly predict group level safety outcomes, mediating the relationship 
between manager safety climate and group level safety outcomes. This is due to 
proximity of supervisors in comparison to managers, which provides them the 
opportunity to punish and reward behaviour and therefore be a more influential 
source of behaviour-outcome expectancies. This was demonstrated in the current 
study by the predictive validity of the supervisor scale at the group level, and the 
path analysis results. The path analyses reflected the findings of Zohar and Luria, in 
that the model in which manager safety climate directly predicted the self-reported 
incident frequency factor displayed poorer fit indices compared to the model in 
which this path was removed. Though the multilevel mediation analyses did not 
support this relationship, they did find that supervisor safety climate predicted 
safety outcomes, and that the relationship between manager safety climate and 
safety outcomes became non-significant when supervisor safety climate was 
included. It is likely that an inadequate sample size prevented the association 
between manager safety climate and supervisor safety climate from being correctly 
estimated.  
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The aforementioned findings all reflected previous research and theory, and while 
they provided much needed support for some of Zohar’s non-replicated findings, 
they did not extend understanding of the construct. In comparison, the extension of 
Zohar’s model to include perceived safety climate may promote conceptual 
development of both safety climate and perceived safety climate. This extension 
was based on the finding that at the individual level the co-worker scale achieved 
the strongest associations with safety outcomes, even after controlling for higher 
level variance. This thesis further found that the relationship between group level 
supervisor safety climate and safety outcomes was mediated by individual level co-
worker safety climate, in other words, perceived safety climate. While previous 
research has assessed perceived safety climate through the same dimensions as 
safety climate, the stronger associations at the individual level suggested that co-
workers are a more suitable subject of individual level perceptions. Additionally, by 
not assessing perceptions of supervisors and managers at the individual level, 
future research will potentially be less ambiguous and more methodologically 
sound. What these findings suggested was that individual variance was important in 
the prediction of individual safety outcomes, with an individual’s subjective 
perceptions of the priority of safety among co-workers being the most proximal 
indicator of safety outcomes. Therefore, the model shows a direct path from 
perceived safety climate to individual safety outcomes, with employee’s behaviour 
reflecting the perceived norms of follow co-workers. If an employee’s behaviour 
reflects a perceived low priority of safety among co-workers then their likelihood of 
becoming injured increases, due to the majority of accidents resulting from human 
behaviour (Reason, 1990). The paths from manager and supervisor safety climate to 
perceived safety climate reflects frontline employee behaviour being the product of 
higher levels climates, which when combined with individual characteristics and 
experiences, results in the formation of an individual’s subjective perception of co-
workers which directs their own behaviour. These paths were partially supported by 
study findings, with the previously mentioned sample size and level of analysis 
problems producing some uncertainty. While the path analyses demonstrated 
strong associations between manager safety climate and co-worker safety climate, 
both dimensions were aggregated to a level inconsistent with the proposed model. 
General Discussion                 211 
 
When multilevel analyses were conducted, facility level variance was not able to be 
estimated, and therefore the addition of this link was on theoretical considerations 
rather than on empirical grounds. It is also possible that the path from manager 
safety climate to perceived safety climate is completely mediated by supervisor 
safety climate, a continuation of the multilevel cascade model described by Zohar 
and Luria. Multilevel analyses were able to establish a link between group level 
supervisor safety climate and perceived safety climate, however given that manager 
safety climate was not able to be adequately estimated, it is uncertain whether this 
path was necessary. However, given previous research which has demonstrated the 
proximal influence of supervisors on individual level safety outcomes (Zohar, 2000; 
Newman, Griffin, & Mason, 2008), it unlikely that perceived safety climate is solely 
the product of manager safety climate. Overall, this pattern of relationships 
between manager, supervisor, and co-worker safety climate represents the area of 
most ambiguity in the proposed model. While all attempts were made to unravel 
these cross-level effects, the inconsistency in results points to the need for future 
research to shed light on the antecedents of perceived safety climate. 
The final path is between individual level safety outcomes and group level safety 
outcomes. This path stems from the fact that an increased individual injury rate 
would also increase a group’s injury rate. Overall, depending on the level of safety 
outcomes, different levels of the organisation are the most proximal predictor. At 
the group level, the supervisor scale is the most proximal predictor, with facility 
level manager safety climate and group level co-worker climate demonstrating 
weaker associations. For individual level safety outcomes, individual perceptions of 
co-workers are the strongest predictor, reflecting the importance of individual 
characteristics in predicting individual safety outcomes. While some paths require 
further supporting evidence, the description of this extended conceptual model 
provides a starting point for future research to assess the relationship between 
safety climate, perceived safety climate, and safety outcomes.  
 
10.7 Practical Implications 
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Possibly the most important implications to come from the study is in terms of 
research methodology. This has been discussed in detail previously, and so will only 
be briefly summarised. What the study found was that the pattern of relationships 
at the individual level are different to those at the aggregate level, providing strong 
evidence that perceived safety climate and safety climate are distinct constructs. 
This finding suggests that researchers and journal editors need to be more vigilant 
when it comes to the labelling of these constructs, as allowing individually 
operationalized (perceived) safety climate to be labelled safety climate promotes 
ambiguity in the literature. The analyses additionally found that regression 
coefficients tended to be larger and standard error smaller when the dependency in 
climate perceptions was not accounted for. Hence, to avoid an overestimation of 
the association between perceived safety climate and safety outcomes, multilevel 
corrections should be employed if possible. If the corrections are not possible, for 
example in organisations where group level identifiers are not available, then a 
more conservative p value should suffice.  
The findings also have a number of practical implications for organisations. In this 
study a multilevel safety climate survey was used in the oil and gas context, 
demonstrating overall good psychometric properties. While sample size was a 
problem in some analyses, the findings overall demonstrated that Zohar’s Multilevel 
Model of Safety Climate was applicable to the oil and gas industry. Since there are 
substantial differences in the context where Zohar tested his model and the current 
study, the findings suggest that the model is relatively robust, with the potential to 
be utilised in a wide range of industries. Given these findings and the significant 
methodological advantages of a multilevel survey, other organisations should have 
the confidence to utilise similar multilevel surveys in the diagnosis of potential 
safety problems. Unlike scales similar to Neal and Griffin’s (2006), in which only 
manager commitment to safety was assessed and no specific behaviours listed, in a 
multilevel behaviour based scale much more practicable information can be 
procured by the organisation. The scale can tell the organisation what specific 
behaviours are underperformed at what level of the organisation, which can form 
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the basis for future behaviour-based interventions (see Geller, 2005), or possibly 
changes to policies, procedures, or practices. 
Importantly, the findings showed that adhering to Zohar’s Multilevel Model of 
Safety Climate does not necessarily mean using his scales. The survey used in the 
current study assessed similar dimensions and used a similar itemisation, but was 
developed to be aligned with the specific organisational needs and context in mind. 
Therefore, other organisations can draw upon Zohar’s model in the development of 
safety climate surveys, and include context specific items to increase the sensitivity 
of the survey. By listing behaviours relating to active, proactive, and declarative 
practices, or as the current survey refers to as standards, involvement, and 
communication, other organisations can develop a relevant and practicable survey 
to assist in the reduction of injuries.  
The results additionally demonstrate the importance of not focusing on one level of 
the organisation when planning safety initiatives. Each level of the organisation was 
found to be important in different ways. Manager safety climate is regarded as the 
antecedent of lower level climates in the organisation (Hofstede et al., 1993; Flin, 
Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000), a view supported by the path models which 
showed strong associations between manager safety climate and supervisor/co-
worker safety climate. Supervisors are also deemed to be an important proximal 
influence on behaviour due to their ability to punish/reward behaviour, which was 
similarly supported by significant associations between supervisor safety climate 
and group level near misses the subsequent year. Finally, perceptions of co-workers 
appeared to be an important influence on the individual level, being the most 
proximal predictor of individual level self-reported near misses. Therefore, the 
study has shown that organisations should take a holistic approach to the 
prevention of injury by targeting behaviours at all levels of the organisation. This 
view is echoed by Turner and colleagues (2010, p. 489) , who states that “…focusing 
on one source of safety-related support (e.g., supervisors, senior management) may 
not be capturing the full range of sources of supports available, and that these 
social influences have the possibility of reinforcing one another under varying job 
conditions”. Turner and colleagues found that co-worker support was not influential 
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when job demands were low; however in demanding conditions they had a larger 
role in preventing hazardous work events compared to supervisors or managers. 
Hence, certain contexts and job conditions can interact with different levels of the 
organisation in the prediction of injury, and so adhering to a multilevel perspective 
of injury prevention will likely lead to the best outcomes for employees. 
 
10.8 Conclusion 
In this thesis, an attempt was made to replicate and extend upon Zohar’s Multilevel 
Model of Safety Climate, thereby providing insight into the lagged and cross-level 
relationships safety climate has with safety outcomes. Additionally, given the 
substantial methodological differences apparent among studies in the literature, 
the effect of level-of-analysis and analytical technique were investigated. While the 
thesis was ironically not immune to methodological deficiencies of its own, with 
sample size related problems preventing a true longitudinal design and clear-cut 
conclusions to be made from facility level analyses, the results generally supported 
Zohar’s model. This importantly suggested that the model generalised beyond the 
manufacturing context wherein it was tested, and could be applied to the Australian 
oil and gas context. 
The thesis also importantly suggested that Zohar’s model could be extended to 
include perceptions of co-worker commitment to safety, though not at the group 
level as originally envisioned. Multilevel analyses demonstrated that at the 
individual level, perceptions of co-workers were the strongest predictor of 
individual safety outcomes, and were more proximal than group level perceptions 
of supervisor commitment to safety. This finding demonstrated that individual level 
climate perceptions (i.e. perceived safety climate) display a different pattern of 
results as compared to aggregated safety climate perceptions. The finding thereby 
provides a strong case for the two constructs to be considered conceptually distinct, 
rather than the same construct assessed at different levels of analysis. An attempt 
was made to separately define and conceptualise perceived safety climate to clarify 
its distinctiveness from safety climate, in the hope that the ambiguity which befell 
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the organisational climate literature does not similarly impede the conceptual 
development of safety climate. Therefore, despite the limitations of some of the 
analyses, this thesis has contributed to the literature by providing evidence of 
perceived safety climate being a separate level in Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety 
Climate. Replications of these findings are required to cement perceived safety 
climate’s place as an important, distinct predictor of safety outcomes.  
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Appendix A 
Additional Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results 
 
 
Figure A1. Measurement Model for Co-worker Scale. 
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Table A1 
Comparison of Models using Robust Fit Statistics (Year 2) 
 
Model S-B χ2 
 
df S-B χ2 
/df 
CFI NNFI RMSEA AIC 
 
Cut-off Criteria   < 3 = / >.85 = / >.85 = / <.08 * 
 
Co-Worker Scale 
       
    Four Factor          
    Uncorrelated 
1726.92 135 12.79 .67 .63 .14 1456.95 
    One Factor 869.10 153 5.68 .85 .83 .09 599.10 
    Four Factor Correlated 450.55 129 3.49 .93 .92 .06 192.55 
Supervisor Scale        
    Four Factor 
    Uncorrelated 
2013.06 135 14.91 .64 .60 .15 1743.06 
    One Factor 541.82 135 4.01 .92 .91 .07 271.82 
    Four Factor Correlated 369.39 129 2.86 .96 .95 .06 107.39 
Manager Scale        
    Four Factor 
    Uncorrelated 
2447.46 209 11.71 .72 .69 .13 2029.46 
    One Factor 778.45 209 3.72 .93 .92 .07 360.45 
    Four Factor Correlated 601.20 203 2.96 .95 .94 .06 195.21 
Note: S-Bχ
2
= Satorra-Bentler Chi-square statistic, S-Bχ
2 
/df = Satorra-Bentler chi-square divided by 
degrees of freedom, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, NNFI = Non-normed Fit Index, RMSEA = Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation, AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion, * = a lower AIC indicates a 
better fit.  
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Table A2 
Comparison of Models to test Participant’s Differentiation of Scales 
 
Model S-B χ2 
 
df S-B χ2 
/df 
CFI NNFI RMSEA AIC 
 
Cut-off Criteria   < 3 = / >.85 = / >.85 = / <.08 * 
    One Factor 1438.32 54 26.64 .74 .68 .19 1330.32 
    Three Factor 174.59 51 3.4 .98 .97 .06 72.59 
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Appendix B 
Facility-Level Co-worker Scale Results 
 
 
Table A3 
 
Cross-sectional Multilevel Logistic Regression Analyses between Co-worker Safety 
Climate and Injury  
 
 Near Miss Estimate 
(SE) 
p 
Value 
Injury Estimate 
(SE) 
p 
Value 
Co-worker Scale -1.074 (0.809) 0.184 0.652 (0.555) 0.240 
       Standards -0.742 (0.772) 0.336 0.700 (0.478) 0.143 
       Communication -0.986 (0.889) 0.267 0.453 (0.652) 0.488 
       Risk 
Management               
-0.896 (0.817) 0.273 0.716 (0.506) 0.158 
       Involvement -1.392 (0.690) 0.044* 0.512 (0.544) 0.346 
*p < 0.05 
 
 
Table A4 
 
Spearman’s Rho Correlations between Co-worker Safety Climate and Self-reported 
Safety Outcomes (N = 9) 
 
 
 
Near Miss 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
 
p 
Value 
Injury Correlation 
Coefficient 
 
p 
Value 
Co-worker Scale 0.033 0.466 -0.150 0.350 
Standards -0.150 0.350 -0.267 0.244 
Communication -0.117 0.383 -0.200 0.303 
Risk 
Management 
0.067 0.432 -0.083 0.416 
Involvement 0.217 0.288 0.033 0.466 
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Table A5 
 
Spearman’s Rho Correlations between Co-worker Safety Climate and Official Injury 
Statistics (N = 8) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Minor Injury 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
 
p 
Value 
Injury Correlation 
Coefficient 
 
p 
Value 
Co-worker Scale 0.167 0.347 0.381 0.176 
Standards 0.238 0.285 0.190 0.326 
Communication 0.167 0.347 -0.048 0.455 
Risk 
Management 
-0.167 0.347 0.524 0.091 
Involvement 0.619 0.051 0.619 0.051 
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Appendix C 
 
Self-Reported and Official Injury Statistics Comparisons 
 
Table A6 
Comparisons between Self-Reported and Official Injury Statistics for each Facility in 
the Organisation (Year 2) 
 Minor Injury 
Mean (SR) 
Minor Injury 
Mean (O) 
Injury Mean 
(SR) 
Injury Mean 
(O) 
Facility 1 .60 .170 .04 .010 
Facility 2 .69 .108 .08 .031 
Facility 3 .41 .117 .04 .017 
Facility 4 .17 - .0 - 
Facility 5 .57 .114 .17 .038 
Facility 6 2.40 .295 .47 .067 
Facility 7 .52 .149 .09 .014 
Facility 8 1.24 .135 .21 .014 
Facility 9 .23 .004 .05 .0 
SR = Self-Reported, O = Official data 
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Appendix D 
 
Distributions of Outcome Variables 
 
Figure A2.  Frequency of Near Misses Reported at the Group Level (N = 49). 
 
Figure A3.  Frequency of Injuries Reported at the Group Level (N = 49).  
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Figure A4.  Frequency of Near Misses Reported at the Facility (N =9) 
 
Figure A5.  Frequency of Injuries Reported at the Facility Level (N = 9) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix E 
 
Annotated Printout of Mediation Analysis Performed in MlwiN 
 
 
 
 
Variance at Facility Level 
Variance at Workgroup Level 
Supervisor Safety Climate Regression 
Coefficient 
Manager Safety Climate Regression 
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p
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